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Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins1 made clear that state courts 
may definitively interpret state constitutions to grant greater individual 
rights than the United States Constitution provides and to prevent 
interference with rights that ordinarily would not give rise to any claim 
under federal law.2 Nonetheless, the specific issue that underlay 
PruneYard - whether state constitutions may be interpreted to protect 
rights from infringement by private actors who are not subject to restraint 
under current federal constitutional law - remains controversial.3 
1. 447 U.S. 74 (1980), affg Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 
5 92 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979). See infra notes 50- 53 and accompanying text. 
2. Admittedly, even to speak of constitutional "rights" or "guarantees" against 
private action inevitably prejudges the point i n  issue: whether general constitutional 
"rights" against private parties exist. However, in the absence of a more acceptable 
locution, those terms are used in this article as abbreviations for those interests and values 
generally acknowledged to be constitutionally protected from unreasonable government 
interference, and that perhaps should be constitutionally protected from certain private 
interferences. 
3. For many years academic discussion has focused on the issues of integrating private 
non-governmental power into the legal scheme and protecting individual rights from 
infringement by those who wield such power. See, e.g., Berle, Constitutional Limitations on 
Corporate Activity - Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic 
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 942-53 (1952); Miller, The Constitutional Law of the 
"Security State," 10 STAN. L. REV. 620 (1958); To briner & Grodin, The Individual and 
the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1253 & 
n.29 (1967). At the outset of the current upsurge of interest in state constitutions, 
com��ntators su�gested that state declarations of rights can resolve these issues by 
prov1dmg a set of liberty enhancing norms applicable to non-governmental actors as well as 
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The "state action " limitation on the scope of federal constitutional 
rights posits an "essential dichotomy ... between deprivations by the 
State, subject to scrutiny under [the Constitution], and private conduct, 
'however discriminatory and wrongful' against which the federal Constitu­
tion generally offers no shield."  Rooted in both a general view of the role of 
constitutions and the particular language of the federal Constitution, the 
state action doctrine is a generalized limitation on virtually all federal 
governmental infringers. See, e.g., Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 4 5  WASH. L. 
REV. 454, 473-74 (1970). As the state action debate continues in the wake of Prune Yard, 
some academic attention is still focused on the possibilities afforded by such state 
declarations in general. See, e.g., Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State Action" 
Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221 (1985); 
see also Developments in the Law - Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 
76 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1963) [hereinafter Developments]. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the basic issues at stake, however, most recent 
commentaries touched upon these questions only in the context of a single factual setting or 
a particular state constitutional provision. Furthermore, except for articles discussing free 
speech issues, the treatment of state action under state constitutions has been brief. See, 
e.g., R. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 127-42 (1988); 
Berdon, Protecting Liberty and Property Under the Connecticut and Federal Constitu­
tions: The Due Process Clauses, 15 CONN. L. REV. 4 1, 5 3-54 (1982) (Connecticut due 
process clause applies only to state action); Dolliver, The Washington Constitution and 
"State Action:" The View of the Framers, 22  WILLAMETTE L. REV. 445 (1986) (speech on 
private property); Heins, "The Marketplace and the World of Ideas:" A Substitute for 
State Action as a Limiting Principle Under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment, 
18 SUF.FOLK L. REV. 347 (1984) (state equal rights amendment); Ragosta, Free Speech 
Access to Shopping Malls Under State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 31 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1986) (public free speech rights in shopping centers); Note, The 
Constitutionality of New York's Garageman's Lien: A "Flexible" State Action Concept 
Under the State Due Process Clause, 43 ALB. L. REV. 121 (1978) [hereinafter Note, 
"Flexible" State Action] (due process); Note, Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum-State 
Action, Strict Scrutiny, and the "New Judicial Federalism," 41 Mo. L. REV. 1219, 1221-
27, 1240-46 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Burning Tree] (equal rights amendment); Nate, Sex 
Discrimination and State Constitutions: State Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks, 
13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115, 122-26 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Pathways] 
(gender discrimination); Comment, Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must ProP_erty 
Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1989) (speech on pnvate 
property). 
. As this article goes to press, however, two articles have appeared that treat these issues 
m depth and reach conclusions similar to those advocated here. Cole, Federal and State 
"State Action:" The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized D octrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 
327 (1990); Friesen, Should California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights 
Apply Ag ainst Private Actors?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111 (1990). 
4. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (197�) (qu�t�ng Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). Although these cases involved claims ansmg under �he 
fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court applied the same approach to state action 
questions regardless of the underlying substantive right at is�ue:.�ee, e:g., Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (198 2) (engaging in a single "state action inquiry for first, fifth and 
fourteenth amendment claims). 
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constitutional rights.11 While scholars debate whether the federal concept 
of state action is "unitary" or whether its precise contours depend on the 
specific rights involved,6 it is clear that private parties are ordinarily 
subject to federal constitutional restraint only if they are directly influ­
enced by, act in concert with, or stand in place of some government act or 
official. To be sure, federal and state statutes and common law limit private 
actions to some extent.7 But, because of state action restrictions on the 
federal Constitution, most non-governmental entities - even those which 
may own property invested with a public interest, provide services on which 
the public depends or otherwise wield significant de facto power over 
individuals - are permitted much greater leeway to impinge upon the 
federal constitutional rights of others than would be permitted for 
government agencies engaged in similar activities.8 
However, as PruneYard indicated, analysis need not end with the 
federal Constitution. During the last dozen years, many state courts have 
considered whether state constitutional rights guarantees should be 
construed to limit infringements by private actors. The decisions are 
5. The thirteenth amendment is an exception to this rule since the amendment and its 
enabling statutes apply to purely private as well as government actions. Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 437-39 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
6. Compare L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 1688-98 (2d ed. 1988) and 
Glennon & Nowack, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" 
Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221 (federal state action decisions are not unitary; they 
mask a balancing of competing rights) with Leedes, State Action Limitations on Courls 
and Congressional Power, 60 N.C.L. REv. 747, 751-52 ( 1982) (state action is a unitary and 
necessary limit on judicial and congressional power). 
7. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1988), which 
prohibits, inter alia, private discrimination in housing, education and employment. Some 
states also have passed civil rights statutes that do not require any showing of state action. 
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ l lH-111(West 1986). Other statutes protect 
rights from private infringement in specific circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CooE § 
1152 (West 1989) (guaranteeing labor organizers access to private labor camps); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 211 B.20 (West Supp. 1990) (guaranteeing political candidates access to 
multiple dwellings). 
Some common law doctrines, such as the traditional procedural restrictions on the 
ability of lienors t o  seize property or the obligation of common carriers to serve all 
customers, also may be seen as promoting basic norms of equality and due process. Such 
common law has also been a source of protection for speech rights. See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 287, 277 A.2d 
369 (1971). Nevertheless, these statutes and doctrines do not cover all circumstances in 
which private actors may infringe basic rights. See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. 
Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1978). 
8. I.n recent years t.his disp��ity has become more obvious and problematic as corporation� and o�her pnvate entities have grown in size and power. Moreover, govern­ments have mcreasu�gly provided goods and services similar to those provided by private en�repreneurs.' and su�ultaneo.u�ly have "privatized" such activities as mail delivery and pnson operations, which trad1t1onally have been government responsibilities. 
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mixed: some state courts have applied their state charters to private entities 
that clearly would not satisfy any federal definition of state action;& others 
have construed similar provisions to apply only to state actors;10 while yet 
others followed a split approach, providing protection against quasi­
private infringeme nt of some rights but not others, 11 or have vacillated, 
alternately rejecting and embracing traditional state action limitations in 
cases raising similar legal a nd factual issues.12 
While some part of this divergence among states can b e  readily 
explained by obvious, well-documented and non-controversial differences 
in their respective constitutional texts, history or traditions, 13 in most cases 
these factors provide no clear answers. Absent clear textual or historical 
guidance, courts must decide whether other reasons or presumptions exist 
to counsel them in determining the applicability of ambiguous state 
constitutional provisions to arguably private infringers. The divergent 
state court decisions r eflect sharp divisions among those jurisdictions as to 
the interpretation and legitimate role of state constitutional rights 
guarantees. 
During the years surrounding Prune Yard, several state courts issued 
decisions either abandoning the state action requirement or interpreting 
the requirement broadly so as to apply their respective bills of rights to a 
range of private defendants, including shopping centers,14 universities,111 
insurance companies, 16 banks, 17 utilities, 18 private clubs19 and possessory 
9. California, New Jersey and Pennsylvania are the most prominent of states applying 
guarantees to private action. See infra notes 50-60, 127-29, 135-48, 170-72 & 190-92 and 
accompanying text. 
10. Connecticut and Michigan are among the most resistant. See infra notes 70-71, 
118, 166, and accompanying text. 
11. New York and Texas appear to follow a split approach. Compare infra text 
accompanying notes 64 & 83-85 (Texas takes a relatively expansive approach to speech 
guarantees) with infra text accompanying notes 119 & 123-25 (Texas continues to require 
some level of state action for equality guarantees). Compare infra text accompanying note 
72 (New York requires an ostensibly traditional degree of state action for speech claims) 
with infra text accompanying notes 178-89 (New York creates an expansive definition of 
state action for due process claims). 
12. Massachusetts and Washington illustrate this phenomenon. See infra text 
accompanying notes 61-62 & 76, respectively . 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 37-48, 98-110, 155-62, 203-05 & 218. 
14. E.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983); 
AlderwoodAssocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) 
(plurality opinion). 
15. E.g., State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455 
U.S.100(1982); Peperv. Princeton Univ. Bd. ofTrustees, 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1978); 
Commonwealth v Tate 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981). 
16. E.g., Ha;tford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 571, 482 
A.2d 542 (1984); Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 343 Pa. Super. 169, 494 A.2d 409 (1985). 
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l ienors.20 In the last several years, however, this trend has reversed. A 
majority of recent decisions have held, 21 and many commentators have 
argued,22 that state guarantees of individual rights do not apply to any 
significant number of potential infringers not already included within the 
federal definitions of state actors. Where courts have continued to reach 
expansive results, they have done so on narrow grounds, either adopting 
1 7. E.g., King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 1 6 1 ,  330 A.2d 1 ( 1 974). 
1 8. E.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1 4  ( 1 979). 
19. E.g., Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 8 1 7  ( 1 985). See 
also Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 1 97 Cal. App. 3d 884, 243 Cal. Rptr. 
1 68 ( 1988). 
20. E.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45  N.Y.2d 1 52, 379 N.E.2d 1 169, 408 
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1 978). 
21. E.g., Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 1 59 Ariz. 37 1 ,  767 P.2d 719 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Schreinerv. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983); 
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88, 378 N.W.2d 337 ( 1 985); Under 21 
v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 N.E.2d I, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 { 1 985); Western Pa. 
Socialist Workers 1 982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 5 1 2  Pa. 23, 5 15  A.2d 
1 3 3 1  (1 986); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3 Wash. 
2d 4 1 3, 780 P.2d 1 282 ( 1 989); Jacobs v. Major, 1 39 W is. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1 987). 
22. See, e.g., Dolliver, supra note 3; Ragosta, supra note 3 .  See also Simon, 
Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of Expres­
sion, 33  U. KAN. L. REV . 305 ( 1 985) (criticizing expansive decisions in the speech context 
as ad hoc and as threatening balkanization of liberties); Note, Post-Pruneyard Access to 
Michigan Shopping Centers: The "Malling" of Constitutional Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 
93 ( 1 983) [hereinafter Note, "Malling" of Constitutional Righ ts] (advocating retaining 
the state action limit in modified form); Comment, supra note 3, at 1 45-52 (criticizing 
expansive decisions as slighting property rights). But see Cole, supra note 3 (arguing that 
state courts should break free of federal analyses); Friesen, supra note 3 (arguing that 
California rights guarantees may apply to private infringers); Margulies, A Terrible 
Beauty: Functional State Action Analysis and State Constitutions, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 
723 (1 988) (noting that state courts have not yet advanced convincing rationales or 
principled limits for expanding the application of state constitutional rights, but arguing 
that judicial intervention on behalf of individual rights is proper in some cases); Skover, 
supra note 3 (Washington state constitution imposes an affirmative duty on the state to 
preserve basic values from private infringement). 
Recent reaffirmations of the need for a state action limitation on the scope of state bills 
of rights may be seen as part of a broader revisionist trend of scholars concerned over the 
�ossibl� adverse consequences of increasing reliance on and expansion of state constitu· 
tional nghts. See, e.g., Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for 
Judicial Restraint, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 85 ( 1 985); Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan 
and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 1 5  HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 ( 1 988); Maltz, 
The Dark Side of State Court Ac;tivism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 ( 1 985) [hereinafter Maltz, 
Dark Side]. 
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definitions of state action only slightly broader than the federal definition2s 
or avoiding the issue. u 
The reasons for this recent trend are not hard to discern. The 
underlying concern appears to be that if courts abandon threshold 
requirements of state action there will be no principled means to prevent 
the "constitutionalization" of an unacceptably broad range of private law 
and private relationships. More specifically, courts and commentators 
have argued that state action limits are required by the plain meaning of 
the particular state constitutional guarantees at issue, the framers' specific 
intent, general principles of constitutional interpretation, the need to 
preserve the competing rights of the allegedly infringing private parties, 
and in order to preserve an appropriate allocation of powers between courts 
and legislatures. Until these objections are resolved, few courts will follow 
the expansive lead of Prune Yard and its progeny.211 
This article argues that there are no inherent or a priori reasons for 
generally imposing federal state action requirements onto state constitu­
tional guarantees. To the contrary, where the text and history of a 
particular constitutional provision fail to show that it was intended to bind 
only the state government, alternative limits for appropriately delineating 
the circumstances in which state rights should apply can be established.26 
Part I of this article surveys the relevant state constitutional provisions and 
decisions, focusing on the three broad substantive areas of free speech, 
23. See, e.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 
408 N.Y.S.2d 39 ( l  978), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 178-89; Jones v. 
Memorial Hosp. Sys. 746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), discussed infra at text 
accompanying notes 83-88. 
24. See, e.g. , Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 89 Or. App. 629, 750 P.2d 1157 (1988), 
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 89-92. 
25. This point was made explicit recently by the Washington Supreme Court, which 
refused to be swayed by "the recent writings of some legal commentators which present an 
array of theoretical arguments as to why they think that constitutional guarantees of 
individual liberties should not be limited to protecting against actions of the state," on the 
ground that constitutional interpretation "must spring not from pure intuition, but from a 
process that is at once articulable, reasonable and reasoned." Southcenter Joint Venture v. 
National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 427, 780 P.2d 1282, 1290 (1989) 
(citation omitted). Advocates of expansive interpretations of state bills of  rights are 
presently at task to show that the rationale for such expansion is not a mere intuition, but is 
instead well grounded in history and reason. 
26. Despite what may be its ultimate rele�ance, �his article �oes not discuss whether or 
how "originalist" or "non-originalist" theories of mterpretat1on should apply to state 
constitutions. It is assumed for purposes of argument that courts are bound to soin:e exte�t to 
respect unambiguous constitutional texts and their draft�r�' clearly expres�ed mtenttons. 
See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Or1gmal Understa�d�ng, 60 B.�.L. REV. 204 (1980); Devlin, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987 - Louisiana Constitu­
tional Law, 48 LA. L. REY. 335, 348-49 (1987); Maltz, Dark Side, supra note 22. 
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equal protection and due process. Part II c ritiques th� ar�umen�s in favor 
of imposing a state action limitation on state const1�ut1onal nghts and 
concludes that, while some limits on the scope of such nghts are necessary, 
in  most cases no compelling reasons for a threshold requirement of "state 
action" exist. Part III suggests a n  alternative set of limits on the 
application of state constitutional g uarantees based on the nature of the 
parties and the competing rights involved. 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE ACTION: DIVERGENT TEXTS 
AND CONFLICTING CASE LAW 
A few basic principles govern interpretation of state constitutional 
rights. First, constitutional guarantees can be written to provide rights that 
even purely private parties may not infringe.21 Second, state courts of last 
resort are the final authorities for the interpretation of their respective state 
constitutions and are free to interpret those state charters in ways that 
diverge from interpretations of the Constitution, even if the language is 
exactly the same.28 Third, federal supremacy dictates that all state 
constitutional rights are subordinate to and may not be applied to conflict 
with federal statutory or constitutional rights.29 Thus, state law may add to 
federal rights only i f  the additional rights granted to one litigant do not 
detract from the federally protected rights of  another - a possibility that 
must always be considered when the conflict is between private parties.30 
27. For example, the thirteenth amendment forbids imposition of slavery or peonage 
by any person, regardless of the existence of state action. See supra note 5 .  Similar 
provisions clearly applicable to private action also exist in many state constitutions. See, 
e.g., Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413, 419 ( Mo. 1957) (interpreting Mo. CONST. art. I, 
§ 29); Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 3 6  N.J. 189, 196, 175 A.2d 639, 643 (196 1 )  
( discussing N.J. CONST. art. I ,  para. 19); Mount Sinai Hospital v .  Davis, 18 Misc. 2d 311 ,  
3 12, 190 N.Y.S.2d 8 70, 8 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct .  1959) ( discussing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17). 
28. See, e.g., Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159,  167 (Alaska 1972); People v. Brisendine, 
13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52, 5 3 1 P.2d 1099, 1 111-14, 119 Cal.  Rptr. 315, 327-31 (1975); Bulova 
Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 
1 41, 146 (1974) . If the state court expresses that it is not relying on federal law, the United 
St�te� Supreme Court will not interfere unless the interpretation violates a federal right. 
M ichigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). But cf Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 
301, 450 A.2d 925, 932 (1982) (emphasizing the persuasiveness of federal precedent and 
"the general advisability in a federal system of uniform interpretation of identical constitutional provisions"). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
30. F�r ex���le, while state constitutions may require some private property owners t� open their facilities to others, �ny .attempt to require those property owners to sponsor or aid �peakers presumably would mfnnge the owners' negative first amendment rights. See Pa�1ficGas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S.  1 (1986). See a/soNote,Accessto Private Fora and State Constitutions: A Proposed Speech and Property Analysis, 46 ALB. 
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Since state constitutional rights operate only interstitially, 31 whether 
they may be me�ningfully applied to private infringers will depend upon 
the degree to which federal law has preempted the resolution of conflicts in 
a particular area. Despite the breadth of federal law, the "strategic space" 
available for state constitutional regulation is far from trivial i n  scope and 
importance. Since state law is the traditional and primary source for 
defining the private "property" and "liberty" i nterests protected by the 
federal due process clause, decisions imposing reasonable restraints on 
those interests in order to vindicate other state constitutional rights are 
legitimate exercises of the state's traditional regulatory authority and not 
impermissible interferences with federal law.32 
Although decisions regarding the application of state rights guaran­
tees to private actors have arisen in many different factual and legal 
contexts, most cases have concerned three substantive issues: 1) whether 
private property owners can prohibit exercise of rights to speech, press, 
petition and assembly on their premises; 2) whether private entities may 
discriminate against members of disfavored groups; and 3) whether 
private creditors m ust afford their debtors some minimal due process 
before taking action against them. For purposes of clarity, this article 
reviews the constitutional texts and leading decisions in each of these areas 
seriatim.33 
L. REV. 1501, 1518-21 ( 1982) (discussing the conflict between speech and property rights 
in the shopping center context); Comment, supra note 3 (same). 
31. Reference to the "interstitial" nature of state constitutional rights is not intended 
as a statement on whether state courts should adopt a "primacy" or "interstitial" approach 
to resolving cases where conduct arguably violates both federal and state constitutional 
norms. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 379 (1980); Simon, supra note 22, at 315-18 . 
32. In Prune Yard, the shopping center argued that requiring it to provide access to 
would-be speakers violated its property rights under the Constitution. On appeal, the 
United States Supreme Court held that no federal property rights were violated. Since the 
Constitution protects only property rights already created by state law and these rights are 
subject to reasonable state regulation, any burdens on the shopping center's property rights 
violate the Constitution only if they become so severe as to amount to an uncompensated 
"taking ." PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980). See also 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (private commercial and fraternal 
organization enjoys first amendment associational rights, but those rights do not preclude 
application of a state anti-discrimination statute). 
It has been argued that federal decisions since Prune Yar� have undercut its holding 
that the infringement of the shopping center owner's property nghts was not so g�eat a� to 
constitute an uncompensated "taking." Comment, supra note 3, at 147-51 (d1scussmg 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) and Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)) .  
33. State action issues have arisen in other contexts as  wel�. For e.x�mple, stat,e guarantees of privacy have been particularly important. See, e.g., Chico Feminist Women s 
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The first amendment facially prohibits only quintessentially govern­
mental activity: passing any law to limit the freedoms it declares.a. 
A lthough the United States Supreme Court once showed considerable 
willingness to expand the federal state action concept in order to vindicate 
freedoms of speech, assembly or petition,36 those rights are not federally 
protected in the absence of state action, as currently defined. ae 
I. State Constitutional Texts 
Like their federal counterpart, virtually all state bills of rights 
guarantee freedom of speech and the press, 37 and the rights to peaceably 
assemble and petition for redress o f  grievances.38 Although these provi­
sions vary in form and wording, they can be grouped into three classes 
based on how clearly they indicate whether the rights granted are protected 
Health Center v. Butte Glenn Medical Soc'y, 557 F. Supp. 1 1 90, i 202 (E.D. Cal. 1983); 
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1 1 23 (Alaska 1989); People v. Zelinski, 
24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1 000, 1 55 Cal. Rptr. 575 ( 1 979); Porten v. University of San 
Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 1 34 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 ( 1 976); State v. Nelson, 354 
So. 2d 540 (La. 1 978). 
34. "Congress shall make no law . . . a bridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
35. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 50 1 ,  504-09 ( 1946), and Amalgamated Food 
Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 3 1 6-20 (1 968), the Court held that 
since the privately owned company town and shopping center, respectively, had function· 
ally replaced the traditional business district as a forum for expression, the properties were 
infused with a "public function" and the private owners were required to respect 
individuals' rights to engage in first amendment activities. The Court also has indicated that 
private civil suits charging violation of state tort Jaw could implicate state action, at least if 
the state laws involved were applied to chill first amendment rights. See, e.g .. NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 9 16  n.5 1  ( 1 982);  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 265 ( 1 964). 
36. The Court has held that the actions of private schools and private sector labor 
unions do not involve sufficient government action to require that they respect the free 
speech interests of their employees or members despite the significant degree of governmen­
tal regulation and de facto private coercive power present in both cases. See, e.g., Rendell­
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 ( 1982); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 
_




82) .  In
_ 
a sequence of cases that influenced the recent resurgence of interest 
m state const1tutional rights, the Court reversed precedent and held that the Constitution 
does not require private owners of public shopping centers to permit the public to exercise 
first amendment freedoms on their premises. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 ( 1 976); 
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 ( 1972) . 
37. Only the Delaware Constitution contains no explicit guarantee of freedom of 
speech. However, �t g�ants a ri
_
ght to freedom of the press. DEL. CONST. art. I, § S. 
38. The constitutions of Minnesota and New Mexico do not explicitly guarantee the 
freedoms of petition or assembly. 
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from only government interference. For example, some states guarantee 
freedom of speech89 and freedom of assembly and peti tion"0 with language 
that tracks the first amendment by providing only that "no law" shall be 
passed curtailing speech, or otherwise indicating that they apply only to 
governmental entities. Not surprisingly, state courts have consistently 
construed such provisions to require state action.0 
In contrast to  these few provisions, the language used by most states to 
guarantee speech, press, assembly and petition do not clearly indicate 
whether they apply to non-governmental infringers. For example, the 
freedoms of speech and press are guaranteed in many states through the 
simple statement that citizens have a right to "freely speak, write and 
publish on all subjects, being responsible for abuse of that liberty." 
Nineteen cons ti tu tions rely on this or similar language. The statement may 
appear alone,41 or combined with other language relating only to the press 
or libel." Likewise, a majority of assembly and petition guarantees do not 
explicitly limit their application to government interference. Rather, these 
provisions usually state that citizens "have a right" to peaceably assemble 
39. HAW. CONST. art. I,§ 4; IND. CONST. art. I,§ 9; OR. CONST. art. I,§ 8; R.I. CONST. 
art. I,§ 2l ;S .C. CONST. art. I,§ 2; UTAH CONST. art. I,§ 15; VA. CONST. art. I,§ 12; w. VA. 
CONST. art. III, § 7. 
40. HAW. CONST. art. I,§ 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 31; LA. CONST. art. I.§ 9; N.Y. 
CONST. art. I,§ 9; OR. CONST. art. I,§ 26; R.I. CONST. art. I,§ 21; S.C. CONST. art. I,§ 2; 
VA. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
41. See, e.g., Reiter v. American Legion, 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1947); State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 611P.2d 1147 (1980). But see Lloyd Corp. v. 
Whiff en, 89 Or. App. 629, 634-35, 750 P.2d 1157, 1160 (1988) (court's action of issuing an 
injunction against persons seeking to exercise speech and petition rights within a large 
private shopping center constitutes sufficient "state action" to implicate the state constitu­
tional guarantee of free speech); see infra notes 63-67. See Note, Private Abridgment of 
Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 182 ( 1980) (even speech provisions 
phrased like the first amendment should not be interpreted to require state action). 
42. ALAS KA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,§ 6; IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 9; 
WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 5. See generally Utter, The Right to Speak, Write and Publish 
Freely: State Constitutional Protection Against Private Abridgement, 8 PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 157, 171-80 (1985) (discussing the text and origins of the Washington speech 
guarantee). 
Five other states use language in their constitutions differing from the standard 
provision quoted, yet they also appear to confer a right beyond prohibiting governmental 
restraints. See MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 16 (as amended by MASS. CONST. amend. LXXVII 
1948); Miss. CONST. art. III,§ 13; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 22; N.C. CONST. art. I,§ 14; Vr. 
CONST. ch. I, art. 13th. 
43. ARK. CONST. art. II,§ 6; ILL. CONST. art. I,§ 4; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights,§ 11; 
KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § § 1, 8; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 40; M INN. 
CONST. art. I,§ 3; NEB. CONST. art. I,§ 5; N .D. CONST. art. I,§ 4; S.D. CONST. art. VI,§ 5; 
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
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and petition for redress of grievances,•• or that such rights .. shall never be 
abridged. "46 The class of potential infringers to whom that command is 
addressed is not explicitly limited. Thus the plain texts of  these constitu­
tional provisions provide no mandate for limiting their application by a 
t hreshold requirement of state action. 
In the final group of states, the textual language is arguably somewhat 
ambiguous because the constitutions contain more than one relevant 
provision. In these states, guarantees of speech and press l ike those quoted 
above appear with other language that parallels the Constitution or clearly 
refers to governmen t  action. One state constitution separates the two 
p rovisions,48 while in others they are combined as separate clauses or 
sentences within a single provision .47 For "dual" state constitutional 
guarantees of this type, purely textual a rguments about their application to 
non-governmental actors depend on whether the two statements are read 
separately or together. If read together, as a reiteration of the same 
guarantee in different forms, the explicit restrictions in one statement 
could be considered i.mplicit in the other. But  if a statement regarding the 
right "to speak and publish freely" is read as an independent grant and not 
as mere surplusage, there is cause for construing that portion of the state's 
44. ALA. CONST. art. I,§ 25; CAL. CONST. art. I ,§ 3; COLO. CONST. art. II,§ 24; CONN. 
CONST. art. I,§ 1 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1 6; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, 
para. 9; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 10; ILL. CONST. art. I , § 5; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 20; KAN. 
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § l ;  ME. CONST. art. I, § 15; Mo. 
CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 13 (no express provision regarding right to assemble); 
MASS. CONST. pt. 1 ,  art. XIX; M ICH . CONST. art. I, § 3 ;  Mo. CONST. art. I, § 9; MONT. 
CONST. art. II,§ 6; NEV. CONST. art. I,§ 10; N .H. CONST. pt. I, art. XXXII; N.J. CONST. of 
1 947 art. I, para. 1 8; N.C. CONST. art. I ,§ 1 2; N .D .  CONST. art. I, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 
3; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; PA. CONST. art. I , § 20; R.I. CONST. art. I ,§ 2 1 ;  TENN. CONST. 
art. I ,§ 23 (no express provision regarding the right to petition); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 27; 
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 20th. 
45. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 6; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 5; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 4; 
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 1 1 ; NEB. CONST. art. I , § 1 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4; WASH. 
CONST. art. I,§ 4; w. VA. CONST. art. III,§ 1 6; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. I, 
§ 2 1 .  
46. CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 5 .  
47. Most of these state provisions combine the a ffirmative statement with a direct 
prohibition on laws restraining speech. ALA. CONST. art. I ,§ 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; 
FLA. CONST. art. I ,§ 4; GA. CONST. art. I, para. 5; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 7; ME. CONST. art. I ,§ 4; M ICH. CONST. art. I , § 5; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8 ;  MONT. CONST. 
art. II,§ 7; NEV. CONST. art. I ,§ 9; N.J. CONST. of 1 947 art. I, para. 6; N.M. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1 7; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 ;  Omo CONST. art. I, § 1 1 ; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; PA. 
CONST. art. I,§ 7; TENN. CONS1:. art.
_ 
I,§ 1 9}EX. CONST. art. I , § 8;  VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; 
Wis. CONST. art. I, § 3. In Cahforma, the dual guarantee" is combined with additional 
matters. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
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guarantee as a right enforceable against  any infringer rather than just a 
privilege against governmental interfere nce."8 
2.  C aselaw: Is State Action Required? 
Several courts in  the late 1 9 70's and early l 980's capitalized on the 
expansive possibilities offered by the absence of explicit language requiring 
state action, applying their state's speech ,  petition and assembly guaran­
tees to limit the power of certain private property owners to prohibit 
expressive or political activities on their premises.'9 
The first and most celebrated of these cases was Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Center/'0 which held that the guarantees of freedom of speech 
and petition in the California Constitution precluded the owner of a large 
private shopping center from closing that facility to otherwise orderly 
persons soliciting signatures for a petition addressed to the President and 
Congress. The United States Supreme Court previously held that such 
shopping centers did not involve state action and thus were not required by 
the Constitution to permit first amendment activity on their premises.51 
Despite this, the court in PruneYard concluded that state guarantees of 
speech and petition could apply to private actors of this type. The 
California court declined to follow federal precedent essentially because of 
the divergent wording of the state's constitutional provisions and the 
special importance of "liberty of speech" in  that state.52 However, the 
48. But see Jacobs v. Major, 1 39 Wis. 2d 4 9 2, 505-07, 407 N.W.2d 8 32, 836-37 
(1987) (the "plain meaning" of such a "dual" constitutional guarantee of speech is that it 
applies only to government infringement). See infra note 203. 
49. For discussion of these cases see Ragosta, supra note 3, at 4-20; Developments, 
supra note 3, at 1 40 1 -0 3 ;  Comment, State Constitutional Rights of Free Speech on Private 
Property: The Liberal Loophole, 1 8  GoNz. L. REV. 8 1  (1982-83).  
50. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341 ,  1 53 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 
( 1 980). 
5 1 .  Hudgens v.  NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 ( 1 97 6 ) .  Under federal law today private actors 
who perform "public functions" are bound by federal constitutional rights only ifthe public 
function is both "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State" and "traditionally 
associated with sovereignty." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 4 1 9  U.S. 345, 352-53 
(1974). The California Supreme Court also had previously adopted a similarly restrictive 
interpretation of the state constitution. Diamond v .  Bland, 1 1  Cal. 3d 3 3 1 ,  5 2 1  P.2d 460, 
1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 4 1 9  U.S. 8 8 5  ( 1 9 7 4) (follow.i�g federal preced�nt and 
concluding that state constitutional rights of speech and petition do not outweigh the 
property interests of a shopping center owner). . . 
52. 23 Cal. 3d at 908-09, 592 P.2d at 346-47, 1 53 Cal. Rptr. at 8 59-60. The Cahforma 
Constitution guarantees freedom of speech through a single two-part provis�on: "Ev�ry 
person may freely speak, write and publish his or her se.ntiment� on �11 subjects, b
eing 
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of spe�ch or 
press." CAL. CONST. art. I , § 2. Although the court in Prune Yard did not express!� discuss 
the point, it evidently interpreted these two sentences as independent sources of nght: one 
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court was less explicit about its reasons for applying the state constitution. 
Although the court discussed the practical importance of shopping centers 
as one of the few places where people congregate and may effectively 
exercise expressive or petitioning rights, it did not clarify whether it 
rejected a state action requirement or  simply broadened the federal 
definition of "state action" to embrace the peculiar facts of the case.118 
Subsequent California cases have not yet clarified the meaning of 
PruneYard. Most lower California courts have interpreted the case as 
abolishing the state action requirement in this context11" and many also 
have shown a wil lingness to extend Prune Yard to cases involving private 
infringers other than shopping center owners.1111 Others have indicated 
parallel to the Constitution and the other intentionally going beyond that model. The court 
also relied on the state constitution's separate provision guaranteeing the right to petition: 
"The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition government for the 
redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good." CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 3.  
53. 23 Cal. 3d at 9 1 0  n.5,  592 P.2d at 346-47 n.5,  153 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 n.5. 
Although the court emphasized that it was not considering "the property or privacy rights of 
an individual homeowner or proprietor of a modest retail establishment," it is not clear 
whether the court meant that in such cases the state constitutional rights found in 
Prune Yard would not apply, or that the type of time, place and manner restrictions imposed 
depend on the nature of the private property involved. 
54. See, e.g., Horton Plaza Assocs. v. Playing for Real Theatre, 1 84 Cal. App. 3d 10, 
228 Cal. Rptr. 8 1 7  ( 1 986), appeal dismissed, 736 P.2d 3 1 9, 236 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1 987) 
(state constitution confers "affirmative expressive rights upon California citizens which 
they may exercise upon private property where they have a right to be," subject only to time, 
place and manner restrictions); Leach v. Drummond Medical Group, Inc., 1 44 Cal. App. 3d 
362, 375, 192 Cal. Rptr. 650, 658 ( 1 983) (same). But see Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden 
Rain Found., 1 3 1  Cal. App. 3d 8 1 6, 8 38, 1 82 Cal. Rptr. 8 1 3 ,  825-26 ( 1 982), appeal 
dismissed, 459 U.S. 1 192 ( 1 983) (noting the ambiguity in Prune Yard but interpreting that 
case as simply broadening the definition of state action rather than abandoning the 
requirement entirely). 
Most courts and commentators have interpreted Prune Yard as abandoning any state 
action requirement .  See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 
2d 230, 241-43, 635 P.2d 1 08 ,  1 1 4- 1 5  ( 1 981 ) ;  Ragosta, supra note 3, at 4-7 .  But see Note, 
Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to Shopping Centers Under the 
California Constitution, 68 CALIF. L.  REV. 641 ,  657-58 ( 1 980) [hereinafter Note, Robins] 
(noting California's retention of modified state action requirements in the due process 
context and reading Prune Yard similarly); Note, Free Speech, Initiative and Property in 
Conflict - Four Alternatives to the State Action Requirement in Washington, 58 WASH. 
L. REv. 587, 592-93 ( 1 983) [hereinafter Note, Four Alternatives] (interpreting 
Prune Yard as adopting a definition for state action similar to pre-Hudgens federal law). 
55. See Leach v. Drum1!1ond Medical Group, Inc., 1 44 Cal. App. 3d 3 62, 375-76, 192 
C�l .  _
Rptr. 6�0, 659 ( 1 983) (mcorporated private medical group with a de facto monopoly 
w1thm a particular area); Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found.,  1 3 1  Cal. App. 3d 
8 1�, 1 82 Cal. Rptr. 8 1 3  ( 1 982), appeal dismissed, 459  U.S. 1 1 92 ( 1 983)  (private walled 
residential community). See also Press v.  Lucky Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 3d 3 1 1 , 667 P.2d 704, 
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hostility to such an e xtension.ae Nevertheless, California law is clear: at 
least some large private entities must respect speech and petition rights as 
if those entities were state actors; these entities may impose time, place and 
manner restrictions on the exercise of such rights only to the same degree 
and for the same purposes as permitted to government entities;67 and the 
right of access, which was originally recognized to protect petitioning and 
other forms of political  activity, has been extended to protect other forms of 
speech as well." 
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's affirmance of 
PruneYard, the highest courts of New Jersey,69 Pennsylvania60 and 
Washington•• rendered decisions abandoning a threshold requirement of 
193 Cal. Rptr. 900 (  1 983) (impliedly approving extension of Prune Yard to a small shopping 
center). 
56. Stt, t.g., Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 1 72 Cal. App. 3 d  322, 342 n.8, 
218 Cal. Rptr. 228, 240 n.8 ( 1 985) (in dictum, declining to independently apply the state 
constitution to a private university). 
57. Stt, t.g., H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 1 93 C al. App. 3d 
1 193, 1208, 238 Cal. Rptr. 84 1 ,  850 ( l  987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988) (holding that 
P1'1'MYard "did not establish a new standard of reasonableness to be applied to private 
property" and subjecting the shopping center to the same rigorous review of its proposed 
time, place and manner restrictions as would be applied to government regulation of 
speech); Horton Plaza Assocs. v .  Playing for Real Theatre, 1 84 Cal. App. 3d 1 0, 228 Cal. 
Rptr. 8 1 7  (1986), appeal dismissed, 736 P.2d 3 1 9, 236 C al. Rptr. 905 ( 1 987) (same). 
58. Stt. t.g., Northern Cal. Newspaper Organizing Comm. v. Sol a no Assocs., 193 
Cal. App. 3d 1644, 239 Cal. Rptr. 227 ( 1 987) (labor union's distribution within shopping 
center of litcrature concerning labor dispute protected by California Constitution); Laguna 
Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 1 3 1  Cal. App. 3d 8 16, 837-38, 1 82 Cal. Rptr. 813, 
825-26 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1 1 92 ( 1 983) (rights extend to commercial 
speech). 
59. State v. Schmid, 84 N .J .  535, 569, 423 A.2d 6 1 5, 633 (1 980), appeal dismissed 
.sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 1 00 ( 1 982). See generally Note, supra note 
30, at 1512- 1 8 .  See also Zelenka v. Benevolent a nd Protective Order of Elks, 1 29 N.J. 
Super. 379, 324 A.2d 35 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 66 N.J. 3 1 7, 3 3 1  A.2d 1 7" ( 1974) 
(violates public policy to permit a purely private club to expel a member solely because of 
free speech rights). 
60. Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 1 58, 1 75, 432 A.2d 1 382, 1 39 1  ( 1 98 1 )  (holding 
that the state guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly preclu?ed enforceme�t of trespass laws against persons peacefully handing out leaflets at a pubhc event on a private 
college campus). 
This decision was significantly limited in Wes tern Pa. Socialist Workers · 1 982 
Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 51 2 Pa. 23, 5 1 5  A.2d 1 33 1  � 1 986), where t�e 
court held that the state constitution did not require a large private shopping mall to permit 
access for a political candidate seeking signatures on a nominating petition. 
61. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243-44, 635 
P.2d 108, 1 15- 16 ( 1 9 8 1  ). The court held, in a plurality opinion gar�e�i!1g.four vo�e�, that state action is not required for claims brought under the SJX'.ech and 1m�1attve provlSlons of 
the state constitution. Accordingly, the owners of a large pnv�t� �h?ppmg �c:nter could not 
exclude a nondisruptive group soliciting signatures on an m1ttative petition. 
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state action for claims arising under their state guarantees of speech, 
assembly and petition. Massachusetts abandoned the requirem�nt .with respect to petitioning activities protected by a related state const1tut1onal 
guarantee of free and fair elections.62 Appellate courts in Oregon63 and 
Texas,6" also have recently rendered similarly expansive decisions that 
apply state constitutional speech and petition rights to lim
_
it  infringe�ent 
by private actors.66 In each case however, the stat� court f� 1 led to provide a 
complete rationale for departing from a state action reqmrement. Instead 
the opinions restated only uncontroversial points: that the rights at stake 
were traditionally regarded as particularly important; that state courts 
may interpret their constitutions independently of federal law; that the 
state constitutional provisions in issue included no express language 
requiring state action; and that state courts, unburdened by federalism 
concerns or the need for nationally uniform rules, can exercise greater 
interpretive freedom than federal cou rts . 66 B ut these factors only establish 
From its inception, the analysis and results in Alderwood have been hotly debated. See, 
e.g., Dolliver, supra note 3; Skover, supra note 3, at 241 -47; Utter, supra note 42, at I 8 1-89; 
Note, Four Alternatives, supra note 54, at 5 94-608 . See also Lobsenz & Swanson, The 
Residential Tenant 's Right to Freedom of Expression, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. I ,  20-
27 ( 1 986) (advocating expansion of the Alderwood analysis to tenants) . 
The Washington Supreme Court has recently modified Alderwood in Southcenter 
Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3  Wash. 2d 4 1 3, 780 P.2d 1282 
( 1 989). See infra note 76. 
62. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N .E.2d 590, 593 ( 1 983). 
This decision was limited in Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 58 1 ,  452 N.E.2d 188 
( 1 983), indicating that state action is required for claims arising under the state 
constitutional guarantee of free speech. 
63. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 89 Or. App. 629, 750 P.2d 1 1 57 ( 1 987) ,  ajfd. 307 Or. 
674, 773 P.2d 1 294 ( 1 989) (finding sufficient "state action" to trigger the state speech 
guarantee merely because the private shopping center owner could seek a court injunction 
to enforce his decision to exclude political speakers from the premises) .  See infra text 
accompanying notes 89-90. 
64. Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564, 567 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1 987) ,  cert. denied, 1 09 S. Ct. 7 1  ( 1 988)  (based on PruneYard, Schmid, 
Tate and Alderwood, " [a ] lthough private property is involved in this case, it is not 
determinative of' a claim of violation of the Texas constitutional guarantee of free speech). 
65. The Supreme Court of Alaska also has hinted at such a result. Johnson v. Tait, 774 
P.2d 185, 1 9� (Alaska 1 989) (state constitutional guarantee of free speech did not apply to 
preclude a p�1vate bar owner from prohibiting patrons from wearing motorcycle club colors 
on th� pr�m1ses. because the si:iian proJ?rietor's right of autonomy outweighed the patron's const1tutlonal nght �f expression, leavmg open the question of how these competing rights 
would be balanced m the context of shopping centers or other similar fora). 
66. See, e.g. , Batchelder, 388 Mass. at 8 7-93, 445 N.E.2d at 592-95; State v. Schmid, 
84 �.J. 535, 5�3-60, 423 A.2d 6 15, 624-28 ( 1 980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton 
Umv. v. Schmid, 455  U.S. 1 00 ( 1982); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 1 58 ,  1 68-73, 432 
A.2d 1 382, 1 387-90 ( 1 98 l ) ; Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council 96 Wash. 2d 
230, 234-44, 635 P.2d 1 08 ,  1 1 1 - 1 6  ( 198 1 ) .  
' 
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that state courts may interpret state action differently than the Supreme 
Court; they do not indicate whether state action should be required and if 
so, how it should be defined. As to these points, the courts decided only that 
each case presented a conflict of private rights that the court should resolve 
on the merits.'' 
In contrast, other states that considered the issue, including N orth 
Carolina," Oklahoma,99 Connecticut,70 M ichigan,71 New York,72 Wis­
consin,n Arizona" and, a pparently, M issouri,7� concluded that their 
constitutional guarantees of speech, assembly, petition and related rights 
do not extend beyond prohibiting government infringement, and do not 
grant any right of access t o  private property .76 Courts that have taken such 
restrictive approaches have articulated a number of reasons for their 
refusal to interpret their constitutions more broadly than the Bi l l  of Rights. 
Prominent among those rationales are the courts' contentions that ex­
tending state constitutional rights beyond protection against the govern­
ment violates a general principle of American constitutional law,77 that 
67. In Alderwood, the court explicitly noted that the absence of constraints applicable 
under federal law allowed the state court to "evaluate in each case the actual harm to the 
speech and property interests" at stake in the case. 96 Wash. 2d at 243, 635 P.2d at 1 1 5.  In 
other decisions, a similar view of the court's role is implied by the extensive balancing of the 
competing interests and the concern for fashioning time, place and manner restrictions to 
maximize both parties' interests. 
68. State v. Felmet, 302 N .C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708, 7 1 1  ( 198 1 ) . See Simon, supra note 
22, at 327·28 (the North Carolina provision "reads more affirmatively than most"). 
69. Oklahomans For Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Okla., Inc., 634 P.2d 704, 708 n. 1 5  
(Okla. 1981 ). 
70. Cologne v. Wcstfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1 201 ( 1 984) . 
71. Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 ( 1 985). 
72. Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1 2 1 1 ,  498 
N.Y.S.2d 99 ( 1985) .  
73. Jacobs v .  Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 ( 1987). 
74. Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 159 Ariz. 37 1 ,  767 P.2d 7 19  
(1988). 
75. Kugler v. Ryan, 682  S.W.2d 47, 5 1  ( Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
76. In addition, Washington, one of the states that had initially upheld a right of 
access to private property subsequently held that the state's speech and assembly 
guarantees do require state action. South center Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y 
Comm., 1 1 3  Wash. 2d 4 1 3, 780 P.2d 1 282  ( 1 989) .  Southcenterdid not disavow the result in 
Alderwood, but it did explicitly overrule the plurality's reasoning. In �outhcenter_th� co�rt followed Justice Dolliver's concurring opinion in Alderwood by drawmg a sharp d1stmction 
between guarantees in the state declaration of rights and other provisions of the state 
constitution. However, in light of the court's vociferous insistence in Southcenter that 
applying guarantees against private action would be "to a�t con�rary to the fundamental 
nature" of state constitutions this distinction between nghts is tenuous. 
77. See, e.g .. Woodland � . Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88, 204-05, 378 
N.W.2d 337, 344 ( 19 85); Shad Alliancev.  Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 502-03, 488 
N.E.2d 1 2 1 l , 1 2 1 5, 498 N .Y .S .2d 99, 103 ( 1 985) ;  Southcenter, 1 1 3  Wash. 2d at 422-23, 
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such an extension would ignore the pa rticular historical origins of the 
provisions, and the framers' intentions,78  that such a n  ex�ension would 
result in arbitrary distinctions between large and small busmesses,7• that 
the rights of private property owners w ould be dispropo.rti?nat�ly im­
paired,80 and that the legislature s hould balance such confl1ctmg rights.81 
3 .  Caselaw: How Should State Action Be Defined? 
Courts that interpret state constitutional guarantees of speech and 
petition to require state action diffe r  in defining the requirement. While 
some courts adhere closely to federal precedent, 82 other courts expand their 
definition to include entities not considered state actors under the federal 
constitution. 
For example, in Jones v. Memorial Hospital System11 the Texas 
Court of Appeals considered a nurse's claim that she was discharged from a 
large private hospital in retaliation for writing a newspaper article, thereby 
violating her right of free speech under the Texas Constitution. The court 
did not decide whether the state constitution applied to wholly private 
entities, but did hold that the affirmative provisions of  the Texas Constitu-
780 P.2d at 1 286-87; Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 
347-53, 635 P.2d 1 08, 1 1 8- 1 9  ( l 98 1 )  (Dolliver, J. ,  concurring); Jacobs, l 39 Wis. 2d at 506-
1 3, 407 N.W.2d at 837-4 1 .  
78. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 1 92 Conn. 48, 60-62, 469 A.2d 120 1 ,  1207-08 
( 1 984); Woodland, 96 Mich. 2d at 204-09 & n.25, 3 78 N.W.2d at 345-46 & n.25; Shad 
A lliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 500, 504 n.6, 488 N.E.2d at 1 2 1 3- 14, 1 2 1 6  n.6, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 
1 0 1 -02; 104 n.6. However, the justices do not always interpret the historical record 
similarly. See, e.g. , Shad Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 5 1 0- 1 1 ,  488 N.E.2d at 1 220-2 1 ,  498 
N.Y.S.2d at 1 08-09 (Wachtler, J. ,  dissenting). 
79. See, e.g. , Cologne, 1 92 Conn. at 64, 469 A.2d at l 209; Jacobs, 1 39 Wis. 2d at 518, 
407 N.W.2d at 843. 
80. See, e.g., Woodland, 423 Mich. at 2 1 0- 1 1 ,  3 78 N.W.2d at 347 (citing L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 149 ( 1st ed. 1 918) ) ; Southcenter, l l 3 Wash. 2d at 430, 
780 P.2d at 1 290-9 1 .  
8 1 .  See, e.g., Cologne, 1 92 Conn. at 65, 469 A.2d at 1 2 1 0; Woodland, 423 Mich. at 
2 1 1 - 1 2, 378 N.W.2d at 347-48; Shad Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 504-05, 488 N.E.2d at 1216-
1 7, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 1 05; Southcenter, l J  3 Wash. 2d at 425-26, 780 P.2d at 1 288-89; 
Alderwood, 96 Wash. 2d at 250, 635 P.2d at 1 1 9 (Dolliver, J., concurring). 
�2. 
_
No state court is bound. to adopt federal standards in interpreting their own state 
coll:stttutions. Even courts that rely heavily on federal precedent in defining government 
action acknowledge that it is only persuasive authority. Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines 
Inc., 432 So. 2d 567, 569 (Fla . . 1 983). Some courts have been persuaded by the extensively developed, though often confusing, federal "state action" jurisprudence. See, e.g. , Cologne, 





d 891  (Tex. Ct. App. 1 988)  (reversing the trial court's grant of 
summary JUd�ment m favor of the defendant hospital on the ground that it was not a state 
ac�or). Cf Gibbons v. State, 775 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 989) (treating a private 
dnveway as a non-public forum for speech purposes) .  
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tion permitted it to .. adopt a test that requires a lower threshold of public 
activity ."" Applying this lower threshold , the court stated if the hospital 
was "substantial ly  involved with state and federal activity" it should be 
treated as a public entity for state constitutional purposes .&& Plaintiff's 
allegations, which if proved would satisfy the state action requirement, 
amounted to commonplace factors such as state l icensing and regulation of 
the hospital, state and federal grants to the hospital, and a number of 
contractual and other relationships with the government. The decision to 
terminate the nurse's employment was made independently b y  the manag­
ers of the hospital without involvement by state officials.86 
The result in Jones would have been different if the court had applied 
federal standards. Where state action is al leged on the basis of "entangle­
ment" between the government and private actor, a plaintiff w ho w ishes to 
state a federal constitutional claim must show that the state is "responsi­
ble" for the "specific conduct" of the private entity because of its exercise 
of coercive power or significant encouragement. Mere acquiescence by the 
state in decisions independently reached by private parties is insufficient to 
imbue them with "state action."87 Under this d efinition, the U nited States 
Supreme Court has held that entities s imila r  to the defendant hospital in 
Jones will not be regarded as .. state actors" for federal constitutional 
purposes absent the kind of official involvement that apparently was not 
alleged in Jones.88 
The Oregon Court of Appeals recently reached a result similar to 
Jones by effectively expanding the definition of state action. Lloyd Corp. v. 
Whi.ffen89 held that the state constitution's free speech guarantee pre­
cluded a state j udge from enjoining a political speech and signature 
gathering in a large s hopping center .90 The court avoided a direct 
confrontation with the state action question. However, since all private 
rights are ultimately defined and enforced by courts, a finding of state 
action based on nothing more than one private citizen seeking j udicial 
84. Id. at 895. The relevant provision in the Texas Bill of Rights is a ''.dual" pro�isio�. 
The first clause states that " [ e ]very person shall be at liberty to sp��k, wr�,te or pubhsh his 
opinions on any subject, being responsible for the a bus� ?f that P.nvtlege, and the second 
clause provides that "no law shall ever be passed curta1hng the hberty of speech or of the 
press." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8 . 
85. 746 S.W.2d at 895.  
86. Id. at 895-96. 
87. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 9 9 1 ,  1 004 ( 1 982); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 ,  1 76-77 ( 1 972). 
88. Rendell-Baker v .  Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 ( 1982); Blum, 451 U.S. 991 .  
89. 89 Or. App. 629, 7 5 0  P.2d 1 1 57 ( 1 988) ,  aff d, 307 Or. 674, 773 P.2d 1
294 (1989). 
90. Id. at 632, 750 P.2d at 1 1 59 .  
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assistance to protect his rights against violation by another private citizen 
would considerably expand the concept of  state action. While the United 
States Supreme Court once appeared to embrace such a the�ry for c.ertain federal constitutional purposes,91 today such facts would be msuffic1ent to 
find state action under the first amendment. 92 
B. Private Discrimination and the Equality Ideal 
The issue of whether state constitutional guarantees of equal protec­
tion create rights enforceable against non-governmental entities has 
aroused far less judicial activity and scholarly scrutiny than have speech 
and private property · rights.93 In light of federal and state statutes 
specifically requiring private and government actors to treat some disfa­
vored classes equally, it is unlikely that state constitutional law will play a 
dominant role in this field.  However, the statutes do not protect all persons, 
and there are indications that some state courts are expanding the class of 
arguably private entities constitutional ly  required to treat others equally.94 
The fourteenth amendment unequivocally states that it applies only to 
government activity;911 accordingly, the Supreme Court has never wavered 
9 1 .  Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 ( 1953)  Uudicial award of damages for breach of 
a racially restrictive covenant constituted state action) ;  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l 
( 1 948) Uudicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constituted state action 
under the fourteenth amendment). 
92. Although the above cases were not overruled, courts have not followed them. They 
are best understood as a response to the unique problems of racial discrimination and the 
balance of substantive rights at issue in those cases. See. e.g., Glennon & Nowack, supra 
note 6, at 238-43; Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a Revised Opinion, 1 1 0 U. PA. L. 
REV. 473, 474-79 ( 1 962); Leedes, supra note 6, at 763-70. 
93. Issues regarding the origin and substantive interpretation of state constitutional 
equality guarantees have received substantial scholarly attention. See, e.g., Schuman, The 
Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities:" A State's Version of "Equal Protection," l 3 
VT. L. REV. 221 ( 1 988) ;  Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 
TEX. L. REv. 1 1 95 ( 1 985) .  However, few commentators have directly addressed the issue of 
whether such guarantees are limited by any state action requirement. See. e.g., Heins, 
supra note 3, at 349-65; Note, Burning Tree, s upra note 3, at 1 240-46; Note, Pathways, 
supra note 3, at 1 25-26. 
94. The lack of statutory protection of women and of gay and lesbian individuals, for 
example, 
_
has forced. these groups to explore the possibility that state constitutions might afford relief from private actors. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. 
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. 1 4  ( 1 979) ;Peperv. Princeton Univ. Bd. of 
Trustees .
.. 
77 N.J. 55,  389 A.2d 465 ( 1978) (gender discrimination). 
95. No State shall . . .  deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 .  
The C:onstitution cont�ins no language expressly prohibiting the federal government 
f�om. d�ny1�g equal pro�ect1on o
f the laws to citizens. However, a prohibition on federal 
d1scnmmat1on, paralleling the prohibition of state discrimination under the fourteenth 
amendment, has been read into the "due process" clause of the fifth amendment. 
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in its holding that private discrimination is  beyond its scope. While the 
Supreme Court once demonstrated a will ingness to expand the boundaries 
of the state action concept to reach cases of racial discrimination ee the 
Burger Court's restrictive approach to the state action concept in' other 
contexts today extends to federal equality rights as well .97 
1 .  State Constitutional Texts 
State constitutional provisions guaranteein g  equality are so variable 
in their wording as to defy definite categorization.98 Nevertheless, as with 
state constitutional guarantees of speech and petition, state equality 
provisions can be grouped according to the extent to which they facially 
indicate whether they apply to private conduct .99 Some either expressly 
state100 or clearly imply101 an intent to restrict only discrimination by some 
Weinbcrger v. Wiesenfcld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n .2  ( 1 97 5 ) ;  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.  497, 
499 ( 1 954) . The fifth amendment, like the fourteenth amendment, was intended to restrict 
only government action. 
96. In cases such as Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U .S.  3 69 ( 1 967) ,  Evans v. Newton, 382 
U.S. 296 (1966), Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 3 6 5  U.S. 7 1 5, 724-25 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  Terry 
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 46 1 ( 1 9 5 3 ) ,  and Shelley v .  Kraemer, 334 U .S.  l ( 1 94 8 ) ,  the Court 
articulated several new and expansive theories by which otherwise private entities were held 
to be sufficiently related to the state to be required to observe fourteenth amendment norms 
of racial neutrality. Although the Court has never stated that the threshold for state action 
would vary depending on the nature of the constitutional rights allegedly infringed, it has 
been noted that the Court at one time appeared more willing to find state action in racial 
discrimination cases. See Gay Law Students Ass'n, 24 Cal. 3d at 473 n.9, 5 0 1  P.2d at 601-
02 n.9, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24 n.9. 
97. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts and Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 
U.S. 522 ( 1 987); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 1 63 ( 1 972);  Evans v. Abney, 396 U .S. 435 
(1970). 
98. However, courts have tended to interpret these facially divergent provisions in 
ways that render them similar in substance. See generally Williams, supra note 93. 
99. Some commentators have argued that such differences in phrasing are significant 
in determining whether a particular practice violates the provision. See, e.g., W illiams, 
supra note 93, at 1 2 1 0- 1 2  ( arguing that provisions prohibiting "discrimination" in the 
exercise of civil rights implies broader substantive protection than is given under the federal 
equal protection doctrine); Note, Pathways, supra note 3 ,  at 1 25-26. As discussed below, it 
does not appear that such variances in wording are often determinative of w?ether a 
provision can apply to private actors. See infra notes 1 1 1 -36 and accompanymg text. 
Nevertheless, the cases indicate that the phrasing of the state guarantee m�y hav� some 
impact on the arguments raised, and state provisions will be grouped in this fashion for 
clarity. 
100. N.H.  CONST. art. 2d; PA. CONST. art. I , § 26; VA. CONST. art. I , § 1 1 . Virginia also 
relies on a separate constitutional provision prohibiting special legislat_
ion. VA. CONST. art. 
IV, §  14. Virginia's constitution, however, grants no greater protection than the federal 
Constitution. See, e.g., Boyd v.  Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 78 1 ,  786 (W.D. Va. 1 986) . Cf Carson 
v. Maurer, 1 20 N.H.  925, 9 3 0-3 1 ,  424 A.2d 825,  8 3 0  ( 1 980) (locating the state equal 
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level of government upon a showing of state action. Other provisions 
impose explicit obligations on private as well as government actors. 102 
Unlike state guarantees of speech and petition, however, the majority 
o f  state equality provisions do not facially indicate whether state action is 
required. Such provisions can be classified into two groups: those following 
the federal Constitution by phrasing the right as a right to "equal 
protection of the law;"103 and those that phrase the right as one of "equality 
under the law," "equality before the law," or the equivalent . 104 In addition, 
many state constitutions lack express constitutional guarantees of equal­
ity, instead reading such rights into more general constitutional language 
including guarantees of "natural" or "inalienable" rights,105 or due 
process ;106 requirements that laws shall have "uniform operation;"107 
protection guarantee in the combination of articles 2d and 1 2th of the New Hampshire 
Constitution). 
101 .  See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
The Louisiana Bill of Rights also contains a separate provision prohibiting discrimination in 
access to public accommodations, LA. CONST. art. I, § 1 2, which was intended by its drafters 
to apply to private infringements. See generally Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the 
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1 ,  6- 10, 37-40 ( 1974). 
102. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ l & 3;  MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 
1 1 . Surprisingly, some of these provisions also have been interpreted to require state action, 
despite their texts. See infra notes 1 1 1 - 1 2  and accompanying text. 
103. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; GA. CONST. art. I, § l ,  para. 2; 
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MICH. CONST. art. 
I, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 .  See Margulies, A Lawyer's View of the Connecticut 
Constitution, 15  CONN. L.  REV. 107, 1 08-09 ( 1 982) (identifying three additional sections 
of the Connecticut Constitution that also protect rights of equality to some degree). 
104. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I ,  § 2; MASS. CONST. Declaration of 
Rights, art. I; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. 
Several states also have adopted separate constitutional provisions explicitly prohibiting 
discrimination based on gender, the majority of which guarantee equality of rights "under 
the law," regardless of sex. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46; N.M. 
CONST. art. II, § 18 ;  PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § l .  For background 
and discussion of the various provisions, see generally Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: 
The Experience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086 ( 1977). 
105. See, e.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 1 5 1  Colo. 235, 380 
P.2d 34 (1962) (construing Cow. CONST. art. I I , § 3) ;  State ex rel. Tomasicv. Kansas City, 
237 Kan. 572, 583, 701  P.2d 13 14, 1 326 ( 1 985)  (KAN. CONST. art. I , § 1 ) ; State v. 
Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 384, 377N.W.2d 5 10 ,  5 1 4  ( 1 985) (NEB. CONST. art. I, § I ) ;  Peper 
v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 79, 389 A.2d 465, 477 ( 1978)  (N.J. CONST. 
of 1 947 art. I, para. l ) ;  Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and 
Social Serv., 1 30 Wis. 2d 79, 83, 387 N.W.2d 254, 256 ( 1986) (Wis. CONST. art. I, § I ) .  
106. See, e.g., State v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 299 Md. 3 1 0, 326-27 n.7, 473 A.2d 
892, 900 n.7 (Ct. App. 1 984) (Mo. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 23) ;  Thompson v. 
Estate of Petroff, 3 1 9  N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1 982) (MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2) ;  T.l.M. Co. v. 
Okla�oma Land Title Ass'n, 698 P.2d 9 1 5, 920-21  (Okla. 1 984) (OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 
7) ;  N1chols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S .W.2d 1 3, 1 8  (Tenn. 1 982) (TENN. CONST. 
art. I , § 8); State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 1 60 W. Va. 1 72, 1 79 233 S.E.2d 3 1 8, 324 
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denials of . .  ar�itrary �wer;"108 �opuli_
st inspired provisions initially 
drafted to forbid granting of special pnvileges or emoluments;10& or a 
combination of several of these or other state constitutional rights.110 Not 
surprisingly, these provisions provide little unambiguous textual guidance 
as to whether state action should be required. 
2. Caselaw: Is State Action Required? 
A great majority of state courts have held that state constitutional 
equality provisions require state action. They have done so regardless of 
(1977) (W. VA. CONST. art. I I I , § 10). In Mississippi, the situation is unclear. See, e.g., 
Genesco, Inc. v. J.C. Penny Co., 3 1 3  So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1 975) (rejecting a challenge to 
Sunday closing laws as violative of due process and equal protection under the fourteenth 
amendment and MISS. CONST. art. 3 ,  § 1 4, without clearly construing the reach of the state 
provision). 
107. See, e.g., Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 66 1 ,  669-70 (Utah 1984) (UTAH CONST. art. 
I, § 24). 
108. See, e.g., Pattie A. Clay Infirmary Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 605 
S.W.2d 52, 55 (Ky. App. 1 980) . (KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 2). 
109. Such provisions generally state that "no law shall be passed" granting any citizen 
or class of citizens "privileges, or  immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally 
belong to all citizens." See, e.g., Valley Nat'! Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538,  554-
55, 159P.2d 292, 299 ( 1 945) (ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 1 3) ;  Cunningham v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am. 417 N.E.2d 1 1 86, 1 1 9 1  (Ind. 1981 ) (IND . CONST. art. I , § 23); Waterloo v. Selden, 251 
N.W.2d 506, 509 (Iowa 1 977) (IOWA CONST. art. I , § 6); State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 
128, 133, 243 N.E.2d 66, 70 ( 1 968) , appeal dismissed and cert . denied, 395 U.S. 163 
(1969) (0HIO CONST. art. I, § 2); State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 370-72, 667 P.2d 509, 512  
(1981) (OR. CONST. art. I, § 20); Roden v .  Solem. 4 1 1 N.W.2d 421 ,  422 (S.D. 1987) (S.D. 
CONST. art. VI, § 18) ;  Darrin v .  Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 868, 540 P.2d 882, 887-88 ( 1975) 
(WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 2) .  
Similar provisions exist i n  the constitutions o f  several other states, including some that 
guarantee equality or freedom from discrimination in more familiar language. See, e.g. , 
CONN.CONST. art. I, §§  1 & 20; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; VA. CONST. art. I, § 4 . 0n the 
origin and development of such provisions, see generally Schumann, supra note 93, at 222-
26; Williams, supra note 93, at 1206-08. 
1 10. See, e.g., Hueytown v. Jiffy Chek Co., 342 So. 2d 761 , 762 (Ala. 1977) 
(construing a general right of equality from the combination of ALA. CoN_
ST .. art. I , § §  1, 6 & 
22, which respectively concern inalienable rights, due process and cnmmal procedural 
rights, and forbidding "special privileges"); State v .  Russell, 103 Idaho 6�9, 7.00, 652 P.2d 
203, 204 (1982) (construing a general equality guarantee from the combmation of IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, §§ l ,  1 3, & 1 8, which respectively speak of inalienable rights, due process and 
access to courts for the redress of injuries); State v.  Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 1 0 1 Nev. 6?8, 
708 P.2d 1022 ( 1985)  (construing NEV. CONST. art. I ,  § 1 & art. IV, § 2 1 ,  which 
respectively address inalienable rights and uniform application of laws); Nygaard v. 
Robinson, 341 N.W.2d 349, 3 5 7  & n. l (N.D. 1983) (construing N.D. CONST. art . . 1 .  §§ �l 
& 22, which respectively forbid special privileges and require general laws to be �mfor� m 
operation). Cf Du Pont v. Family Court, 1 53 A.2d 1 89, 1 92 (Del. 1959) (co?strumg a right 
to non-discriminatory access to courts from DEL. CoNST. art. I, §§ 7 & 9, which concern due 
process and access to courts, respectively). 
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how the provision in issue is framed. In one extreme example involving a 
gender discrimination claim against a l a rge civic organization, the Alaska 
Supreme Court held, despite a state equality guarantee expressly placing 
its "obligations" on "all persons," that a showing of government action 
was, nevertheless, a prerequisite for a n y  claim brought thereunder. 1 1 1  In so 
holding, the court did not define ·the "all persons" language, nor did it 
present any evidence of the intentions o f  the state constitution's drafters or 
ratifiers. Rather, the decision invoked a general axiom of "American 
constitutional theory" that constitutions restrain governments only.112 
Although arguably ambiguous on their faces, us equality guarantees 
framed like the federal Constitution i n  terms of "equal protection of the 
laws," have been universally construed to apply only to state actors. In Gay 
Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,  114 the 
1 1 1 .  United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1 0 1 3  (Alaska 1983) 
(challenging the association's policy of excluding women from membership, as, inter a/ia, 
violative of ALASKA CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. I, §§ I & 3) .  
1 1 2. Richardet, 666 P.2d at 10 13 . The court cited no authority for this axiom other 
than its own dictum in a prior case. See also Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 
5 1 2, 87 N.E.2d 541 ( 1 949). In this early case involving a race discrimination claim against a 
large privately owned but state aided urban redevelopment project, the New York Court of 
Appeals construed a rather complex constitutional equality provision, N.  Y. CONST. art. I, § 
1 1 . The court held that to the extent the guarantee is phrased in terms of a right to "equal 
protection of the laws," it applied only to governmental actors. Despite the existence of 
other language indicating an intent to protect civil rights from private as well as government 
discrimination, the New York court relied on what it took to be "the plain meaning of plain 
words." In addition, it relied on the identity of language between the state and federal 
provisions and on some historical evidence that the framers of the New York provision 
intended to track the substantive scope of the fourteenth amendment to reach that result. 
Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 530- 3 1 ,  87 N.E.2d at 548. 
1 1 3 . Most of these provisions consist of only a statement of the right without further 
elaboration or restriction. In five states, the equality guarantee is combined in a single 
section with a guarantee of due process. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 ;  HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; 
ILL. CONST. art. I , § 2; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; N.M.  CONST. art. II , §  1 8 .  In another seven 
constitutions, the equality provision appears either alone or in combination with other 
matte�s. AR�. CONST. art. II, § 3;  CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 
(combined with a guarantee of inalienable rights and other matters); MASS. CONST. 
Declaration of Rights, art. I (combined with a guarantee of inalienable rights); MICH. 
CONST. art. I, §.2; S.C. CoNsT .. art. I , § 3 (due process and inalienable rights); TEX. CONST. art. 1.,§ 3.�· In either c�se, nothing on the face of the provisions, other than that they refer to equality of the laws, seems to suggest that only state actors must observe their precepts. 
'?ther state gua.ra�tees are �ritten to obl.igate the government to enforce the right to equality, but do not md1cate agamst whom this enforcement is to be directed. GA. CONST. art. I, § l ,  para. 2; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2 .  While these provisions expressly refer to 
�ov�rnments rather tha.n to private .a�tors, it is not clear that they bar only government mfrmgements. Indeed, if these prov1s1ons are construed to impose an affirmative govern­mental duty to prevent discriminatory action by non-governmental actors they could have the same effect as an equality guarantee directly enforceable against p;ivate infringers. 1 14. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. 14  ( 1 979) .  
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California Supreme Court recognized that the state's equal protection 
guarantee, though phrased in terms of "equal protection of the laws " 
differed from its federal counterpart i n  that it contained n o  explidit 
requirement of government action. 1 1 11  The court, nevertheless ,  h eld that a 
limitation should be read into the state constitution because the  drafting 
history of the equality provision failed to d emonstrate a specific intention 
on the part of the drafters to reach private conduct.116 Courts i n  Illinois, 
Michigan and Connecticut, which also have constitutional guarantees 
phrased in terms of "equal protection of the laws," reached similar 
conclusions on less a nalysis. The Illinois Appellate Court relied on no more 
than the assertion, without citation, that " [i ] t  is fundamental" that state 
constitutional guarantees "apply only to governments and not to individu­
als."117 The Michigan District Court and the  Connecticut Supreme Court 
relied on a reaffir mation, without discussion, that the state and federal 
equal protection provisions "have the same meaning and the same 
limitations."118 The unexpressed presumption appears to be that a state 
constitutional provision framed in the same words as a federal provision 
was intended to apply exactly like its federal model. 
State equality provisions phrased in terms of "equality u nder the law" 
1 1 5. Id. at 468, 5 9 5  P.2d at 598, 1 56 Cal.  Rptr. at 20. 
1 16. Id. (relying o n  Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 1  Cal. 3d 352, 3 66-67, 521  P.2d 
441, 449-50, 1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457-58 ( 1 974) (similar conclusion in the context of a claim 
of violation of the due process protections of the state constitution)) .  The argument that the 
record's silence speaks against applying the constitutional guarantee to non-governmental 
actors is somewhat persuasive in the context of a claim brought under the California 
constitution's guarantee o f  due process before the 1 974 amendments. The relevant 
language existed as part o f  what was then article I, section 13,  a provision that explicitly 
referred to criminal procedural rights and other matters that only a state could infringe. 
The implication that the due process guarantee was originally implicitly limited to state 
action, and that any attempt to broaden its applicability by amendment should have been 
indicated in the amendment's history, seems persuasive in that context. However, such an 
argument is less persuasive with respect to that state constitution's guarantee of equal 
protection, which was essentially a new provision. 
1 1 7. Aldridge v .  Boys, 9 8  Ill. App. 3d 803, 808, 424 N.E.2d 886, 889 ( 1 981) .  
1 1 8. Caldor's, Inc. v.  Bedding Barn Inc., 1 77 Conn. 304, 3 1 4, 4 1 7  A . 2d 343,  349 
(1979); Lockwood v. Killian, 1 72 Conn. 496, 500, 3 7 5  A.2d 998, 1 00 1  ( 1 977) (quoting 
Karpv. Zoning Bd. o f  Stamford, 1 56 Conn. 287, 2 9 5 ,  240 A.2d 845, 849 ( 1 968)).  See also 
Schroederv. Dayton- Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 9 1 0,  9 1 5  (E.D. �ich. 1 977),  modi.fie� in 
part, 456 F. Supp. 6 5 0  (E.D. Mich. 1 979) �equal protection clause m the state const1tut1on 
was intended to provide same rights as its federal counterpart). 
The courts' reliance in Caldor's and Schroeder on this principle of substa?tive �dentity 
between state and federal provisions seems Jess than a cm�plete answe� to the issue m those 
cases. Although two provisions forbid the same substantive conduc�, m the absence of t�e 
explicit "state action" l anguage limiting its federal counterpart •. 1t �oe� not necess�nly 
follow that they must apply to exactly the same classes of potential mfnngers. See infra 
notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
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also have been i nterpreted as applying only to governmental actors. Courts 
in  Texas, 1 19 Florida 120 and Maryland 1 2 1  held that state equality guarantees 
framed in this fashion implicitly apply only to state actors. Several other 
states have implied as much. 122 Although both the Texas and Florida 
courts argued that restrictive readings were required in order to comply 
with their framers' intent, neither provided persuasive documentation that 
the drafters did in fact intend to impose such a government action 
l imitation. 123 The conclusion that government action of some kind is 
required seems to have resulted more from the courts' various perceptions 
that the phrase "under the law" implicitly refers to some kind of 
government action, 124 that it would be a radical departure from prior law to 
1 1 9. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 922, 925 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Junior Football Ass'n of Orange v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70, 7 1  (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1 976) . See also Zentgrafv. Texas A. & M. Univ., 492 F. Supp. 265, 272 (S.D. 
Tex. 1980). 
1 20. Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1 ,  
7 1 5-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 982), affd, 432 So. 2d  567 (Fla. 1983).  The Florida 
Constitution contains two separate statements regarding equality within a single section. 
The first states that " [a] ll natural persons are equal before the law," and the second that 
" [n]o person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap." 
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. The appellate opinion focused on the interpretation of the latter 
clause. 408 So. 2d at 7 1 6- 1 7 . The Florida Supreme Court's affirmance focused on the 
former. 432 So. 2d at 569-70. See infra notes 1 33-34 and accompanying text. 
1 2 1 .  Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 63-64, 501 A.2d 8 1 7, 822-23 
( 1 985). 
122. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm. Against Discrimina­
tion, 391 Mass. 594, 609 n.9, 463 N.E.2d 1 1 5 1 ,  1 1 60 n.9 ( I  984); Garcia v. Albuquerque 
Public Schools Bd. of Educ., 95 N.M. 39 1 ,  393, 622 P.2d 699, 701 { l980) ; Maclean v. First 
Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347, 635 P.2d 683, 688 ( 198 1 ) . 
123. Lincoln, 576 S.W.2d at 925; Junior Football Ass'n, 546 S.W.2d at 7 1 .  The 
Florida court referred only to comments from the floor debate of the Constitutional 
Revision Committee to the effect that "the section was intended to function in a manner 
similar to" the fourteenth amendment. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 7 16. 
1 24. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 7 1 5- 16; Lincoln, 576 S.W.2d at 925; Junior Football 
Ass'n, 546 S. W.2d at 7 1 .  The court in Schreiner was the most explicit in relying on such a 
cons�ruction of the language: "The first sentence [of the Florida equal protection clause] 
specifically states that all persons 'are equal before the law.' This clause indicates that this 
section deals with the relationship between the people and the state." Schreiner, 408 So. 2d 
at 7 15. 
�he court in Lincoln seems to have reached essentially the same conclusion by the 
negative argument tha� th� framers of the Texas constitution had not clearly indicated to 
the contrary that apphcat10n to non-governmental entities was intended. Lincoln, 576 
S.W.2d at 925. The opinion in Junior Football Ass'n, later quoted and followed in Lincoln 
and Zentgrajf, was even more laconic, confining itself to a conclusory statement that "under 
the law" meant that the �iscriminati�n be by
_ 
state action or private conduct "encouraged 
by. enabled by, or close I y interrelated in function with state action." Junior Foot ball Ass' n, 
�46 � .. W.2d at � l . . It appear� th�t these_ courts reasoned that any reference to "law" 
is 
1mphc1tly a restnct1on to applications against those who make, interpret or enforce the law. 
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interpret the state constitution to apply to non-governmenta l  infringers, 
and that it would risk infringing on individuals'  cultural and religious 
views, particularly i n  cases alleging gender discrimination. 126 The Mary­
land court was even more laconic, stating only that its state equal rights 
amendment does not, "of course," apply unless the requirements of the 
government action doctrine are met. 126 
While clearly dominant, this trend is not unanimous. The Pennsylva­
nia Supreme Court held that state action in its federal sense is irrelevant to 
a claim brought under a state equal rights a mendment phrased in terms of 
"equality under the law ." 127 The court determined that the a mendment 
must be interpreted on its own terms, in light of its own language. The court 
did not give any general definition of the phrase "under the law" or discuss 
whether the phrase should be interpreted to impose a requirement of 
government action. Instead ,  it held only that the state provision applied in a 
case in which the private insurer made the operative rate-setting decision 
on its own and the state's involvement was limited to the Insurance 
Commissioner's approval of those discriminatory rates.128 Despite the 
court's reticence, however, if it is willing to find the constitutional 
guarantee applicable under such circumstances, it has effectively read the 
phrase "under the law" out of the provision a s  a meaningful threshold 
restriction. In any event, subsequent lower court decisions in Pennsylvania 
125. Lincoln, 576 S.W .2d at 925. While the validity of such arguments will be 
discussed below, see infra notes 254-68 and accompanying text, it is worth noting that the 
defendants in all of these cases were not private individuals but large institutions or 
associations with significant state contacts. 
126. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53,  63, 501 A.2d 8 1 7, 822 ( 1 985). 
Although the opinion of the court spoke for only a three judge majority, it appears that the 
court was unanimous that some sort of state action doctrine must apply. See Note, Burning 
Tree, supra note 3. 
127. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 57 1 ,  586, 482 
A.2d 542, 549 ( 1984). The court held that plaintiff's challenge to a private insurer's 
automobile insurance rates, which discriminated on the basis of gender, stated a claim 
under the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment. That provision, in words virtually 
identical to its Texas and Florida counterparts, provides that " [ e] quality of rights under the 
law shall not be denied or abridged . . .  because of the sex of the indi�i�ual:" PA. CONST. 
art. I, § 28 . Hartford effectively overruled the prior appellate decision m Murphy v. 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 282  Pa. Super. 244, 257, 422 A.2d 1097, 1 104 ( 1980), ��rt. 
denied,454 U.S. 896 ( 1 98 1  ) ,  which has been cited in academic literature for the proposition 
that the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment applies only to state action. Id. See also 
Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 343  Pa. Super. 1 69, 1 74, 494 A.�d 409, 4 1 2  �1985)  (a.fter 
Hartford, "Murphy must now be viewed as no longer followed with respect to its analysis of 
the E.R.A."). 
128. Hartford Accident, 505 Pa. at 586, 482 A.2d at 549. 
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concluded that claims under the state constitution need not always allege 
any degree of government or official involvement at all . 1 29 
Where a state constitutional guarantee of equality is not express, but 
construed from other provisions, textual arguments shed l ittle light on the 
question whether the guarantee applies to private infringers. However, it 
does appear that equality protections derived from due process clauses or 
other provisions prohibiting the passage o f  any "law" inconsistent with 
their terms, implicitly require some form o f  government action to invoke 
their protections. In contrast, equal ity rights inferred out of guarantees of 
inalienable rights may stand on a different footing. A number of state cases 
during the pre-incorporation period a pplied such generalized guarantees 
of fundamental  rights against private as well as governmental infring­
ers.130 Nothing in the language or the concept of "inherent," "natural" or 
"inalienable" rights requires restriction o f  only governmental infringers. 
Regardless of such arguments from text, however, most state guaran­
tees of this type also have been interpreted to apply only to government 
actors. The Supreme Court of Arizona, for example, held that the 
guarantee of equality that has been read into that state's due process 
provision must be interpreted like the fourteenth amendment to apply only 
to state action .131 In Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines and Risk 
Management Services, Inc. ,132 the Supreme Court of Florida similarly 
rejected arguments that the "inalienable rights" and "deprivation" 
clauses, which guarantee basic rights under the state's constitution, might 
apply to private as well as government infringements.133 While recognizing 
that nothing in  the language of those clauses mandated any state action 
requirement, the court in Schreiner held that the historical record did not 
make it clear that the constitution's drafters intended or communicated to 
the public an intention to engage in what the court deemed a "major policy 
change. "13• 
129. Welsch, 343 Pa. Super. at 1 74, 494 A.2d at 4 1 2; Bartholomew v. Foster, 1 1 5 Pa. �ommw. 430, 43.7 ,  541  A.2d 393, 396 ( 1 98 8 ) .  Since both of these cases, like Hartford, mvolved the heavily regulated insurance industry, it is possible that the .. equality under the 
law" lan�uage may app�y only to private institutions that are heavily regulated by the state, 
perform 1m�rtant pubhc functions or are otherwise connected with the state. However, the 
Pennsylvama courts have not yet announced any such restriction. 
130. S�e infra notes 232-44 and accompanying text. 
1 3 1 .  N1edner v. The Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 1 2 1  Ariz. 3 3 1 ,  332, 590 P.2d 447, 448 ( 1979) . The court gave no reasons for this conclusion but merely stated that the state constitution is to be interpreted like the fourteenth amendment. 1 32. 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1 983) .  
1 33. Id. at 569-70 (construing FLA. CONST. art. 1 ,  § 2, which also provides that " [a]ll persons are equal before the law"). 
1 34. Id. As the court itself noted, however, at least some evidence from the historical 
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At least one exception to this trend may exist for provisions of this type 
also. The �upre�� C�urt of �ew 
.
�ersey, which has read an equality 
guarantee mto an mahenable rights provision, h eld in Peper v. Princeton 
University Board of Trustees, i s& that a female employee could maintain an 
action for sex discrimination against a private university directly under 
that provision . Unfortunately,  the court, like the Pennsylvania court in 
Hartford, did not explain in detail why government action was not 
required. The court noted only that it was necessary to permit Peper's 
claim in order to prevent the rights guaranteed by the inalienable rights 
provision from being rendered "hollow . "136 
3 .  Caselaw: How Should State Action Be Defined? 
As with state s peech and petition rights, courts that have i nterpreted 
state equality guarantees to apply against only state actors differ as to 
defining that requirement.  Most state courts followed federal prece­
dents.m Some courts, however, hav� accepted the argument that a 
showing of state action is required, but have defined that requirement 
expansively to reach certain powerful private actors. 
For example ,  in the Gay Law Students decision mentioned above, the 
California Supreme Court considered whether a public utility's refusal to 
hire homosexuals violated their state constitutional right to ..  equality 
under the law."138 Although the utility was privately owned, the court 
record indicated that an expansive interpretation was intended. Id. at 570. Cf State ex rel. 
Nyitray v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 2 Ohio St. 3d 1 73, 1 75, 443 N.E.2d 962, 964 ( 1983) 
(holding, in a case not raising state action issues, that the "limitations placed upon 
governmental action by the Equal Protection Clauses [of the state and federal govern­
ments] are essentially the same"); Darrin v. Gould, 8 5  Wash. 2d 859, 870-7 1 ,  540 P.2d 882, 
889 (1975) (implying in dictum that government action is required for a claim either under 
WASH. CONST. art. I ,  § 1 2, which prohibits laws granting "special privileges and 
immunities," or under the state equal rights amendment). 
135. 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1 978). For a further discussion of Peper see Note, 
Pathways, supra note 3, at 1 24-25. 
1 36. Peper, 77 N .J. at 79-80, 389 A.2d at 4 77-78. See also Gray v. Serruto Builders, 
Inc., l lO N .J.  Super. 297, 305-06, 265 A.2d 404, 409 (Ch. Div. 1970) (fi�di�g as an 
alternative holding that the non-discrimination clause of the New Jersey constltut1on, N .J. 
CONST. of 1947 art. I, § §  1 & 9, is applicable to a claim of racial discrimination against a 
private landlord). 
137. See, e.g . .  Lockwood v. Killian, 1 7 2  Conn. 496, 500-07, 375 A.2d 998, 1 001-04 
(1977); Pattie A. Clay Infirmary Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 605 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 
App. 1980); Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 8 1 7  ( 1 985) ;  Under 
21 v. City of New York, 65  N .Y.2d 344, 359-64, 482 N .E.2d l ,  7- 1 0, 492 N.Y.S. 2d 522, 
528-3 1 (1985). 
1 38. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,  466-75, 595 
P.2d 592, 597-602, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. 14, 1 9-24 ( 1 979) .  See supra notes 1 14- 1 6  and 
accompanying text. 
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found sufficient "state action" to t rigger state constitutional protection 
from the facts that the utility held a state  franchise that gave it a near 
monopoly on t elephone services, that it  was subject to a high degree of state 
regulation, and that it enjoyed certain quasi-governmental powers such as 
the power of eminent domain. 139 The court also relied on the importance of 
the right to work, the degree of i nj ury done to the plaintiffs, and the 
insulation that defendant's monopoly status provided against attempts by 
the plaintiffs or the public to use ordinary market mechanisms to register 
d isapproval of or effectively change the utility's policies. 140 The utility's 
decision not to employ homosexuals apparently was reached independently 
by the utility company since there was no a llegation that any state official, 
law, or policy contributed to the d ecision. 
It is clear, according to current law, that the facts in Gay Law 
Students would not demonstrate sufficient state action to trigger applica­
t ion of the fourteenth amendment. As the United States Supreme Court 
held in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,  141 state granted monopolies 
- even those which are subject to extensive public regulation and receive 
s ignificant benefits from the state - do not, without more, constitute state 
actors.142 The additional element required to trigger constitutional rights, 
p recisely what was absent in Gay Law Students, is some exercise of the 
state's "coercive power" over the utility or some other "significant 
encouragement, either overt or covert," of  the particular decision of the 
private entity. 143 Mere state acquiescence in decisions independently 
reached even by regulated monopolies is not sufficient. 
In departing from federal precedent, the court in Gay Law Students 
did not explicit ly reject the reasoning or the results of the federal cases. The 
court also did not explain why or under what circumstances the concept of 
state action should be defined differently for state than for federal 
constitutional purposes. On the contrary, the court stated that federal cases 
on this question constituted persua sive precedent. 144 M oreover, it took 
pains to distinguish Jackson on its particular facts145 and to find older 
139. Id. at 469-70, 595 P.2d at 597-99, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 2 1 -22.  
140. Id. at 470-72, 595 P.2d at 599-600, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 2 1 -22. 
14 1 .  4 1 9  U.S. 345 ( 1 974). 
142. Id. at 358 ;  See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 ( 1 987); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 1 63 ( 1 972). 
143 .  San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 546. 
144. Gay Law Students, 24 Cal. 3d at 472, 5 9 5  P.2d at 600, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 22. 1 45. Id._ at 473  ?.9, 595 P.2d at 601 n.9, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.9. The court noted that Jackson �as mapposite because t�e ri�h� all�gedly infringed in that case was less important than the issues of emp�oyme!1t discnmmatton present in the instant case. Regardless of whether one agrees with this assessment of relative importance, it is clear that such 
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federal precedent that could arguably support its conclusion.1'6 Neverthe­
less, Gay Law Students clearly expanded the federal definition of state 
action in result, if not in theory. While subsequent California decisions 
have refrained from aggressively extending the results in Gay Law 
Students to other situations or other rights, 147 a few lower California courts 
have expanded, at least covertly, the category of state actors required to 
observe state constitutional norms of non-discrimination.148 
California does not stand alone. Courts in other states, while refusing 
to find state action in the cases before them, also have implied that they 
could interpret their tests for state action more broadly than allowable 
under current federal law .149 
C. Due Process and the Private Creditor 
The final area of inquiry concerns whether state constitutional 
guarantees against the taking of property without "due process" create 
procedural rights enforceable against private or quasi-private entities. 
This question, like the issue of the applicability of state equality guaran-
arguments go to the merits of the underlying dispute and have nothing to do with the 
threshold question of whether the defendant is a "private" or a "public" actor. 
146. Id. at 472-73, 595 P.2d at 600-01, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23 (discussing Steele v. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 ( I  944) and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209 (1977) ). 
147. The decision in Gay Law Students continues to be good law in California. Some 
subsequent decisions, however, construe the Gay Law Students state action holding as 
applying only to the specific facts of the case. See, e .g. ,  King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 1229 
n.12, 743 P.2d 889, 896 n.12, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 n.12 (1 987 ). California courts also 
have refused to extend the rationale in Gay Law Students beyond the equal protection 
context to other substantive state constitutional rights. See, e.g., Pasillas v. Agricultural 
Labor Relations Bd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 312, 349, 202 Cal. Rptr. 739, 760 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1 145 (1985) (refusing to extend Gay Law Students to 
case claiming violation of the state constitutional rights to freedom of  speech and 
association). 
148. See, e.g., Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 197 Cal. App. 3d 884, 
243 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988). The court 
in Jonathan Club held that where a private club leased beachfront property from the state 
for the exclusive use o f  the club's members, the club was sufficiently "entangled" with the 
state to become a state actor for purposes of both the federal and the state equality 
guarantees, although nothing in the facts showed that any government official or policy had 
anything to do with "coercing" or "encouraging" the club's decision to discriminate. 
149. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n 
.
• 576 S.W.2� 922 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1979) (taking a "middle ground" approach by d.efimng stat� action. as a.ny "private conduct [that) is encouraged by, enabled by or closely 1�terrel�ted m. fu�cti_on �Ith state action")· United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm n Agamst D1scnmmation, 
391 Mass. 594, 609 n.9, 463 N.E.2d 1151, 1 1 60 n.9 (1984) (for state constitutional 
purposes court might "take a broader view of w h a t  constitutes State action than has the 
United States Supreme Court"). See generally Heins, supra note 3. 
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tees, has aroused comparatively little scholarly scrutiny. 1 60 Nonetheless, a 
few state courts have expanded the class o f  arguably private entities that 
are bound to provide the procedural safeguards of notice and an opportu­
n ity to be heard before depriving others of their interests in property. m As 
was the case with the substantive rights a lready considered, the context 
and language of the fi fth and fourteenth a mendments, w hich guarantee 
that persons will  not be deprived of "life, l i berty, or property without due 
process of law, "  indicate that the prohibition was intended to apply only to 
government activity . 162 While the United States Supreme Court repeat­
edly held that the federal due process clauses apply to some state aided 
attempts by private creditors to seize their debtors' assets, 163 it is equally 
clear that state action remains a threshold requirement for this substantive 
right as well. 1 64 
I .  State Constitutional Texts 
Paralleling the United States Constitution, forty-four state constitu­
tions contain explicit provisions guaranteeing that no one will  be deprived 
150. But see Berdon, supra note 3, at 53-54 (advocating a broadened definition of 
state action for state due process purposes) ;  and Comment, Civilian Thoughts On U.C.C. 
Section 9-503 Self-Help Repossession: Reasoning in a Historical Vacuum, 42 LA. L. REV. 
239, 264-266 ( 198 1 )  (arguing that U.C.C. self-help remedies would violate the Louisiana 
due process guarantee). 
The parallel question of whether creditors' self-help remedies constitute sufficient 
state action under the Constitution to trigger application of the fourteenth amendment's 
due process clause was considered in several influential articles in the l 970's. See, e.g., 
Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors ' Rights: An Essay on 
the Fourteenth Amendment (Part Ill), 47 S.  CAL. L.  REV. 1 ( 1 973) ;  Mentschikoff, 
Peaceful Repossession Under The Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and 
Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L .  REV. 767 ( 1 973).  
15 l .  Procedural due process has long been held to encompass two essential elements: 
"notice" at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner; and an "opportunity to be 
heard" by an appropriate trier of fact. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 ( 1 972) (citing 
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. ( 1  Wall.) 223 ( 1 863)) .  
1 52. The due process clause of the fifth amendment is  co-joined with other provisions 
gove�ing criminal procedure and condemnation for public use, both of which are 
exclusively governmental activities. The provision was historically intended to restrict only 
the activities of the nascent federal power. The parallel clause of the fourteenth amendment 
�s �ve� �ore explicit, providing that "[n]o State shall . . .  deny to any person within its 
Junsd1ct1on the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
. 1 53 .  See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U .S. 9
22 ( 1 982); Sniadach v. Family 
Fmance Corp. 395 U.S. 337  ( 1969) . 
154. See, ;.g., Flag� Bros. v.1 
Brooks; 436 U.S. 1 49 ( 1978). Flagg Bros. held that a 
ware�ouseman s sale of its debtor s property pursuant to statutory authorization did not 
�n�tltu�e "state ac:ion" su_
fficient to trigger federal due process rights. The court 
d1stmgu1shed the
_ 
Smad�c� hne �f cases on the ground that "[i]n each of those cases a 
government official part1c1pated m the physical deprivation." Id. at 1 60 n. 1 0. 
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of life, liberty o r  property without due process of law or, i n  a n  older, 
equivalent phrasing, that such deprivations will not occur except in accord 
with the "law of the land."111G The constitutions of twenty-five of those 
states indicate that some kind of govern ment action is required for their 
due process provisions. 1G6 I n  contrast, the due p rocess clause of the South 
Dakota Constitution appears in a single section along with a " right to 
work" clause that is  clearly directed at private entities, and may indicate 
that the due process provision should be construed similarly.1G7 I n  the 
constitutions of the remaining eighteen states the text of the due process 
guarantee does not explicitly indicate the nature of the entities to which it 
applies. This ambiguity exists because the due process provision appears in 
a separate section by itself, us or because it appears in a single section with a 
guarantee of equality that similarly fails to refer to potential private 
infringers or to exclusively governmental action.1119 
155. Six states use the older "Jaw of the land" phrasing in their guarantees of 
procedural protection for life, liberty and property. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2 1 ;  KY. CONST. 
Bill of Rights, § 1 1 ;  N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 9; TENN .  CONST. art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 
19; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 10. The constitutions of New York and Minnesota each contain 
two applicable provisions: one that speaks of "the law of the land" and a second that 
parallels the federal language. N .Y. CONST. art. I, § §  1 & 6;  MINN. CONST. art. 1 ,  §§  2 & 7. 
It is well established, by both federal and state decisions, that "due process of law" and "the 
law of the land" are interchangeable terms embodying equivalent legal rights. Davidson v. 
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 ( 1 877) ;  Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Brand Distribs. of North 
Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 1 4 1 ,  1 46 ( 1 974). 
156. In these constitutions, the due process or "law of the land" provision appears in a 
single section together with provisions regarding criminal procedure or other constitutional 
rights that only governments are in a position to infringe. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA 
CONST. art. I, § 7;  ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2 1 ;  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7;  CONN. CONST. art. I, § 
8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1 3; IOWA CONST. 
art. l, § 9; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1 1 ; Mo. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 24; MASS. 
CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17;  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; 
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N .H .  CONST. pt. l, art. 1 5; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C.  CONST. art. 
I, § 19; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 2; PA. CONST. art. I , § 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; TENN. CONST. 
art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 10th; v A. CONST. art. I, § 1 1 . 
157. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
158. ARIZ. CONST. art. II , § 4; COLO. CONST. art. I I , § 25; GA. CONST. art. I , § 1, para. 
l ; LA. CONST. art. I , § 2; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 1 4; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 1 0; MONT. CONST. 
art. II, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. I , § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 7; · 
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; w. VA. CONST. art. Ill ,  § 1 0; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6. But see 
Garfinkle v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 2 1  Cal. 3d 268, 282 n. 19 ,  578 P.2d 
925, 934 n. 19, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 2 1 7  n . 19  ( 1 978), cert. denied, 43? U .S. 1 1 04 ( 1 9'.9) 
(rejecting an argument that the existence of a state due process clause m a  separate section 
might indicate that it applies to private parties) .  
159. HAW. CONST. art. I , § 5;  ILL. CONST. art. 1 ;  § 2;  ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; N.M. 
CONST. art. II, § 1 8; S .C. CONST. art. I ,  § 3 .  But see, e.g., USA I Lehndorff ��rm�.ge�­
sverwaltung v. Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 1 1 , 20, .348 N .E.2d 83 1 ,  8 3 5
 ( 19  ) ( mms 
due process guarantee limits only government action) .  
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The six states without an explicit due process clause have all construed 
other provisions of their respective state constitutions to provide equivalent 
protections. Provisions used for this purpose include guarantees that courts 
and legal processes shall be available fo r  the redress of grievances,180 
provisions guaranteeing "natural" or "inherent" rights to life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness, 161 or a combina tion of several different state 
constitutional rights. 162 These texts also provide little guidance as to the 
requirement o f  state action. 
2. Caselaw: Is  State Act ion Required ? 
Courts construing these various due process provisions have disagreed 
to some extent with each other and with the United States Supreme Court 
regarding whether state action is present in particular circumstances.163 
They have been virtually unanimous, however, in concluding that the 
requirement must be met in some fashion before private creditors will be 
required to afford their debtors any of the rights guaranteed by state due 
process clauses. This principle has extended to possessory liens by 
garagemen, mechanics and others; 164 non-j udicial sales by such lienors; 186 
non-judicial foreclosures of mortgages or deeds of trust; 166 self-help 
160. IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1 8 ; OR. CONST. art. I. § IO 
("procedural" due process only). See. e.g. , State ex rel. McCormick v. Superior Court of 
Knox County, 229 Ind. 1 1 8, 95 N.E.2d 829 ( 1 95 1 ) ;  Harrison v. Long, 241 Kan. 174, 734 
P.2d 1 1 55 ( 1 987) ;  Carr v. Saif Corp., 65 Or. App. 1 1 0, 670 P.2d 1 037 ( 1 983).  But see 
Roberts v. Gray's Crane & Rigging, Inc., 73 Or. App. 29, 34-35, 697 P.2d 985, 988-89 
( I  985) (noting that older cases found an equivalent of substantive due process in the 
"equality of privileges" language of OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. See generally Linde, Without 
"Due Process:" Unconstitutional l.Aw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 1 25 ,  1 3 5-46 ( 1970) 
· (arguing that Oregon has no state "due process" clause). 
1 6 1 .  These provisions go beyond the concerns of standard due process language. N.J. 
CONST. of 1 947 art. I, § l ;  WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1 .  See, e.g., King v. South Jersey Nat'! Bank, 
66 N.J. 1 6 1 ,  330 A.2d 1 ( I 974); Robinson v. Cahill, 6 2  N.J.  473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 
414  U.S. 976 ( 1 973) ;  Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines v. Board of Public Utility 
Comm'rs, 5 N.J. 1 1 4, 74 A.2d 265, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 876 ( 1 950).  
1 62. See generally Peebles v.  Clement, 63  Ohio St. 2d 3 14, 3 1 7, 408 N.E.2d 689, 691 
( 1 980); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 6 1  Ohio St. 2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 66 ( I  980) (construing a 
due process guarantee into Omo CONST. art. I, §§  l ,  2, 1 6  & 1 9) .  
1 63. See infra notes 1 78-92. 
1 64. See, e.g. , Reinertsen v. Porter, 242 Ga. 624, 627, 250 S.E.2d 475, 477 ( 1 978); 
Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 1 5, 22, 353  A.2d 222, 227 ( 1 976). 
165. See, e.g., Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, l l Cal. 3d 1 46, 1 52, 520 P.2d 
961 ,  964, 1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 1 45, 148-49 ( 1 974); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 
N.Y.2d 1 52, 1 59-60, 379 N.E.2d 1 1 69, 1 1 73-74, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43-44 ( 1 978). 
1 66. See, e.g. , Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 282, 5 7 8  P.2d 925, 934, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, � 1 7  ( 1 978), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1 104 ( 1 979); Cramer �. Metropolitan Savings & Loan, 401 Mich. 2 52, 259, 258 N.W.2d 20, 23 ( 1 977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 958 ( 1 978); Federal Nat'! Mortgage Ass'n v. Howlett, 521  S.W.2d 
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repossessions ;167 bank s et off s ;168 and various  other methods of non-judicial 
debt collection.169 
The sole pos s ibl e e xception to this otherwi s e  cons i stent r e quirem ent 
may be found in King v. Sou.th Jersey National Bank,110 in which the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing s e lf-h e lp repos s es ­
sion of plaintiff's autom obile did not cons titute state action s ufficient to 
trigger federal due proc e s s  protections ,  and that the practic e  "would not 
. .. involve a que stion of fundamental right s ,  nor . .. be offe nsive to" the 
state constitution's guarantee of inalie nable rights . 171 It was unclear from 
thi s language whether the failure to find a viola ti on of the state constitution 
was bas ed on the abs e nce of state actio n  or on the m erits of the claim. 
However, the subsequent u s e  of King in opinions on private infringem ent of 
other state constitutional rights may indicate that due proce s s  rights under 
the New Jersey Constitution can be invoked without a thr e shold s howing of 
anything approaching a federal standard of state action.112 
Notwithstanding this exception, howev er,  the differenc es in the texts 
of various state constitutional due proce s s  provisions have little bearing on 
whether state action i s  required.173 Courts have requir ed the s am e  showing 
of state action for constitutional pr ovi s ions  phras ed in terms of "the law of 
428, 439 (Mo.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 909 ( 1 975);  Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the 
West, 88 Wash. 2d 7 1 8 ,  725-26, 565 P.2d 8 1 2, 8 1 6  ( 1 977); Dennison v. Jack, 304 S.E.2d 
300, 306 (W. Va. 1 983) .  
167. See, e.g., Crouse v .  First Trust Union Bank, 86  A.D.2d 978, 978 ,  448 N_.Y.S.2d 
329, 330 (1982); Helfinstine v. Martin, 561 P.2d 9 5 1 ,  958 (Okla. 1 977) .  
168. See, e.g., Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 1  Cal. 3d  352, 357 ,  5 3 1 P.2d 441 ,  442, 
1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 449, 450 ( 1 974); Meyer v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 96 Idaho 208, 209, 525 
P.2d 990, 991 ( 1 974); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'! Bank of 
Washington, 10 Wash. App. 530, 541, 5 1 8  P.2d 7 34, 7 4 1 ,  cert. denied, 4 1 9  U.S. 967 (1974). 
169. See, e.g., Donahoo v. Household Finance Corp., 472 F. Supp. 3 5 3 ,  3 54-55 (E._D. 
Mich. 1979) (wage assignments); USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung v. Cousins 
Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 1 1 , 20, 348 N .E.2d 8 3 1 ,  8 3 5  ( 1 976) (lessor's distraint); Monta.l�o �· 
Consolidated Edison Co., 92 A.D .2d 389, 393,  460 N.Y.S.2d 784, 787 ( 1 9 8 3) (utility s 
refusal to provide service until disputed bill is first paid); North Carolina Nat'! Bank v. 
Burnette, 297 N .C. 524, 5 34-35, 256 S.E.2d 388 ,  3 9 4  ( 1979) (sale of collateral by secured 
party). 
170. 66 N.J. 1 6 1 ,  1 77-78, 330 A.2d 1 ,  9 - 1 0  ( 1974). 
171. Id. at 178, 3 3 0  A.2d at 10. . r · 172. Justice Pashman, dissenting in King, explicitly rejected any state action imit on 
N.J. CONST. of 1 947 art. I, para. 1 ,  arguing th�t, "New Jers�y courts hav_e Ion� 
r�und 
support for intervention to prevent purely private interference with property nghts m that 
provision. 66 N.J. at 1 94, 330 A.2d at 1 8 .  . . . n Subsequent New Jersey cases dealing with alleged p�ivate mfn�gement o f  f�nd�men
; 
ta! state constitutional rights have paid respectful attention to Justice Pashman s disse · 
See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 559-60, 423 A.2d 6 1 5, 628 ( 1 9 8 0) ;  Peper v. 
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55 ,  76-77, 389  A.2d 465, 47� ( 1 978) . . .  
173. Differences in wording may, however, be important for determmmg how willin
g 
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the land, "174 or  in even more general language, 1711 as for the more common 
"due process o f  law" language, and h ave done so regardless of whether the 
provision appears alone, 176 or in the context of criminal rights guarantees 
or other language implying that the drafters were concerned with only 
governmental infringements. 1 77 
While courts have not extensively explained the reasons for their 
insistence upon state action, two seem at least implicit in most due process 
decisions. First, the concept of due process "of law" is presumed to 
inherently refer to legal, and thus governmental, activity. Secondly, 
concerns parallelling those raised in  speech and equality cases exist: the 
need to avoid judicial interference with the competing rights of other 
private parties; a general view of constitutions as inherently limited to 
governments; and concerns about infringing on an area more appropriate 
for legislative regulation. 
3 .  Caselaw: How Should State Action Be Defined? 
Despite their near unanimity in  requiring state action, state courts 
have differed over how to define this requi rement. W hile many courts have 
adhered to federal precedents, a few have expressly rejected the narrow 
federal definition of state action when interpreting state constitutional due 
process guarantees. A leading example of this expansive approach is 
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc. ,  178 in  which the New York Court of 
Appeals held unconstitutional the portion of the state's lien law that 
permitted a private garageman to enforce its lien by an ex parte auction of 
plaintiff's property without granting pla intiff a prior opportunity to be 
heard. Recogn izing that the facts of the case might not constitute state 
a court will be to find sufficient state action in ambiguous circumstances. See discussion 
infra notes 1 78-95. 
174. See, e.g., Brandt v. St. Vincent Infirmary, 287 Ark. 43 1 ,  434, 701 S.W.2d 103, 
1 05 (1985); North Carolina Nat'l Bankv. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 534-35 ,  256 S.E.2d 388, 
3 94-95 ( 1 979); Kitt,rell v. Kittrell, 409 S.W.2d 1 79, 1 8 1  (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 966); 
175. See, e.g., Peebles v. Clement, 6 3  Ohio St. 2d 3 14, 3 1 7, 408 N.E.2d 689, 691 
( 1 980); Carr v. Saif Corp., 65 Or. App. 1 1 0, 670 P.2d 1037, 1 040 ( 1 983) . 
. 176. See, e.g., Niedner v. Salt River Proj . Agric. Improvement & Power District, 121 Anz. 33 1 ,  332, 5 90 P.2d 447, 448 ( 1 979) ;  Reinertsen, 242 Ga. 624, 250 S.E.2d 475. 
177.  See, e.g., Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277  Md. 1 5, 353 A.2d 
222 (1976); Cramer v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan, 401 Mich. 252, 258 N.W.2d 20 
( 1 977); Campbell v. St. Mary's Hosp., 3 1 2  Minn. 379, 384-85,  252 N.W.2d 58 1 ,  585 
( 1 977); Duffiey v. New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n 1 22 N H  484 490-91 
446 A.2d 462, 466 ( 1 982). 
' . . ' ' 
178.  45 N.Y.2d 1 52,  379 N.E.2d 1 1 69,  408 N.Y.S.2d 39 ( 1 978 ) .  
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action for federal purposes, 179 the court stated that differences in the 
language, history and purposes of the federal and state constitutions 
permitted state courts to apply a more "flexible" definition of the state 
action requirement than would be possible under the fourteenth amend­
ment.110 As the court phrased it, the question for state purposes is whether 
the state "has so entwined itself into the debtor-creditor relationship as to 
constitute sufficient and meaningful State participation which triggers the 
protections afforded by our Constitution."181 The court found sufficient 
state action on the facts before it because the statute expanded upon the 
creditor's common law rights by allowing it to sell as well as seize the 
debtor's property, because the very existence of the  statute permitting such 
self-help remedies served to "encourage" the creditor to use this remedy 
and thereby violate the debtor's rights, and because the statute effectively 
transferred to the private creditor what had been the traditional,  sovereign 
and exclusive power of the state to resolve legal disputes other than by 
consent.m 
These facts would not have been sufficient to find state action under 
federal standards. Only a few months prior to Sharrock, the United States 
Supreme Court had held that New York's version of section 7-2 1 0  of the 
Uniform Commercial Code -which similarly permitted a warehouseman 
to unilaterally foreclose a lien by ex parte sale without affording the debtor 
any opportunity to be heard as to the validity of the debt ·- did not involve 
sufficient "state action" to implicate the fourteenth amendment.183 In so 
concluding, the Court specifically rej ected each of the arguments that 
prevailed in Sharrock.18" The New York court distinguished its facts from 
179. Id. at 157-59, 379 N . E.2d at 1 1 72-73, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43. See also Note, 
"Flexible" State Action. supra note 3. 
180. 45 N.Y.2d at 1 59-61 ,  379 N.E.2d at 1 173-74, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44. The court in 
Sharrock noted the word "state" does not appear in the New York due process guarantee, 
which provides only that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property wit�out due 
process of law." Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
The New York court also relied on the difference between the central purpose of the 
fourteenth amendment and the broader purposes of the state constitution. The federal 
provision was intended to provide minimum standards of protection for individuals "a�ainst 
the potential abuses of a monolithic government, whether that gover�m�nt be natlo�al, 
State or local." Conversely, the Sharrock court saw the state const�tut�on a� granting 
fundamental rights good against the world: "In contrast, State Constitutions m general, 
and the New York Constitution in particular, have long saf�guarde�, any threat to individual liberties, irrespective of from what quarter that penl arose. Sharrock, 45 
N.Y.2d at 160-61,  379 N.E.2d at 1 1 74, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44. 
18 1 .  45 N.Y.2d at 1 6 1 ,  379 N.E.2d at 1 1 74, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44. 
182. Id. at 161-63, 379 N.E.2d at 1 1 74-76, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46. 
183. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 1 49 ( 1 978). 
184. Id. at 1 6 1 -66. 
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those i n  Flagg Bros. by pointing to t h e  need fo r  state cooperation in 
recording the transfer of title to automobiles.1811 However, as many courts 
have noted, this distinction is too fra i l  a reed on which to rest the existence 
of a right to due process. 186 
Subsequent New York decisions have partially extended the '"flexi­
ble" state action rationale of Sharrock to find sufficient state action to 
trigger state, though not federal, due process protections in a case involving 
a private ex parte sale of bailed goods pursuant to section 7-2 1 0. 187 
Nonetheless, where a statute authorizing the private creditor's actions did 
not change pre-existing common law rights, 188 or where the state's 
regulatory bodies merely failed to a ffirmatively require a private utility to 
afford a customer notice and a hearing on a disputed bill before refusing 
new service, 189 courts have found insufficient state action to trigger the due 
process protections of the New York Constitution. 
California courts also have been willing to expand the concept of state 
action in limited situations. I n  a series of cases predating Flagg Bros. , the 
California courts held that private creditors exercising statutory self-help 
remedies greater than common law remedies were engaged in state action 
sufficient to trigger both federal and state due process protections. 190 
185. Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 1 59 n.2, 379 N.E.2d at 1 1 73 n.2, 408 N.Y.S.2d at43 n.2. 
Some courts have accepted similar arguments. See, e.g., Adams v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles, 1 1  Cal. 3d 1 46, 152, 520 P.2d 96 1 ,  965, 1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (1 974). 
186. Most courts addressing the issue have rejected this argument essentially because 
the state's action of issuing new title documents or recording the transfer of title amounts to 
nothing more than noting a fact already accomplished by private action. See, e.g., Smith v. 
Spradling, 532 S.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Mo. 1 976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976) 
(citing inter a/ia Nichols v .  Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 3 74 (E.D. Mo. 1 973), aff d, 
497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1 974)) .  See generally Burke & Reber, supra note 150, at 19-23. 
187. Svendsen v. Smith's Moving and Trucking Co., 76 A.D.2d 504, 431 N.Y.S.2d94 
( 1 980), affd, 54 N.Y.2d 865, 429 N.E.2d 4 I  I ,  444 N .Y.S .2d 904 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 927 ( 1982).  
I88. See, e.g., Jefferds v.  Ellis, I 32 A.D.2d 398,  522 N.Y.S.2d 398 ( 1 987), appeal 
dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 1 002, 521 N.E.2d 445, 526 N .Y.S.2d 438 ( 1 988)  (U.C.C. §§ 9-503 
and 9-504 do not involve state action because self-help repossession under a chattel 
mortgage permitted at common law); accord Crouse v .  First Trust Union Bank, 86 A.D.2d 
978, 448 N.Y.S.2d 329 ( 1 982). 
1 89. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Consolidated Edison of N.Y., 92 A.D.2d 389, 460 
N.Y.S.2d 784 ( 1 983),  affd, 61 N.Y.2d 8 1 0, 462 N .E.2d I49, 473 N.Y.S.2d 972 (I984). 
I 90.  See, e.g., Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court of Merced County, I 7  Cal. 3d 
803 , 8 14- 1 5, 553 P.2d 637,  644-45, 1 32 Cal. Rptr. 477, 484-85 ( 1 976) ,  appeal dismissed, 
429 U.S. 1056 ( I  977);  Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, l I Cal. 3d 352, 3 59-63, 5 2 I  P.2d 44I ,  
444-47, I 1 3  Cal. Rptr. 449, 452-55 ( 1 974) ; Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, I I 
Cal. 3d 146, I52,  520 P.2d 96 1 ,  965, 1 I 3  Cal. Rptr. 1 45, 149 ( 1 974) . But see Connolly, 17 
C�l: �d at 8 I 5  n . I 4, 553 P.2d at 645 n . 1 4, 1 32 Cal. Rptr. at 485 n . 1 4  (acknowledging 
c�1tlc1sm of t�e constitutional distinction between common law and statutory creditor's 
nghts). See infra notes 337-44. 
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Although Flagg Bros. made it impossible for courts to maintain that 
position with respect to the Constitution, California courts have adhered to 
the broader definition for state due process purposes.191 In other areas of 
due process law, however, the California courts have found federal state 
action precedent persuasive.192 
D. Summary and Analysis of the Case/aw 
Examined as a whole, the decisions interpreting state constitutional 
guarantees of speech, petition, equality and due process j ustify a few 
general propositions about how state courts have approached the state 
action issue, and the reasons for their conclusions. 
I .  Applying state constitutional guarantees against private infringers 
not already subject to federal restraint is not a n  issue that is confined to 
specific substantive rights or fact patterns. Ra t h  er, it is an issue of general 
concern across the spectrum of substantive rights. The frequency of 
expansive interpretations varies depending on the substantive right in­
volved, with expansive interpretations more common in cases involving 
speech and petition rights than in cases involving equality or due process 
guarantees. Courts' rationales and a pproaches also have varied. Some 
courts reached expansive results by rej ecting state action limits entirely, 
while others merely rejected restrictive federal definitions of those limits. 
All of the substantive areas studied, however, include examples of courts 
that took an expansive a pproach to the questions of whether and under 
what circumstances non-governmental entities must respect the state 
constitutional rights of others. 
2. The expansive a pproach adopted by some courts appears to rest on 
two underlying perceptions: that non-governmental entities may be in a 
position to curtail  the liberties of others such that an expansive approach is 
necessary to prevent encroachment on state constitutional rights;193 and 
that for structural reasons involving the absence of federalism concerns, 
191 .  Martin v. Heady, 1 03 Cal. App. 3d 580, 586-88, 163 Cal. Rptr. 1 1 7, 12 1 -22 
(1980) (creditor's ex parte sale of collateral pursuant to California's Aircraf� Lien Law 
constituted state action for state due process purposes even though no state official took any 
action in connection therewith, and even though Flagg Bros. made clear that. these facts 
would not constitute state action under the fourteenth amendment) . See also Kmg v · South 
JerseyNat'l Bank, 66 N .J. 1 6 1 ,  19 1 -95, 330 A.2d l ,  1 7 - 1 9  ( l  �74) (Pashman, J., �iss,�nting) 
(arguing that the court "need not impose [as] rigorous a requirement of state action under 
the New Jersey due process clause as under federal law). 
192. See, e.g., Garfinkle v.  Superior Court, 2 1  Cal. 3d 268, 281 -82, 578  P .2d 925, 934, 
146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 2 1 7, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S.  949 (1978).  
193. See, e.g., Robins v .  PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 8 99, 906-07, 592 
P.2d 341 ,  345, 1 5 3  Cal. Rptr. 854, 858  ( 1 979),  a.ffd, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1980) . 
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state courts and constitutions are in a better position than their federal 
counterparts to restrict private parties . 19• These points are uncontroverted 
by even the most restrictive of courts. 
3. The differences in outcomes among courts appea r to result not just 
from differences i n  particular constitutional texts or histories, but from 
basic legal and philosophical divergences as well. Courts interpreting 
identical or virtually identical provisions have reached opposite conclu­
sions regarding state action. 195 Some courts demonstrated a general 
willingness to expand the appl ication of their state constitution beyond 
1 94. One of the traditional reasons for imposing a state action limitation on the Bill of 
Rights is the potential impact on the issue of federalism. State law has traditionally 
governed the rights and responsibilities of private parties inter se; im�ing federal 
constitutional standards on such relationships would effectively shift power away from state 
to federal law. The Civil Rights Cases, 1 09 U.S. 3, 1 1 - 1 3  ( 1883) .  
There are, however, no such federalism constraints on state constitutional guarantees. 
Moreover, state courts construing these provisions are in a better institutional position to 
expand the coverage of such rights because they are unconstrained by the need for uniform 
nationwide applicability. States serve as laboratories, free to consider how to apply such 
guarantees in light of local circumstances or traditions. See generally Maltz, Individual 
Rights and State Autonomy, 1 2  HARV. J.L. & Soc. PoL'Y 1 6 1  ( 1 989) (emphasizing the 
importance of the "structural" federalism issues in construing the federal and state 
constitutions). 
1 95. Compare Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 1 59 Ariz. 37 1,  767 
P.2d 719  ( 1 988) (Arizona's affirmative free speech guarantee of ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6 
does not apply to private conduct) with Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 
96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d l 08 ( 1 98 1 )  (identical language in WASH. CONST. art. I , §  5 does 
so apply). Compare State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535,  423 A.2d 6 1 5  (1 980), appeal dismissed, 
455 U.S. 982 ( 1 982) ("dual" speech guarantee of N.J. CONST. of 1947 art. I, para. 6 applies 
to private infringers) and Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 34 1 ,  1 53 Cal. Rptr. 854 ( 1979), 
affd, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1 979) (CAL. CONST. art. I ,  § 2 applies to private action) with 
Oklahomans For Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Oklahoma, Inc., 634 P.2d 704, 708 n. 1 5  (Okla. 
1 981 )  ("dual" guarantee of OKLA. CONST. art. II ,  § 22 applies only to state actors); 
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88, 378 N.W.2d 337  ( 1 985) (same, 
MICH. CONST. art. I , § 5 ) ;  Shad Alliance v.  Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 
1 2 1 1 ,  498 N.Y.S.2d 99 ( 1 985) (same, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 )  and Jacobs v. Major, 139 
Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 ( 1987)  (same, Wis. CONST. art. I, § 3) .  Compare Welsch v. 
Aetna Ins. Co., 343 Pa. Super. 169, 494 A.2d 409 ( 1 985)  (guarantee of "[e]qualityofrights 
under the law" does not require state action) and Bartholomew ex rel. Bartholomew v. 
Foster, 1 1 5 Pa. Com,mw. 430, 541 A.2d 393 ( 1 988) ,  affd, 522 Pa. 489, 563 A.2d 1 390 
( 1989) (same) with Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1  (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1982), aff d, 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1 983 )  (Florida's guarantee that "persons are equal 
before the law," requires state action); Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n, 576 
S.""!.2d 922 (T�x. Civ. App. 1 979) (guarantee of " [e]quality under the law" requires state 
action) and Junior Football Ass'n of Orange County v.  Gaudet, 546 S. W .2d 70, 7 1  (Ct. Civ. 
App. 1976) (sa!Ile) .  Comp01:e Schreiner, 432 So. 2d at 567 (Florida's "inalienable rights" 
guarantee requires state a�ti?n) with ��per v.  Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 
389 .A.2d 465 ( 1 978) (s1mtlar provlSlon in the New Jersey constitution had no such reqmrement). 
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federal models, 196 while others flatly refused to do so, 197 regardless of the 
substantive right or particular provision at  issue. 
4. All courts, even those most expansive in their interpretations, have 
been cautious in extending the reach of their state constitutions. Expansion 
has been accomplished more often by the less radical method of redefining 
the scope of the state action requirement than by abandoning the 
requirement entirely. 198 Even those courts that rejected state action 
requirements have resisted extending those results much beyond the 
particular fact patterns of  the paradigm cases, or their obvious analogs. 
5. The recent trend has been away from e xpanding the reach of state 
constitutional rights. With some exceptions, most of the decisions taking 
an expansive approach were decided between five and fifteen years ago.199 
Most recent cases have continued to require a showing of state action, 
using a definition similar to the federal courts' definition, before applying 
state constitutional rights. 200 Even the relatively few recent decisions that 
have effectively extended state constitutional rights to cover private 
infringements have often done so in silence201 or by subterfuge,202 rather 
196. California and New Jersey have widened the scope of their respective constitu­
tions in several substantive areas. See, e.g., Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 1 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 854 (speech); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 
P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14  ( 1 979) (equality); Martin v. Heady, 103 Cal. App. 3d 580, 586-
88, 163 Cal. Rptr. 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 -22  ( 1 980) (due process); Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.3d 6 1 5  
(speech); Peper, 7 7  N.J. 5 5 ,  3 8 9  A.2d 465 (equality) ;  King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 
N.J. 161 ,  1 9 1-95, 330 A.2d I ,  17 - 19  ( 1 974) (inalienable rights). 
197. Courts in Connecticut and Michigan, for example, have rejected claims that 
various substantive provisions of their respective state constitutions apply to private 
infringers. See, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 1 92 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1 20 1  ( 1984) 
(speech); Lockwood v.  Killian, 1 72 Conn. 496, 375  A.2d 998 ( 1977) (equal protection); 
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88,  378  N.W.2d 337 ( 1 985) (speech); 
Scbroedcrv. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 9 1 0, 9 1 5  (E.D. Mich. 1 977) (quoting Fox 
v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 379 Mi�h. 579, 1 53 N .W.2d 644, 647 ( 1 967)) (equality); 
Donahoo v. Household Fin. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 353, 354-55 (E.D. Mich. 1 979) (due 
process). 
198. See supra notes 82-92, 137-49 & 1 78-91 .  
199. The major cases expanding on federal definitions of state action for due process 
purposes 
- King, Sharrock, Connolly and Martin - were decided be�ween 1 974 and 
1980. The most important cases expanding speech and petition rights on private property ­
Robins, Schmid, Tate, Alderwood and Batchelder - were all decided between 1 979 and 
1983. The cases providing the most expansive applications of equality guarantees - Gay 
!Aw Students, Peper and Hartford - were decided b�twee� 1 978 an� 1 984. 
200. Most of the important state action cases decided smce 1 98� mvolv�d speech 
rights on private property, and many of these imposed rig�rous state action requ1.rements. 
See supra notes 68-77  and accompanying text. See also Umted States Jaycees v. R1chard�t, 
666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1 983)  (imposing a state action requirement on a state equality 
guarantee). 
201 .  E.g., Hartford Accident & lndem. Co. v .  Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 571 ,  482 
A.2d 542 (1984), discussed supra note 1 27.  
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than by any straightforward reexamination or modification o f  the state 
action requirement. 
6. This recent trend away from expansive interpretations does not 
appear to have resulted from any lessening of courts' awareness of the 
growth of private power. Rather, such fears have been overlain by contrary 
concerns that abandoning or weakening the state action requirement may 
violate the traditional understanding of the purpose of constitutions, that it 
represents a slippery slope likely to lead to the inappropriate imposition of 
constitutional restraints on a broad range of private relations among 
individuals, a nd that altering state action requirements could violate the 
appropriate allocation of powers between courts and legislatures. If state 
constitutions are to serve as a systematic protection against private 
infringement of i ndividual rights, these concerns must be addressed. 
III .  PARSING THE ARGUMENTS: MUST STATE ACTION 
REQUIREMENTS BE READ INTO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
GUARANTEES? 
The arguments against expanding the reach of state constitutional 
rights beyond the confines of state action have been of many types. The 
most common elements include not only instrumental arguments that 
consider the need to avoid interference with the competing rights of other 
private parties, but also appeals to the "plain meaning" of the state 
constitutiona l  texts, the specific drafting history of particular provisions, 
asserted general principles of constitutional interpretation that would a 
priori limit their application to state actors, and arguments concerning 
separation of powers. Before discussing alternate means of defining the 
reach of state rights guarantees, i t  is necessary to consider each of these 
arguments and determine whether they require a state action limitation. 
A. Arguments from the Plain Meaning of Constitutional Texts 
Instances exist in which a particular state provision clearly indicates 
that it protects rights against infringement by any party, private or 
governmental .  203 Other provisions equ ally clearly indicate by their 
words20• or context206 that they apply only to governmental actors. In most 
cases, however, the provisions leave open the question o f  to whom they 
202. E.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 89 Or. App. 629, 750 P.2d 1 1 57  ( 1 988) ,  discussed 
supra notes 89- 9 1  and accompanying text. 
203. See supra notes 102 & 1 57 and accompanying text. 204. See supra notes 39-40 & I 00 and accompanying text. 205. See supra notes 101  & 1 56 and accompanying text. 
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apply. For example, state guarantees of freedom of speech expressed in 
language that citizens have a right to "freely speak, write and publish on all 
subjects, being responsible for abuse of that liberty,"206 or presumably 
absolute statements that persons have "inalienable rights" to equality207 or 
due process,208 can support interpretations extending their application to at 
least some private actors. A significant number of courts have i n terpreted 
them in this manner.  209 
A more difficult i nterpretive problem i s  posed by provisions stating, in 
otherwise absolute terms, that citizens are entitled to equality "before the 
Jaw" or "under the law ,"210 or by provisio n s  that conclusively prohibit loss 
of liberty or property absent "due process of law" or the equivalent.211 
Some courts and commentators have argued that the reference to "law" in 
such provisions implies that those provisions refer only to the relation 
between the claiman t  and the state in its  law making or law enforcing 
capacity.212 Such a reading, while plausible,  is  by no means compelled by 
the texts. Any guarantee of freedom expressed as being "of law" or "under 
law" could equally b e  interpreted as constituting no more than a direction 
that the right should be vindicated by legal processes, or a pledge that the 
law will operate to vindicate such � right, o r  that no one, public or private, 
may use the forms and methods of law to violate such rights.213 
206. See supra notes 4 1 -47 and accompanying text. But see Jacobs v. �ajor, 1 39 Wis. 
2d 492, 503-04, 407 N.W.2d 832, 836-37 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  construing a "dual" constitutional 
guarantee of speech -free speech language combined with a separate statement that the 
legislature should pass "no law" abridging speech. Interpreting these clauses in light of the 
"presumption" that the state bill of rights applies only to state action, the court found the 
"plain meaning" of these clauses to preclude application to private actors. It is noteworthy 
that this "plain meaning" was derived not from the provision's text, but from an a priori 
presumption. 
207. See supra notes 1 0 5  & 1 30-36 and accompanying text (inalienable rights). 
208. See supra notes 1 6 1  & 1 70-72 and accompanying text (absolute rights to 
equality). 
209. See Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 5 9 2  P.2d 341,  �53 
Cal. Rptr. 854 ( 1 979),  aff d, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1 980), d iscussed supra notes 50-67 (regardmg 
speech and assembly guarantees); Peper v. Princeton Uni_
v. Bd. of'�rus�ees, 7_7 N.J. 5�, 389 
A.2d 465 (1978), discussed supra notes 1 35-.36 (regardmg equality �
tghts mferred into a 
state guarantee of inalienable rights); and Kmg v. South Jersey Nat l Bank, 66 N.J. 161,  
191-93, 330 A.2d 1 ,  1 8  ( 1 974) (Pashman, J., dissenting), discusse� supra note� 1 70-72 
(regarding due process rights inferred from a state guara.ntee of mahena
ble rights). 
210. See supra notes 1 04 & 1 1 9-29 and accompanymg text. 
21 l .  See supra notes 1 58-59 and accompanying text. . 
212. See, e.g., Note, Pathways, supra note 3 ,  at 1 25-26; Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank 
Lines, Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1 , 7 1 5  (Fla. App. 1 98 2 ) .  
2 1 3 .  Most courts that have considered provisions such as these have concluded that 
they apply only to state actors of some kind. See supra notes 1 1 9-26 &: 1 74-76 a�d 
I. d " . 1  · ng" analysis accompanying text. However, these courts hav� not .re .1e on a P am meam . . . · 
The possibility of expansive interpretation ofthts or similar language was at least imphc
1tly 
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Notwithstanding the debate over alternative readings, the basic 
problem with a reliance on textual argu ments or an asserted plain meaning 
of state constitutional guarantees is the inability of any such approach to 
predict results .  Relying on the plain meaning of their constitutional 
provisions, states with virtually identically phrased guarantees have 
interpreted them in divergent ways. 2 14 Courts that wish to impose a state 
action requirement will do so even in the face of constitutional language 
clearly indicating that no such limitation is required.216 States that wish to 
vindicate righ ts against private infringeme.nt can find a way to do so, even if 
the constitutional provision at issue seems to apply only to state actors.11• 
Perhaps as a result of such problems, few courts to date have been willing to 
base their conclusions regarding the application of such guarantees to non­
governmental actors on any subtle parsing of text or appeal to the asserted 
"plain meaning." Instead, the operative d ecisions appear to depend more 
on the courts' views as to the role o f  constitutional guarantees in general or 
on one or more of the arguments considered below.217 
B. Arguments from Constitutional History and Framers ' Intent 
In some cases, state courts have marshalled persuasive evidence that 
their respective framers and ratifiers considered the issue and knowingly 
chose to limit the reach of particular  constitutional guarantees to govern­
menta l  action only. 218 In such circumstances, the argument for retaining a 
recognized in Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 571 ,  586, 
482 A.2d 542, 549 ( I  984). See supra notes 1 27-29. See Skover, supra note 3, at 245 n.58, 
arguing that such language should be interpreted to refer to an extension of protection 
under the "law of the land" clause rather than as an identification of the targets of the 
constitutional prohibition. . 
214. See supra note 1 95 and accompanying text. 
215 .  See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1 983). See 
also supra notes 1 1 1 - 1 2  and accompanying text. 
' 
216. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiff en, 89 Or. App. 629, 7 50 P.2d 1 1 57 ( 1 988) .  See also supra 
notes 89-9 1 and accompanying text. 
. 2 17. A few courts have reached conservative results by explicitly rejecting arguments 
based on language alone. See, e.g., Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol 'y 
Comm., 1 1 3  Wash. 2d 4 1 3 , 424, 780 P.2d 1 282,  1 28 7-88 ( 1 989) (while an early draft of the 
state's spec:ch guarantee contained explicit state action language, the court refused to 
attach significance to the change in language); Richardet 666 P.2d at 1 0 1 2- 1 3  & n.14 
(rejecting petitioner's attempt to distinguish between st�te constitutions guaranteeing 
"equal protection of the laws" and those, like Alaska's, which are phrased more broadly). 
218 .  See, e.g., Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88 ,  208-09, 378 
N.W:2d 337, �45-46 ( 1 985),  in which the court quoted the chairman of the· relevant ?raftmg committee fo� the state's �ece�tly revised constitution as stating the committee's 
intent to generall� r�tam a stat� action hmit for the state bill of rights. Although the debate 
f�used on the Michigan equality rather th�n the speech guarantee, it still provided strong 
evidence that the drafters consciously considered the issue and decided to treat the rights 
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state action limit is certainly compelling. However, arguments that the 
historical record and the intentions of the framers require courts to infer a 
state action limit on other.wise ambiguous state constitutional rights 
guarantees do not always rest on such compelling factual bases. For 
example, several courts have based arguments in favor of imposing a state 
action limit on nothing more than some indication that those drafters 
regarded the government as the pri mary source of potential infringement 
of the rights they sought to protect.219 But while the primary impetus for 
drafting state bills of rights may have been a concern to limit the powers of 
governments, such an argument does not, by i tself, show that the primary 
purpose also was intended to be the sole purpose. 
The same is true for arguments based on the existence of analogous 
federal provisions or on evidence that state constitutional draftsmen 
intended to incorporate substantive protections already protected by 
cognate federal guarantees.220 While such evidence may have some value 
in eliciting the drafters' intentions, it is far less probative than evidence that 
the draftsmen considered the issue and decided to restrict the application 
of such guarantees to traditionally defined state actors. Direct federal 
inspiration for state bills of rights is relatively rare; the original colonies 
adopted their respective bills of rights long before the federal version was 
ever drafted. Subsequently admitted states generally drew inspiration for 
their charters from other states, rather than from the Constitution.221 
Moreover, to the extent that the Constitution may have provided the 
inspiration for including certain additional substantive guarantees, there is 
a significant difference between agreeing that a particular interest is 
worthy of constitutional protection in general, and agreeing with all of the 
specifics as to precisely how and against whom that right will be protected. 
Nor does the absence of affirmative evidence that the framers 
considered state action issues necessarily suggest an intent to restrict the 
reach of state constitutional rights. 222 In light of the difficulty of ascertain-
enumerated as privileges against governmental interference rather than as "rights" in the 
Hohfeldian sense. 
219. See, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 1 9 2  Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1 20 1 ,  1 207-08 
(1984); Jacobs v. Major, 1 39 Wis. 2d 492, 5 1 1 - 12,  407 N.W.2d 832, 840 ( 1 987). 
220. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Killian, 1 7 2  Conn. �9.6, 5�1 -04, 37? �.2d 998, l�l 
(1977) (arguing that state and federal equality pro�1s1ons impose s1�ilar substa�hve 
restraints and, therefore, state provisions also must be interpreted to require state action). 
See also supra note 1 1 8 .  . . 
221 . Linde, supra note 3 1 ,  at 380-82 ( 1980); Utter, Freedon:' and Diversit� m a 
Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declar
ation of 
Rights, 7 U. PuGET SouND L. REV. 491 ,  496-�7 ( 1 984). . 
222. See, e.g., Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lmes, Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1 , 7 1 6  (Fla .. D1�
t. 
Ct. App. 1982), a.ff d, 432 So. 2d 567, 569 ( 1 983)  (absence of discussion of state a
ction m 
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ing any general sense o f  the w i l l  of a d i tf  use group o f  constitutional 
draftsmen,223 and the frequently incomplete nature of the historical 
record, such a lack of evidence may reflect no more than an inevitable 
degree of u ncertainty as to what the framers' intentions were. Or it may 
mean no more than that the issue was never considered.  It does not 
necessarily demonstrate that the draftsmen intentionally chose to retain a 
state action requirement. 
But the essential difficulty goes beyond any of these particular 
arguments. Attempts to rely upon historical evidence of framers' intent in 
order to decide whether to retain a state action limit generally founder on 
the fact that the requisite evidence is often contradictory, unclear or 
nonexistent.2u The problem is particularly acute where the state bills of 
rights were drafted long ago and remain unamended or w here the relevant 
language has been carried forward without substantial change. But even 
where state constitutions have been recently revised and extensive records 
of the drafting history and debates have been kept, it is rare to find any 
overt discussion of the state action issue.2211 
Neverth eless, these problems of proof are not necessarily conclusive. 
Though arguments such as these are generally cast in terms of framers' 
intent, they can be viewed more sympathetically as articulating a set of 
presumptions that courts use to guide their interpretation of constitutional 
rights. If there was a general understandin g  in the legal community at the 
time state constitutions were drafted that constitutional rights by their 
nature applied only to restrict the activities of governments, then it would 
make sense to accept indirect indications that the framers of a particular 
the records indicates that the framers intended that the relevant constitutional provisions 
apply only to government actors). 
223. See generally Brest, supra note 26, at 209- 1 7  (exploring the difficulties of 
"framers' intent" arguments in general). 
224. A good example of the practical difficulty of such a historical or intent-based 
analysis of the state action issue can be found in the debate between Justices Utter and 
Dolliver of the Washington Supreme Court. Compare Utter, supra note 42, at 1 63-66 & 
1 78-80, arguing that the h istorical record concerning the framers' overall intentions and 
specific proposals clearly indicate that they intended to bind individuals as well as 
governments! with Dolliver, supra note 3,  at 450-54, arguing that the framers instead shared a basic, though not always expressed, foundation premise that constitutions bind 
only governments. 
�25-. Half of the current state constitutions are a century old or more. Even those 
constitutions that have been recently redrafted have in most cases carried forward 
provisions in their bills of rights without significant change or discussion. While the 
�mple�eness of the record� vary, it is not surprising that many do not reflect any express 
d1scus�10n. of sue� current issues as the definition of state action. See Note, "Malling" of Constztu�zona� Rights, supra note 22, at 1 1 0, noting the absence of express discussion of 
state action with respect to the speech guarantee in the Michigan Constitution of 1963. 
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constitution shared that common view or to i mpose a burden of production 
and proof on those arguing for a different result.228 But this analysis 
assumes that there was a common agreement on some general principle or 
understanding of the role of bills of rights - that they apply not merely 
primarily, but solely to the actions of government. It  remains to be seen if 
such an absolute principle ever existed in so strong a form. 
C. Arguments from the "General Principle " that Constitutions by Their 
Nature Bind Only Governments 
In addition to arguments about a specific state's drafting history, 
many courts and commentators have raised the related argument that it is 
a traditional foundation principle of A merican constitutional interpreta­
tion that guarantees of individual rights, state or federal, are properly 
understood as directed to limiting only government action, at least in the 
absence of explicit textual or historical evidence to the contrary.227 Courts 
have found authority for this principle both i n  nineteenth century treatise 
writers such as Thomas Cooley228 and modern commentators. 229 But while 
the argument contains some element of truth - fear of governmental 
power was a major motivating force for creating bills of rights - it remains 
considerably overstated. 
If the argument is taken as a claim that constitutional rights by their 
inherent nature can never apply to private action, it is demonstrably 
incorrect. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was established 
that a state's plenary power over citizens could in principle be exercised by 
imposing constitutional restraints on individuals in their dealings with 
each other.230 Today it is clear that state constitutional provisions can be 
226. See, e.g., Dolliver, supra note 3, at 453-54. 
227. See, e.g., Aldridge v. Boys, 98 Ill. App. 3d 803, 807-09, 424 N.E.2d 886, 889 
(1981)  (noting laconically that " [i]t is fundamental that constitutional restraints apply 
only to governments and not to individuals") ;  Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 
N.Y.2d 496, 502-03, 488 N .E.2d 1 2 1 1 ,  1 2 1 5, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 ( 1 985); Alderwood 
Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 247-5 1 ,  635 P.2d 108, 1 18-19 
(198 1) (Dolliver, J . ,  dissenting); Jacobs v. Major, 1 39 Wis. 2d 492, 506-08, 407 N.W.2d 
832, 837-38 (1987);  Dolliver, supra note 3 ,  at 447-54; Ragosta, supra note 3, at 23. 
228. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH. RE�T 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER Of THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION ( 1 868) (c1ted m 
Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3  Wash. 2d 413 ,  780 
P.2d 1282 (1989)) .  
229. Shad Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d a t  503, 488 N.E.2d at 1 21 6, 498. N.Y.,S.2d at 103; 
Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 248, 635 P . 2d at 1 1 8 (Dolliver, J., d1ssentmg); Jacobs, 
139 Wis. 2d at 508, 407 N .W.2d at 838.  . . . 
230. See Utter, supra note 42, at 1 63-66, noting that this prmc1ple was well 
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explicitly drafted and consistently i n terpreted to protect some rights 
against private as well as governmental infringement.231 
The principle that state constitutions bind only governments never has 
been consistently followed. On the contrary, decisions from several states 
show that even before the current interest in state constitutions as sources 
of individual rights, considerable precedent already existed for the d irect 
application of a wide range of state con s ti tutional guarantees against some 
private parties. Labor unions were a frequent target of such decisions. 
Courts in Pennsylvania,232 Californi a,233 New Jersey23" and Massachu­
setts236 all held that state guarantees of inherent and inalienable rights of 
life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness prohibited unions from 
attempting to interfere with the freedom of non-members to pursue their 
livelihood, or with the freedom of e m ployers to hire non-union members. 
Similarly, New York courts held that a state constitutional right to 
procedural due process independently and directly precluded labor un­
ionS, 236 as well as other private voluntary associations,237 from expelling 
members without affording them notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Other state constitutional rights l ikewise received a t  least occasional 
protection from private infringement  during the pre-incorporation era. 
Courts in several states held that state guarantees of freedom of speech, 
press, petition, and assembly prohibited private citizens from interfering 
with the publication of a newspaper,238 precluded a labor union from 
�stablished and popularly understood when the Washington state constitution was adopted 
ID 1 889. 
23 1 .  See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 1 2  and provisions cited supra note 27. 
232. Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327 ( 1903). 
233. Jordahl v. Hayda, 1 Cal. App. 696, 82 P. 1079 ( 1 905). 
. 234. Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Pic�ure Operators,
_ 
1 1 8 N.J. Eq. 1 1 , 1 76 A. 692 (E.& A. 1935) ; Collins v. International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture Machine Operators, 1 1 9 N.J. �\�iO, 241 ,  1 8 2  A. 37, 43-44 (E.& �· 1 935 ) ;  Walsche v. Sherlock, 1 1 0 N .J. Eq. 223, 1 59 
A: 190��:





ves v. Scott, 324 Mass. 594, 598, 87 N.E.2d 833 ,  8 3 5  ( 1 949) . 
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o;, 1 54 Misc. 28 1_, 277 N.Y.S. 8 1  (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), 
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Stock and Petroleum Exchange of New York); 
from a social and literary diub). 
· · · 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1904) (expulsion of a member 
238. E.g., Ulster Square Deal F l . 1 908). The private defendants in t�rs
v
� 
ow er, 5� Misc. �25'. 1 1 1  �.Y.S. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
therefore, might be held to be "st t t 
ase,,acted m combmation with public officials and, a e ac ors under current doctrine. What is striking about 
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expelling a member who signed a petition opposing a union supported 
law,m and prevented the American Legion from taking retaliatory action 
against a member who p ublicly spoke out against a position favored by that 
body ... 0 In Ohio, the state constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion 
was held to prevent a private school from requiring a Jewish student to 
attend Christian services.20 The California constitutional right to the 
pursuit of happiness was held to include a right of privacy, which was 
violated when a private film company made a film about the plaintiff's 
sordid life.141 The New Jersey constitutional guarantee of workers' rights 
to organize and bargain collectively was held to create enforceable rights 
against interference by either a private employer243 or a labor union.24• 
It is certainly true that most court decisions involving state rights have 
involved challenges to government acts, and that some earlier state court 
decisions explicitly hold that particular state bills of rights have no 
application to private infringements. Nonetheless, the fact that a substan­
tial number of pre-incorporation precedents for applying state constitu­
tions to private infringers exist at least disproves any claim that applying 
state constitutional guarantees to private action would be fundamentally 
contrary to the nature or spirit of American constitutions. S uch precedents 
also may demonstrate that such guarantees retain at least the potential for 
contemporary use in dealing with violations of fundamental interests by 
non-governmental entities. Even if the cases applying state guarantees to 
private infringers constitute no more than relatively rare responses to 
unusual problems, it could still be argued that the size and power of some 
this case is that the court did not find it necessary to inquire into the question of the degree of 
"state" involvement in the violation. Rather, the court quite evidently regarded state 
constitutional rights as rights good against the world, which no one could violate: "The 
plaintiff has the constitutional right to publish its newspaper . . . .  No one can take unto 
himself the right of suppressing in advance the publication of the printed sentiments of 
another citizen on any public or private question." Id. at 327, 1 1 1  N.Y.S. at 17- 18  
(emphasis added) . 
239. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 1 1 3  A.  70 ( 1 921). 
240. Gallaher v. American Legion, 1 54 Misc. 28 1 ,  277 N.Y.S. 8 1  (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1934). See also Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 129 N.J.  Super. 379, 324 
A.2d 35 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 66 N.J.  3 1 7, 3 3 1  A.2d 17  ( 1974) . . 
241 .  Miami Military Institute v. Leff, 1 29 Misc. 48 1 ,  220 N.Y.S. 799 (City Ct. 1926). 
See also Barry v. Order of Catholic Knights of Wisconsin, 1 19 Wis. 362, 96 N.W .. �97 
(1903) (holding that an association's rule that limited membership benefits. t? pract1cmg 
Catholics did not violate the state constitutional right to freedom of rehg1on because 
membership in the association was voluntary). 
242. Melvin v .  Reid, 1 1 2 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 9 1  ( 193 1 ) .  
243. Cooper v .  Nutley Sun Printing Co., �6 N .J. 1 8?, 175  A.2d 6 3 9  ( 1961). 
244. Independent Dairy Workers v.  Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Loca� No. 680, 
23 N.J. 85, 99- 1 00, 1 27 A.2d 869, 876-77 ( 1 956). See also Comite Orgamzador de 
Trabajadores Agricolas v. Molinelli, 1 14 N.J .  87, 552 A.2d 1003 ( 1 989). 
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private institutions i n  the modern world call for a n  equally creative 
application of fundamental principles of  law. 
Beyond whatever may be inferred from these precedents, the underly­
ing reality is that the claims made i n  the name of this asserted traditional 
general principle greatly overstate the conceptual distinctions on which it is 
based. To be sure, as Cooley and his contemporaries stated, the major 
motivating purpose for state bills of  rights was to put limits on the ability of 
state governments to legislate or otherwise infringe the rights of individu­
als.2415 This admittedly central purpose, h owever, is not the only purpose 
that such provisions might address.  On the contrary, American state 
constitutions were conceived by their framers as "horizontal" compacts 
among citizens rather than as "vertical" agreements between citizens and 
some pre-existing governing authority. Thus, nothing prevented those 
citizens from binding themselves a s  well a s  the government they created, 
and no reason compels the conclusion that they did not do so. 
The standard view shared by Cooley a nd his contemporaries was that 
state bills of rights generally did not confer or create rights of any kind. 
Rather, they declared rights that citizens a lready possessed by virtue of the 
common law, and by virtue of  the n atural law on which the common law 
was based.246 In the natural law tradition, the distinction that modern 
245. T. COOLEY, supra note 228. See also H .  BLACK, HANDBOOK OF CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW 9- 1 0  ( 1 895); J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1 45 ( 1 870). Note that in Cooley and Pomeroy, quoted above, the 
commentators were speaking of issues other than whether state constitutional rights can be 
protected against private infringement. 
246. T. COOLEY, supra note 228. 
Jn considering state constitutions we must not commit the mistake of 
supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and protected by them, they 
must also be considered as owing their origin to them. The instruments measure the 
powers of the rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed . . . .  {A 
constitution] grants no rights to the people but is the creature of their power, the 
instrument of their convenience. [It is d]esigned for their protection in the 
enjoyment of the rights and powers they possessed before the constitution was 
made . . . .  
Id. at 36-37
_
(quoting Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court, 1 5  Mo. 1 ,  1 4  (Bates, arguendo)). 
It IS to be observed of {state constitutional provisions regarding freedom of 
speech and the press], that they recognize certain rights as now existing, and seek to 
protect and per�et�at� them, by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that 
they sha.ll remam mv1ol�t�. T�ey do not assume to create new rights, but their purpose is to protect the citizen m the enjoyment of those already possessed. We arc 
at on�, therefore, turned back fro!Il these provisions to the pre-existing [common] law, m ord�r that we may ascertam what the rights are which are thus protected and what is the extent of the privileges they undertake to secure. ' 
Id. at 415- 1 7. . 
See also, to similar effect, H. BLACK, supra note 245, at 7-9; J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1 858,  1860 (tracing bills of rights to 
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lawyers draw between the body of law governing relations between 
individuals and the state and the body of law governing relations among 
individuals was far less rigid or defined. On the contrary, natural law 
provided the revolutionary generation with a unified foundation both for 
the common law governing relations between individuals247 and for the 
fundamental public .. liberties" that the colonists asserted against the 
perceived encroachments of the British authorities.248 Although the 
precise content of and remedies available under the law of the land as 
private law were certainly different than under the law as a restraint on 
King and Parliament, both aspects fun ctioned as  complementary parts of a 
single legal tradition that protected individual rights from unjust en­
croachments at the hands of fellow citizens and from violations by the 
"state."248 Thus, it would not be incongruous for those who drafted the 
initial state bills of rights to regard the i nterests listed in  state bills of rights 
as "rights" good against the world, which individuals could vindicate even 
if the source of infringement were not the state.260 
Such arguments may not, however, suffice for state guarantees 
drafted, amended or reincorporated at  a later period, after the orthodox 
view became established that such guarantees apply only to state actors. 
Regardless of the views of the revolutionary era drafters of the initial state 
bills of rights, it could be argued that those who subsequently amended 
those early constitutions or who drafted and ratified the constitutions of 
later admitted states assumed that constitutions generally bind only 
governments, and that i t  is the beliefs and understandings of these 
subsequent framers that must guide interpretation of state constitutional 
guarantees. Despite this argument's force, it does not offer an independent 
reason why state rights must be construed to require state action. If the 
common law sources and noting their use for curbing infringements by government organs 
and people mobilized as popular majorities). 
247. On the natural law basis of private law in the revolutionary period, see generally 
M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LA w 1780 - 1 860 ( 1 977), distinguish­
ing between the colonists' acceptance of British common law as "the law of nature and its 
author," and their suspicion of British statutory law. 
248. See generally E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LA w" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LA w ( 1 9  5 5) ;  Grey, Origins oft he Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental 
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30  STAN. L. REV: 843 ( 1 978).  . . 
249. See E. CORWIN, supra note 248, at 24.  "Many of the rights that the Constitution 
of the United States protects at this moment against legislative power were first protected 
by the common law against one's neighbors." Id. 
250. See generally Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 127 (1987) (the framers of the federal Constit�tion did not intend t.hat th� document 
they drafted was to be considered the sole source of higher law to be apph� by J�dg.e�, but 
was to function only as a part of the broader tradition of natural law protection of md1v1dual 
rights). 
870 RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21 :819 
historical record demonstrates that subsequent re-drafters or amenders 
consciously considered state action issues, their choice to limit the 
application o f  rights may well be entitled to deference. H owever, if the view 
that constitutions "inherently" l imit only governments reflected an unex­
amined assumption by those later constitutional framers - an assumption 
that apparently diverged from the understandings of the very predecessors 
who these later drafters intended to follow - then any claim to deference 
seems much weaker. 2111 If  the latter day framers did err in their assump­
tions regarding the original framers' intent, the purposes behind originalist 
interpretation would suggest that modern courts should give effect to the 
views of the original framers rather than the errors o f  their successors. 
Finally, it could be objected that even if the individual rights protected 
by state constitutions were interpreted a s  part of a natural law tradition 
that also protected those interests from private infringement, this would 
not necessarily require the state constitu tions themselves to be interpreted 
in such a fashion. On the contrary, courts have traditionally had authority 
to protect fundamental interests from some forms of private infringement. 
Such authority, however, did not derive from any written constitution and 
is irrelevant to interpretation of such a document .2112 The purpose of a 
written constitution was to provide the authority for courts to protect those 
rights from infringement by coordinate branches of government, an 
authority that was unclear at best u nder common law. T herefore, to speak 
of a right not only as "fundamental" but also as "constitutional" might 
imply that the specific right should be understood as  a restriction on 
25 1 .  Originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation emphasize that courts 
may not alter the framer's initial intent; otherwise the document's original, ratified political 
and philosophical legitimacy would be undermined. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, supra note 228, 
at 68-70; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-9 (198Q). 
Although relevant to reconstruct the intent of later re-drafters or amenders, a background 
assumption is not a conscious choice and does not constitute a fundamental political act to 
which subsequent generations must defer. 
· 
. �52 . . Fo� example, the 
fundamental right of equal treatment by  private individuals 
w1eldmg s1gmficant de facto power was vindicated by the nonconstitutional common law 
rule tha� requires common carriers or other providers of necessary services to treat all 
P.ro�pective customers equally. The 
fundamental rights of liberty and privacy were 
s1mil�rly protected !rom some forms of non-governmental infringement through the tort 
doctrme of defamat10:°. See -?ener�lly Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 275-8 1 (1963) 
(Do�gl�s, J., concurnng) (dJS<;ussmg the common law duties of businesses affected with a 
pubhc mterest) .  
. The existence of th
is early body of non-constitutional doctrine was not lost on the 
nmete.ent� century commentators. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, supra note 228 (the federal �o�s�1tut10� was based on the pre-existing legal order that already guaranteed a range of 
md1V1dual nghts and personal freedoms). 
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government, regardless of whether the same or a cognate right against 
private infringement also may exist by virtue of another body of law. 
Understood in this fashion, the a rgument that as a matter of general 
principle state "constitutional" rights apply only against governments may 
have considerable historical validity. But, s o  understood, the argument 
may express little more than a semantic distinction. At the very least, state 
and federal bills of rights serve as formal statements of what their drafters 
and the nation a s  a whole consider the most important natural and civil 
rights. Assume, arguendo, that state consti tutional rights are i ndepen­
dently protected against private infringement by other bodies of law and 
that when courts speak of "private infringement of constitutional rights" 
that they would be more correct if they referred to a private infringement of 
rights that are so fundamental that we have also given courts explicit 
constitutional authority to protect them against governmental i nfringe­
ment. ls this a distinction that makes a difference? In either case, the 
statement of the right in a constitution is merely declarative and does not 
create rights. In common parlance of lawyers and laymen alike, such rights 
are generally considered of "constitutional" magnitude regardless of who 
is infringing upon them . 
Nevertheless, there is one level o n  w hich a distinction between rights 
in their more general sense as pre-constitutional "natural rights" and in 
their strict "constitutional" sense as restrictions on government might 
make a critical difference. That is w ith reference to the willingness of 
courts to act on their own to vindicate those rights. Written bills of rights 
and the doctrine of judicial review provided a firm basis from which state 
and federal courts could assert authority to overturn governmental acts 
that violated the rights restated therein .  I n  contrast, as the reliance on 
natural law gave way to the dominance o f  positivist concepts in  the early 
nineteenth century, the traditional justification for courts to independently 
define and vindicate fundamental individual interests from non-govern­
mental infringement declined. As a result, the role of defining the rights of 
individuals inter se was largely taken over by legislatures.263 
For these reasons, the tradition that "constitutional" rights, narrowly 
defined, are directed at  limiting the actions of governments - a tradition 
which some courts have ascribed to Cooley a nd other nineteenth century 
treatise writers - may well exist. Upo n  analysis, however, that tradition 
253. See generally M .  HORWITZ, supra note 247, at 4-30. This .double movem�nt 
demonstrates both the ultimate roots of the state action requirement as 1t has been appl
ied 
outside of the fourteenth amendment context, and
 a reason w?y court.s �ttemptmg to 
vindicate fundamental rights from private infringement cast their analysis m the
 form of 
constitutional interpretation. 
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has far less t o  d o  with whether the framers o f  the state bills of rights 
intended to restrict the scope and appl ication of the rights restated therein, 
than it has to do with whether courts should share with legislatures the 
power to define those rights as they apply to interactions between private 
entities. The real issue is not an independent question of how constitutions 
themselves have traditionally been interpreted, but a question of the 
separation of powers between court and legislature - a question that will 
be taken up in part E, below. 
D. Arguments from the Need to Avoid Interfering with the Liberties of 
Other Private Parties 
The main instrumental reason advanced in favor of a state action limit 
on the reach of constitutionally protected rights is that in the absence of 
such a limitation courts seeking to vindicate the rights of one private party 
might infringe the equally important competing liberties of other private 
parties. This argument has been raised by the United States Supreme 
Court construing the Bill of Rights,21H by state courts construing state 
constitutional rights21111 and by various commentators.2156 But while such 
considerations suggest caution in expanding the reach o f  state constitu­
tional rights, they do not necessarily require that any limits must take the 
form of a state action requirement. 
On one level, the claim that state action limitat ions are freedom 
enhancing reflects the potential for conflict between specific competing 
rights. For example, in cases where individuals exercise their rights of 
speech or petition within shopping centers or other privately owned 
premises, a conflict arises between the expressive rights of one non­
governmental party and the property rights of another. Simi larly, attempts 
to require businesses or private associations to observe constitutional 
norms of equality or due process can infringe on those entities' rights of 
property, freedom of contract or freedom of association . I n  such cases, the 
254. Lugar �· Ednl;ondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 ( 1 982); Columbia Broadcasting 
Sys. v. Democratic Nat l Comm., 4 1 2  U.S. 94 ( 1 973) ;  Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 
U.S. 244, 249-50 ( 1 963) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
255. See, e.g., Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88, 2 1 1 - 1 2, 378 
N.W.2d 337, 347 ( 1 985) ;  Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 503, 488 N._
E.2d 1 2 1 1 ,  1 2 1 5, �98 N.Y.S.2d 99, 1 04 ( 1 985) (Jasen, J., concurring); Southcenter Jomt Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3 Wash. 2d 4 1 3, 780 P.2d 1282 ( 1 989);Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wash. App. 326, 340-41 6 1 3 P.2d 5 3 3  542 rev denied 94 Wash. 2d 1 0 1 4  { 1 980). ' ' ' 
· ' 
256. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 1 49 ( 1 978);  Burke & Reber, supra note 1 50, at 1 0 1 6; Skover, supra note 3 ,  at 253-54; and Note Robins supra note 54, at 659. ' ' 
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state action doctrine arguably performs a valuable service by preventing 
courts from imposing constitutional obligations on either party, since any 
gain in liberty enjoyed by one party would inevitably be offset by the 
freedom lost by the other, a loss made even more egregious by the fact that 
it is coercively imposed by the court. 2G7 
This argument, however, rests on the unspoken assumptions that the 
legal realm is so densely filled with "rights" of constitutional dimension 
that no right can be expanded without i mmediately encountering and 
diminishing another, and that all of these conflicting rights are of roughly 
equivalent weight and importance. While this may be an accurate 
description of some areas of constitutional law, it does not accurately 
describe the particular countervailing righ ts at issue in most state 
constitutional .. state action" cases. Neither rights of property,2H rights of 
group association, 2H nor rights of contract and commercial freedom260 are 
so absolute as to preclude governmental regulation in furtherance of 
competing constitutional values. Whether this result is explained on the 
ground that the substantive content of these rights does not extend to the 
boundaries impl icitly set by competing rights, or whether these rights are 
deemed less important than more favored rights, the result is the same: 
courts and legislatures have some freedom to impose burdens on the 
257. These arguments have been frequently raised by commentators concerned with 
the loss of property rights suffered by owners required to allow speech and petitioning 
activities on their premises. See, e.g., Ragosta, supra note 3, at 32-35; Comment, supra note 
3. Similar arguments can be made with regard to other state constitutional rights. For 
example, any imposition of due process restraints on creditors necessarily diminishes their 
property rights in the collateral they seek. 
258. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 8 2-88 (1 980) 
(property rights of shopping center owners are not so absolute as to preclude reasonable 
state regulation requiring those owners to provide access for speech and petitioning) . 
259. New York Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 ( 1 98 8 )  (local ordinance 
requiring certain private clubs to refrain from discrimination did not facially violate the 
associational interests of the clubs or their members). See also Board of Directors of Rotary 
Int'! v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 48 1 U.S. 537 ( 1 987) ;  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609 (1984). A fortiori, large commercial establishments possess no absolute right� of 
association or managerial discretion that would immunize them from reasonable regulation 
by states in furtherance of similar constitutional goals. Id. at 634-38 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (distinguishing rights of"commercial" association) . Only individuals engaged 
in intimate human relationships enjoy pure associational rights generally exempt from state 
restriction. Id. at 6 17-22. 
260. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 ( 1 97 2) (holding unenforceable so muc� of a 
conditional sales contract as purported to entitle the creditor to replevy the chattel without 
affording the debtor a prior notice and opportunit� to .be h�ard) ;  D.H. Ov�
rmyer. �o. v. 
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 1 74 ( 1 972)  (upholding the const1tut1onahty o�the cognov1t J?ro�1s1on of 
the contract, but indicating that such provisions are generally subject to regulation m order 
to preserve the due process rights of debtors).  
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interests of one set o f  private parties in order to further the constitutional-
[ h 
. . 281 type interests o ot er private parties. 
In any event, regardless of the accuracy of the assumptions underlying 
these arguments, they do not justify so broad and non-discriminating an 
approach to conflict avoidance as an across-the-board state action require­
ment. While some degree of "liberty" is inevitably lost whenever private 
parties are required to conform their conduct to constitutional norms, 
freedoms are also infringed when priva te parties violate those norms. The 
issue is to strike the correct balance. Any existing conflict could be more 
sensitively and appropriately resolved on the merits by weighing all 
relevant factors and balancing the interests actually at stake, rather than 
by any single threshold requirement, such as state action.282 
In addition, state courts and state constitutions are a ppropriate organs 
for resolving the conflicts that arise in these cases. The countervailing 
private interests that would most often be subordinated in such cases -
including the rights of property owners, employers or creditors - have 
traditionally been both founded u pon and limited by state law. Conse­
quently, there is nothing inherently inappropriate in the prospect of a state 
court finding that state constitutions as well as state statutory or common 
law principles must be considered when such private rights must be defined 
or limited.283 
26 1 .  If the implicit assumption was correct that these potentially conflicting rights 
also were protected by the federal Constitution, the argument would prove far more than its 
proponents intend. If all constitutional rights "touch" at their margins, so that to expand 
one would necessarily contract another, then any decision by a state court attempting to 
balance conflicting private rights would deny the federal constitutional rights of the party 
losing the litigation. The supremacy clause, however, prevents this result. Under these 
assumptions, only the United States Supreme Court would have the power to define the 
boundaries between private rights, and state courts and constitutions would effectively be 
deprived of any independent role. This is not to dispute, as Professor Maltz has pointed out, 
that private interests conflict and that state constitutional adjudications may not increase 
the sum total of "rights" in the world. Maltz, Dark Side, supra note 22. The point is that 
state courts and state constitutions may have some legitimate role to play in balancing those 
competing interests. 
262. The utility of a direct choice among competing interests rather than a 
mechanical application of the state action doctrine has been recognized even in the federal 
context. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, More ls Not Less: A Rejoinder To Professor Marshall, 80 
�":'· U.L. REV. 571 ,. 57�-73 0.980). Professor Skover also has argued that state action hmits on state const1tu:ional n��ts guarantees do not effectively preserve liberty, but 
merely render th� operative definition of those rights systematically underinclusive. Skover, 
supra note 3, at 253-54. 
2�3 . A similar poin� was made by the United States Supreme Court in PruneYard 
Sh?ppmg Center v. �obm�, 447 .l!·S.  74 (1 980). In that case, a shopping center owner clam�ed that the Cahforma de�1s.1ons. requiring it to allow expressive activities on its premises had the effect of depnvmg it of federally constitutionally protected property 
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The claim that a threshold state action requirement is freedom 
preserving also can be understood on a nother level a s  a claim that 
individuals should enjoy some realm of a utonomy in which they are free to 
act arbitrarily, to refuse to listen to certai n  points of view for no better 
reason than because they happen to disagree, or to exercise private 
prejudices in their personal dealings with others. Arguably, these are 
important elements of individual autonomy that should never be sacrificed 
to the countervailing interests of others, or even questioned by any court.2s' 
As applied to individual human beings, such arguments have great force2sa 
and argue in favor of limiting the reach of state constitutional rights to 
ensure that an appropriate realm of persona l  individual autonomy can be 
maintained. 
Nevertheless, while arguing in favor of  some limits on the reach of 
state rights, these considerations do not necessarily favor defining that 
limit along the lines of "state action," as that term is ordinarily understood. · 
Most courts relying on such arguments to j ustify reading a state action 
limitation into state constitutions, h ave done so in cases where the parties 
seeking to avoid constitutional restraint were not private individuals but 
business organizations or other relatively powerful and i mpersonal enti­
ties.288 By grouping all  non-governmental entities into a single class of non-
rights. The Court had previously indicated that such an argument had merit in the context 
of an asserted first amendment right of access to such private fora. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
407 U.S. 551 ( 1972) .  It sharply distinguished the situation presented, however, when the 
asserted right of access was based on state rather than federal constitutional principles. In 
the latter circumstance, the state merely is exercising, through its courts, an undisputed 
state police power to define and limit property rights. 44 7 U.S. at 8 1 .  The vindicated state 
constitutional right to speak thus becomes the functional equivalent of an easement 
imposed upon the property by operation ofla w, an easement states may freely impose unless 
it becomes so onerous as to constitute a "taking" of property without compensation. 
264. The erosion of liberty that can result from unrestricted j udicial inquiry into 
private conduct has been frequently noted. See, e.g., Note, Four Alternatives, supra note 
54, at 601;  Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wash. App. 326, 340-4 1 ,  6 1 3  P.2d 533, 541-42, rev. 
denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1 0 1 4  ( 1 980). The United States Supreme Court has frequently noted 
that some personal choice and intimate Gonduct is a fundamental attribute of liberty and 
generally immune from state regulation. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 617-21  ( 1 984); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373  U.S. 267, 274-7 5  ( 1 962) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
· 
265. Burke & Reber, supra note 1 50, at 1 0 1 6. 
266. Defendants in cases raising speech and petition rights have most often been 
shopping centers and universities. See supra notes 50-9 1 .  In addition, they have �ncluded a 
state fair, a large private hospital and an agricultural labor camp. See Umted Farm 
Workers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 201 Cal. App. 3d 1 2 1 3 ,  236 Cal. Rptr. ?8, 
vacated on other grounds, 237 Cal. Rptr. 576, 737  P.2d 779 ( 1987); Oklahomans for Life, 
Inc. v. State Fair of Okla., Inc., 634 P.2d 704 (Okla. 1 981 ); Jone.s �· Memo�ial �osp. Sys., 
746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). Defendants in cases �arsmg equahty r�ghts have 
included insurance companies and other business entities, private clubs and high school 
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state actors, no matter how large, institutionalized or powerful, the state 
action doctrine has served primarily to divert attention from the need to 
protect the autonomy interests of private individuals. It  ha� instead ��nded 
to protect the ability of relatively large a n d  powerful business entities or 
private associations to act arbitrarily, to discriminate, to effectively muzzle 
others, or to infringe on those values of personal autonomy that they assert 
i n  their own defense. 
Finally, abandoning a state action requirement need not sacrifice the 
autonomy interests of private individuals.  On the contrary, those courts 
most active in abandoning or modifying state action requirements have 
consistently reaffirmed that the expansion they envisage is not without 
limit, and that the decisions of private i ndividuals will remain free of 
constitutional scrutiny.287 While the debate continues a s  to how best to 
define alternative limits, all courts considering the issue have excluded 
from constitutional scrutiny any purely private decision by an individual in 
matters truly infringing personal  autonomy.288 
E. Arguments from Separation of Powers: That Private Infringement of 
Fundamental Rights Should Be Regulated by Legislatures, Not Courts 
The most powerful argument employed in defense of reading state 
action limits into state bills of rights is one of separation of powers. This 
argument has been phrased and explained by various courts in different 
ways: that regulation of private relations is inherently a function of the 
athletic associations. See United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 
1 983); Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 1 97 Cal. App. 3d 884, 243 Cal. Rptr. 
1 68, appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 881  ( 1 988) ;  Gay Law Students Ass'n v.  Pacific Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. 1 4  ( 1 979); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank 
Lines & Risk Mgmt., Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1  (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 982), a.ffd, 432 So. 2d 567 
(Fla. 1983); Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53 ,  50 1 A.2d 8 1 7  (1985); 
Hartford Accident & lndem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 57 1 ,  586, 482 A.2d 542, 
549 (1984); Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1979); Defendants in cases raising due process issues have generally been banks, 
business corporations and similar institutional creditors. See supra notes 1 66-67. 
2�7. In Robins a?d .Gay Law Students, the California Supreme Court did not procl�1m a� ab�olute prmc1ple that state constitutional restraints apply across the board to 
all private mfrmgers. Rather, it carefully weighed the particular facts of each case. See 
supra notes 50-53 & 1 38-40 and ac�om�anying text. Where the competing rights of the 
�efen�ant have been greater, Cahforma courts have found constitutional restraints 
mapphcable. See, e.g., Franklin v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 1 72 Cal. App. 3d 322, 342 n.8, 
2 1 8  Cal. R�tr. 228 , 24? n.8 ( 1 985). Courts in New Jersey, Washington, Alaska, Texas and 
Pennsylvania have ach1ev�d the same result through explicit balancing tests. See infra notes 
299-304 and accompanying text. 
268. See infra notes 3 1 6- 18 and accompanying text. 
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legislative branch;299 that the complexity, fluctuating interests and varia­
bility of private relations demand flexibility that constitutional adjudica­
tion cannot provide;210 or that attempts to apply guarantees to the relations 
of non-governmental parties would cause jud ges to inappropriately impose 
their individual beliefs and philosophies o n  other branches of govern­
ment.n1 The common thread is that, regardless of whether it would be 
desirable to require some non-governmental entities to observe constitu­
tional norms, it is properly the business of legislatures, not courts, to define 
and impose those requirements .272 
At the outset, it should be noted that state constitutions and state 
judges occupy a somewhat different position with respect to separation of 
powers issues than do their federal counterparts. Federal law provides a 
"floor" for all competing rights at stake i n  individual rights cases; no state 
decision can denigrate these federal rights, even in the name of the state 
constitutional rights of another party. Consequently, state courts have 
comparatively limited discretion to construe their state constitutions in 
ways that would impose burdens on private parties.273 Moreover, many 
separation of powers arguments apply with less force to state than to 
federal constitutional law. In states with j udiciaries directly elected or 
subject to retention elections, institutional concerns over undemocratic 
decisionmaking should be lessened .21• And even in states with purely 
appointed judiciaries, the relative ease and frequency with which state 
constitutions have been amended significantly lessens the possi bility that 
judicial decisions out of step with popular sentiments will be unchange­
able.2711 Of course, elected judges must respect the prerogatives of 
269. See, e.g. , Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88, 2 1 1 n.28, 378 
N.W.2d 337, 347 n.28 ( 1 985). 
270. See, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 1 92 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1 201 ( 1984); 
Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 
23, 31-32, 5 15  A.2d 1 3 3 1 ,  1 3 35 ( 1986); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic 
Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3  Wash. 2d 4 13 , 780 P.2d 1 282 ( 1 989). 
271 .  See, e.g., Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 503-04, 488 
N.E.2d 1 2 1 1 ,  1 2 1 6, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 1 04 ( 1 985) .  See also Deukmejian & Thompson, All 
Sail and No Anchor - Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 975, 1001 -04 (1979). 
272. This point has been raised by academic commentators as well. See, �;g., L._TR.I.BE, 
supra note 256, at 1 1 49; Note, Robins, supra note 54, at 659-60; Note, Malling of 
Omstitutional Rights. supra note 22, at 1 1 6- 1 8. 
273. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. . . 
274. See generally Skover, supra note 3 ,  at �57-59; Utte�, �tate Constitutional ��· 
the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountab1/zty: ls There a Crocodile in 
the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 1 9  ( 1 989) .  . 
275. The Louisiana Constitution, for example, was completely redraftc:<1 !n 1 974, and 
then amended some 22  more times between 1 974 and 1 988. See generally Williams, In Th
e 
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coordinate branches, and the power to amend the state constitution, 
however easy, should not be taken lightly. 278 Nevertheless, separation of 
powers arg uments developed in the federal context in support of a state 
action requirement cannot be a utomatically transferred to the state 
constitutional  context. 
Viewed solely in terms of state constitutional law, the separation of 
powers question resolves into two related but separable aspects. The first 
focuses on the appropriate allocation o f  authority between courts and 
legislatures and asks whether there are historical or practical reasons 
requiring courts to systematically refrain, in the a bsence of explicit 
statutory direction, from requiring private entities to respect the .. constitu­
tional-type" rights of others. The second focuses on the ditf erences between 
constitutions and other sources of  law, such as statutes or  common law, and 
asks whether constitutions have any legitimate role in regulating the 
relations between non-governmental parties. 
Courts in the common law tradition do not seem restrained by any 
historical or inherent reason from playing a role in regulating the 
fundamental rights of private parties in their relations with each other. The 
task of regulating the ordinary relations of private parties was a major 
Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning 
and Result, 3 5  S.C.L. REV. 353, 382 ( l  984) (noting the ease and frequency of state 
constitutional amendments to "correct" unpopular judicial decisions); Comment, The 
Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and 
Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1 47 3  ( 1 987). 
276. The negative consequences of political methods that overturn unpopular state 
judicial decisions are well illustrated by the recent retention election controversy that 
resulted in the ouster of California Supreme Court Chief Justice Bird and Justices Grodin 
and Reynoso. That campaign demonstrates the dangers of politicization of state constitu· 
tional decisions. See generally Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's 
Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 6 1  S. CAL. L. REV. 1 969 ( 1 988) .  As Dean 
Calabresi noted in a parallel context: 
[T]he position that where procedures for amending constitutions are relatively 
easy courts can use constitutional adjudication to modify or eliminate anachronistic 
laws, as well as to uphold constitutional rights, is simplistic and wrong. 
[Constitutional adjudications are] and should be more than an invitation to 
amend the constitution. Indeed, the easier the procedure for amendment the more 
must the judicial decrees of unconstitutionality put to the people the seri�usness of 
what an amendmen� m.e�ns. 
Only in this way can constitutional rights be protected 
from temporary m�Jonties. [Too easy a reliance on amendment to control judicial 
excess] cheapens, mdeed destroys, the crucial moral force that underlies and 
protects true constitutional decisions. 
':!· CA�A��ESI, A C�M�ON LA� FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 2  ( 1 982) .  See also Note, 
'Mal/mg . of Constllutwnal Rights, supra note 22, at 1 1 7. There is some evidence that contr?ve�stal state constitutional judicial decisions only rarely result in responsive state 
const1tut1onal amendments. Utter, supra note 274, at 36-40. 
· 
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function of traditional common law courts . 277 Courts' innate capacities do 
not change when fundamental rights are involved. American courts have in 
the past found no impediment to t heir a pplication of fundamental 
principles (whether drawn from natural law or from written state constitu­
tions) to controversies between private parties.278 The courts' capacity to 
deal with such questions cannot be v i ewed a s  permanently lost merely 
because the judicial function has become less common in recent decades.279 
Nor can it be said t hat courts lack all democratic legitimacy when 
making decisions of this sort . To the extent that majoritarian choice 
constitutes the ultimate authority for allocating rights a mong private 
claimants, legislatures are, arguably, the single most appropriate forum 
for determining such issues . Courts should, therefore, exercise appropriate 
self-restraint. It does not fol low, however, that courts cannot legitimately 
participate in the process of allocating basic rights among private parties. 
The authority of courts to order private relationships is ultimately founded 
on the longstanding consent of the people and their political leaders. This 
consent, while occasionally questioned in controversial cases, has never 
been substantially withdrawn. Moreover, even in those states where 
justices are appointed rather than elected, the judiciary as a group 
inevitably tend to reflect long term trends in majority sentiment. The 
creation of law by the process of case-by-case development is by definition 
incremental in nature and ultimately the result of many different judges 
confronting variations on a single problem over a period of time. As such, 
the ultimate results of the process can be expected to, and generally do, 
reflect long term societal consensus, rather than the potential ly divergent 
views of one or more well-placed individuals.280 
Similarly, the practical advantages that legislatures enjoy over the 
judiciary in the task of allocating rights among competing private 
claimants are not so overwhelming a s  to completely deprive courts of all 
ability to participate with legislatures as partners in fashioning the 
operative rules governing the circumstances under which non-governmen­
tal entities may be required to respect the fundamental rights of others. 
Although legislative bodies are generally better suited than courts to 
gather some kinds of information and to reconcile the conflicting interests 
277. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-87 ( 1985). 
278. See supra notes 232-44 and accompanying te�t. . , 
279. See generally Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol � Comm., 
1 13  Wash. 2d 4 1 3, 446-49, 780 P.2d 1 282 ,  1 299  ( 1989) (Utter, J . ,  concurring) . 
280. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 67-68 ( 1980); G. CALABRESI, supra note 
276, at 93-95. 
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of different segments of society,281 courts have some compensating 
advantages of their own. As has been recognized in other contexts, the 
case-by-case process of judicial decisionmaking permits greater flexibility 
of response to unforeseeable or s ubtly varying factua l circumstances and 
allows tentative solutions to difficult or closely balanced issues of fact and 
principle to be worked out in practice without committing the deci­
sionmaker to the same result in  future cases.282 Moreover, because case­
by-case decisionmaking is constrained by the need to justify results by 
reference to principles previously announced, it is more likely to ultimately 
result in consistent and intellectually defensible results rather than from ad 
hoc political horse trading. Finally, to the extent that one may fear the 
ability of powerful private entities to wield disproportionate influence over 
political representatives, the relative political isolation of courts may 
provide a practical additional safeguard. 
Moreover, even if concerns over the lack of immediate democratic 
sanction or the practical incapacities of courts constitute a reason for 
courts to defer to legislatures for policy choices, the dividing line between 
the role of legislatures and courts need not necessarily be drawn on the 
basis of whether "state action" is  involved. Certainly Americans expect 
most of the rules governing the daily activities of private parties to be set by 
elected representatives. But they equally expect most of the rules governing 
the activities of government and its officials to be set by those same 
representatives. Judges seem to enjoy, i f  a nything, more practical insight 
and a historically better sanctioned role as partners with legislators in cases 
concerning private rights and duties than in cases concerning government 
operations. The undoubted necessity of judicial self-restraint in all 
situations does not dictate that permissible judicial activity should depend 
on the presence of state action. 
Such arguments address only half of the problem, however, and can be 
construed as fundamentally misleading insofar as they posit a real 
"partnership" between courts and legislatures. The more difficult question 
is the proper role of state constitutions i n  allocating rights among private 
claimants. As man y  courts and commentators have poi nted out, judicial 
decisions based on constitutional i nterpretation, unlike those based on 
28 1 .  See. e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 271 ,  at 1 000. 
�82 .. In �he analogo�s situation where an administrative agency can choose between quas1-leg1slat1ve rulemakmg and quasi-judicial case-by-case adjudication as alternative 
ways .of developing pol�cy, the Court has noted that the latter method has significant practical advantages of its own. See, e.g.! �ational Labor Relations Bd. v .  Bell Aerospace 
Co., 416  U.S. 267, 292-94 ( 1 974); SecuntJes & Exchange Comm'n v Chenery Corp 332 
U.S. 1 94, 202-03 ( 1 947). 
. 
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other sources of law, cannot be changed by ordinary legislative processes. 
Such decisions contemplate a complete displacement of legislative author­
ity and majoritarian decisionmaking, not a cooperative effort by courts and 
legislatures.283 Such objections do constitute additional reasons for j udicial 
self-restraint in interpreting the substance of constitutional rights. How­
ever, these arguments do not demonstrate that constitutionally based 
rights are totally different in kind from those based on other sources of law, 
and are not dis positive of whether fundamental constitutional rights must 
be interpreted as rights against only governmental interference.284 
The claim that decisions grounded in constitutional interpretation are 
permanently beyond majoritarian control significantly overstates reality. 
No judicial decision can do more than establish a provisional "interim" 
rule. Majoritarian processes can overturn any decision; the only issue is the 
relative difficulty of this task. Decisions based on statutes or common law 
can be overturned relatively easily by legislative enactment. Those based 
on the federal Constitution can be overturned only with great difficulty by 
amendment or by the slow and uncertain process of replacing outgoing 
Justices with successors holding different views. As noted above, state 
constitutional decisions fall in the middle of this spectrum .  They can be 
overturned by the relatively easier process of state constitutional amend­
ment or, in many states, by electing justices likely to reconsider controver­
sial decisions. Such methods of state constitutional change are not "easy" 
in any absolute sense, nor should they be. But the state process is 
considerably easier than that required to produce equivalent changes on 
the federal level.  These methods are sufficiently easy to significantly lessen 
the danger that judicial decisions based on state constitutional rights 
guarantees will long or often hamstring popular will in the area of private 
rights.286 Thus, the real issue is not w hether state constitutions preempt 
majoritarian decisionmaking, but w hether the somewhat increased diffi­
culty of overturning decisions based on state constitutions requires that 
state action requirements be systematically read · into state rights 
guarantees. 
283. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 276, at 1 1 - 12; Deukmejian & Thompson, 
supra note 27 1 ,  at 986; Maltz, Dark Side, supra note 22, at 1000. . 
284. See Skover, supra note 3, at 259 (suggesting that the proper pnm�cy ?f s.t�te 
legislatures in allocating private rights can be mainta�ned bes� by su.bstantive Jud
icial 
deference, rather than by threshold tests like the.state action doctrme
, which removes whole 
categories of cases from effective judicial review) .  
285. See supra note 275. Cf Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 27 1 ,. at. 986 
(decrying the anti-democratic impact of expansive in�erp:etations ?f state const1tut1ons, 
but noting that the greater ease of amending state constitutions permits state courts greater 
leeway than federal courts should exercise in similar cases)
. 
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Reformulated in this way, the question becomes whether the risks of 
permitting constitutionally based judicial input outweigh the risks of 
depriving courts of any independent role to determine the extent to which 
fundamental rights can be vindicated against private infringement. This 
may ultimately be a matter of judgment. But the same rationales that have 
been traditionally used to justify j udicial actions as a second line of defense 
for fundamental rights when democra tic processes fail  to prevent govern­
mental violations of those rights would appea r to equally justify similar 
protection when legislative processes fail to protect those rights from 
private-party infringement.286 W hatever the source o f  infringement, the 
legislature concededly has the primary role in determining the operative 
rules. But in both cases, courts applying constitutional norms may be able 
to play a useful role by supplementing or tentatively reversing political 
decisions in  those relatively rare instances where the polit ical branches fail 
to protect substantive rights. I n  the context of state constitutional law, 
where judicial errors are relatively easy to correct, the risks of judicial 
abdication seem greater than the risks of judicial domination. 
Undeniably, the substance of what a state constitution commands 
may differ depending on whether state or private infringement is alleged, 
and the range of permissible results may be significantly broader where 
private rights conflict. But this difference involves the substantive question 
of how a constitutional right to free speech, equal treatment or due process 
is defined in particular circumstances. It does not demonstrate that 
constitutions are irrelevant simply because a private rather than a 
government infringer is at bar .  While such arguments may thus counsel 
judicial self-restraint, they too do not demonstrate that the line between 
permissible and impermissible j udicial activity must be drawn along the 
"state action" frontier. 
The remaining arguments against reliance on state constitutions as 
sources of law to protect rights from n on-governmental interference are 
essentially arguments of prudence: that constitutions are inherently too 
rigid and unchangeable to provide workable rules for a n  area so complex 
286. So�� state co_n�titutional rights guarantees clearly express this view of the role of 
courts by exphc1tly providmg that they are self-executing; courts are thereby empowered to 
enforce them regardless of whethe: t.he legislature acts. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 3a. �ven whe:e the texts a:e �ot explicit, several state courts have implicitly embraced this 
view, holdmg.that certam nghts guaranteed by their constitutions are also to be construed as self-e�f?rcmg grants. See, e.g., Harley v.  Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp. 1 9 1  (E.D. Pa. 
1 979) (citl?g Erdman �· Mitch�ll, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A.  327 ( 1 903) (PA. CONST. art. I, § I is 
self-executmg)) .  Cf Bivens v'. Stx Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 ( 1 97 1 )  (construing a cause of action directly under the fourth amendment). 
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and fast changing as private relations are alleged to be;287 a nd that 
expanding the reach of state constitutional rights will likely have the effect 
of diluting their substantive content .288 
As to the first point,  while constitutional principles are inappropriate 
instruments for regulating the details of p rivate conduct, i t  is far less 
evident that placing constitutional outer bounds on such conduct would 
require excessively detailed regulatio n .  Nothing is so inherently "com­
plex" or "changeable" about decidi n g  on the merits whether privately 
owned public gathering places should be closed to speech and petitioning 
activity, whether large employers may invidiously discriminate against 
homosexual job applicants, or whether financial institutions should notify 
their debtors before engaging in self-help seizure of the debtor's property. 
Respecting the second point, i t  is surely true that the substantive 
constitutional rules that bind government may not always be transferable 
without change into the realm of private i nteractions. However, protec­
tions against government action need not be weakened or diluted. Rather, 
all that is necessary is to recognize that the substantive meaning of 
constitutional norms may change depending on the nature of the violator, 
and to make distinctions accordingly.289 
* * * 
For the reasons discussed above, it is evident that state constitutional 
rights guarantees should not be applied a cross the board to all  types of 
interactions a mong private parties; limiting principles are necessary. 
However, except in rare cases where the state constitutional text or history 
is explicit, such argum ents do not demonstrate that those limits should be 
based on a requirement of state action, instead of some other criterion. The 
construction of  alternative limits on the application of state bills of rights 
on a basis other than a "state action" requirement, and whether such limits 
are preferable to state action, are thus open to consideration on their 
merits. 
IV. CONSTRUCTING LIMITS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
GUARANTEES:  ARE THERE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO "STATE 
ACTION?'' 
Courts that have considered the applicability of state rights guaran-
287. Maltz, Dark Side, supra note 22, at 1003-05 (noting that this argument is 
flawed). . . . "R h . k . S t 288. See Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethznkzng et zn zng ta e 
Action," 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 558 ( 1 985) .  
289. See infra note 296. 
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tees, regardless of their position o n  the state action .que�tion, have 
recognized that some limits must be placed on the application of state 
constitutional rights; they disagree only as to defining those limits. They 
have, for example, uniformly agreed that in certain factual situations -
such as w here anti-abortion demonstrators intrude on the private property 
of abortion clinics - expressive activity is not protected by state constitu­
tional speech and assembly guarantees. Courts that require state action 
concluded that this activity is not protected on the g round that the clinics 
are not sufficiently connected with the govern ment. 28° Courts not requiring 
state action reached identical results by balancing the competing private 
interests at stake.291 
Despite such convergences, the distinction between states that inter· 
pret their constitutions to contai n  an implied state act ion limit on the reach 
of rights guarantees and those that do not remains important. If a showing 
of state action is required before state rights guarantees become operative, 
then those guarantees will be ineffective as a basis for systematic protection 
of individual rights from powerful  non-governmental infringers. Con· 
structing a n  alternative set of l imits on those provisions may extend their 
operative reach, and thus provide a means to control nominally private 
institutions that wield significant  de facto power over individuals. What 
must be determined is whether an alternative set of limits can be 
constructed and whether such limits would be preferable to the state action 
requirement as a means of limiting the application of state rights. 
A. Constructing Alternative Limits: What Factors Are Relevant? 
As was discussed above, some l imits on the reach of state constitu· 
tional rights guarantees must be imposed to preserve the autonomy of 
individual s,292 to maintain an a ppropriate scope for legislative choice in 
290. See, e.g., Ingram v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, [nc., 396 Mass. 720, 488 
N.E.2� 408 ( 1 986); Kugler v. Ryan, 6 8 2  S.W.2d 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 984); State v. Horn, 
139 Wis. 2d 473, 407 N.W.2d 854 ( 1 987) .  But see Parkmed Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, 
Inc., 9 1  A.�.2d 55 1 ,  457 N.y.S.2d 27 ( 1 982) (injunction that prohibited any anti-abortion demonstrations on the privately owned plaza fronting a large office building was overbroad) . 
. 29 1 .  See, e.g., State v. Brown, 2 1 2  N.J. Super. 6 1 ,  5 1 3  A.2d 974 (App. Div.), certif. denied, _
1 07 N .J. 53 ,  5 26 A.2d 1 40 ( 1 986);  Planned Parenthood of Monmouth County, Inc. v. Cannizzaro, 204 N .J.  Super. 53 1 ,  499 A.2d 5 3 5  (Ch. Div. 1 985);  Crozer Chester Medical Center v. May,, 352_
P�. Super. 5 1 ,  506 A.2d 1 37 7  ( 1 986); Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Wo�en s Chmc, 737 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988); Benng v: Share, 1 06 Wash. 2d 2 1 2, 721 P.2d 9 1 8  ( 1 986), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 1050 ( 1 987); City of Sunnyside v. Lopez, 50 Wash. App. 786, 75 1 P.2d 3 1 3  (1988). 292. See supra notes 254-63 and accompanying text. 
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balancing the competing rights and interests of private parties,29s and in 
general, to avoid sacrificing more liberty than would be gained by such
' 
an 
expansion of constitutional reach.29" These considerations suggest some of 
the factors that should contribute to any alternative set of l imits. 
First, to avoid impermissible infringements on zones of personal 
autonomy, state constitutional rights guarantees should be construed to 
bind, in addition to government, only corporatioris, associations or other 
similar entities, and natural persons only to the extent those individuals are 
wielding impersonal power. "Impersonal power" used in this context 
means not the authority enjoyed by all individuals to make personal choices 
but the power that some individuals enjoy - by reason of wealth, position, 
or some other factor - to exercise control over public or business related 
matters that affect many people. It is,  for example, one thing for a Donald 
Trump to decree that political discussion i s  not permitted at his dinner 
table. It would be something quite different for that individual to decree 
that political discussions are not allowed among employees in his hotels.296 
State constitutional rights should not be applied in a ny manner that would 
restrict choices of individual persons acting in private capacities with 
respect to matters that personally a ffect them. 
Second, to preserve the dominant role of legislatures in the definition 
and allocation of private rights, courts should be cautious in expanding the 
substantive reach of state constitutional guarantees as applied to non­
governmental infringers. This caution should encompass both a recogni­
tion that only the most important and fundamental state constitutional 
rights furnish a sufficiently important basis for judicial intervention, and a 
strong resistance to intervention even in support of these core values unless 
those rights are violated in some important respect. Detailed prescriptions 
of private conduct should be avoided and m inor or technical violations that 
might not be tolerated if state action is involved should be considered de 
minimis if a private infringer is at bar.296 
Finally, to maximize the liberty o f  a l l  private parties involved in 
293. See supra notes 269-89 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text. 
295. The distinction is similar to those drawn by other commentators who have 
attempted to define a sphere of public life to which const�tutional rights should apply. See, 
e.g., Heins, supra note 3,  at 3 5 1  (Massachusetts equal rights a�endme�t .should �P�!Y to 
"discrimination that injures its victims in public, social, economic, �r poh�1cal affairs but 
not to "discrimination causing injuries that are private, personal, insulting perhaps, but 
without material impact on public life"). . . . . . . . 
296 The purpose and effect of such a restriction is similar to the goal of Judic
ial 
restraint: which also has been advocated by others. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompso
n, 
supra note 27 1 ,  at 98 1 .  See generally Skover, supra note 3, at 277-79. 
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disputes of this type, infringement of the plaintiffs rights �annot be 
considered in a vacuum or on any absolute scale .  Instead, those rights must 
be balanced against the competing rights of the a l leged infringer. Re­
straints should be imposed only when the imposition on the fundamental 
liberties caused by the challenged action outweigh the imposition of 
constitutional restraints on the li berties of the defendant.1t7 
State decisions holding that  stat e  constitutional  guarantees of funda­
mental rights can apply in the a bsence of state action lend support to such 
an alternative set of limiting principles. Contrary to the fears of some 
critics, t hose decisions have not indicated that state constitutional rights 
guarantees should be binding on a l l  private part ies regardless of the 
circumstances. Rather, these courts appear to be in the process of 
articulating a different set of l imiting principles, not rooted in a threshold 
consideration o f  whether the infringer is connected to the government. 
Though the arguments have not been completely expressed, these cases are 
strikingly similar to the above t hree-factor test both in  their common goal 
of defining a category of arguably "private" actors who can j ustifiably be 
required to observe state consti tutional norms and in their results. 
For example, in State v. Schmid, 298 a case involving the exercise of 
speech and assembly rights a t  a privately owned shopping center, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that  its state constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech was not limit e d  by a ny requirement of state action. The 
court did not, however, hold that  t h e  constitution binds all private parties. 
Instead, the court held that three factors must be considered to determine 
when private property owners would be required to permit such activity on 
their premises: 1 )  the nature and ordinary use of the property at issue; 2) 
the extent of the owner's invitation to the public to e nter those premises; 
and 3) the purpose and nature of the expressive activity at stake/'" 
Other states have taken a similar approach to cases involving free 
speech and private property. For example, in Alderwood Associates v. 
Washington Environmental Cou ncil, 300 another shopping center case, the 
. 297. Approaches to state rights that involve balancing competing interests on the merits also have been advocated by others. See, e.g., Note, Four Alternatives, supra note 54, at 608- 1 2 ;  Note, supra note 30, at 1 522-3 1 .  However, such balancing tests are usually proposed as part of a flexible or shifting definition of state action rather than an alternative to the state action requirement. See, e.g., Glennon & Nowak, s upra note 6; Comment, supra note 49, at 9 5-99; Note, Robins, supra note 54; at 660-62 . 
. 298. 84 N.J. 5 3 5 ,  423 A.2d 6 1 5  ( 1 980), appeal dismissed 455 U.S. 1 00 ( 1982). See supra note 59.  ' 
299. Id. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630 . 
. �00: 96 Wash. 2d 2�0, 635 P.2d 1 08 ( 1 98 1 ).  See supra note 6 1 .  In its subsequent dec1s1on m Southcenter Jomt Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3 Wash. 2d 
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Washington Supreme Court also rejected a state action requirement and 
substituted a multi-factor balancin g  test of the competing interests 
involved. Like the Schmid test, the Alderwood test focused on the nature 
and use of the private property and the nature of the expressive activity. 
Unlike the New Jersey version, however, the Washington test explicitly 
considered the possibilities of effective time, place and manner regulation 
of the activity.301 The California S upreme Court, in Prune Yard, though 
less clear in rejecting the state action concept in its entirety,302 also 
proposed a multipart test for speech and petition access to shopping 
centers. This test included the factors listed i n  Alderwood, plus considera­
tion of the availability of alternative fora .303 Other state courts, while not 
explicitly articulating the precise nature of the test used, also have 
explicitly balanced competing private rights to resolve claims under state 
guarantees of speech and assembly.30" 
Moreover, it appears that decisions abandoning state action limits for 
other state constitutional rights also may be interpreted like Schmid, 
Alderwood and Prune Yard as imposing i nstead a different and more 
expansive - but nonetheless real - set of limits on the applicability of 
those rights. For example, as noted above, a series of Pennsylvania cases 
held that rate setting decisions by private insurers are subject to the 
constraints of the state constitution's equal rights amendment .3011 Al­
though those decisions appear to suggest that those rights apply without 
limit,308 both the unique status of the a utomobile insurance business307 and 
413, 780 P.2d 1 282  ( 1 989), the Washington Supreme Court rejected the Alderwood 
analysis for claims based on the state guarantee of free speech and other rights set forth in 
the Washington Declaration of Rights. It did, however, retain that analytic approach for 
claims against private actors who infringe upon rights contemplated by that state's 
initiative and referendum procedures. Id. at 426, 780  P.2d at 1 289. Before Southcenter 
limited its application, the Alderwood test was successfully applied by lower courts in 
Washington. Id. at 454-57 ,  780 P.2d at 1 303-04 (Utter, J., concurring). 
30 1 .  96 Wash. 2d at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 1 1 6 .  
302. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. . 
303. Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center, 2 3  Cal. 3d 899, 9 10, 592 P.2d 341 , 347, 
153 Cal. Rptr. 8 54, 860 ( 1 978), affd, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1980). 
304. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tait, 774 P.2d 1 85,  1 90 (Alaska 1
_
989) ; C�ozer Chester 
Medica! Center v. May, 3 5 2  Pa. Super. 5 1 ,  506 A.2d 1 377  (1986); Right to Life Advocates, 
Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 987) .  
305. See supra notes 1 27-29 and accompanying text. , 
306. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm r, 505 Pa. 57 1 ,  586, 482 
A.2d542, 549 ( 1 984); Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 343 Pa. Super. 1 69, 1 73-74, 494 A.2d 409, 
412 (1985); Bartholomew v. Foster, 1 1 5 Pa. Commw. 430, 437, 5� 1 A .2� �93, 396 ( 1988) .  
307. As several courts have noted in the context of claim� ansmg under state 
constitutional due process provisions automobile insurers benefit directly fr?m the leg�l ' h · Th· " ptive market ' requirement in all states that drivers must have sue ms�rance. is c� " 
',, 
combined with the special degree of regulation they are subjected to under either no fault 
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the failure of the courts to extend this rationale to other factual situations, 
suggest an alternative explanation. These cases could be reinterpreted to 
hold that some limits on the a pplica tion of state equality rights may be 
required but that the requirement may be met where the defendant 
provides a necessary public service, derives benefits from the state, has 
traditionally been subject to significant regulation, and is a lleged to be 
infringing on important constitutional values. 308 
In similar fashion, the pre-Schmid decisions of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees3°' and 
Kingv. South Jersey National Bank, 310 a lso may be interpreted to intimate 
that non-state action limits may be applied to state guarantees of equal 
protection and due process. The holding in Peper, that Princeton Univer­
sity was bound by New Jersey's equal protection provision despite its 
private status, appears to turn on the importa nce of the right to pursue 
one's livelihood.311  More importantly, the significa nt economic and cul­
tural power wielded by Princeton University and its multiple ties to the 
state and federal government, though not relied on by the court, also may 
be grounds for distinguishing that defendant from others. The holding in 
King, that financial institutions engag ing in self-help repossessions must 
afford their debtors some minimal  due process rights, a lso may be seen to 
have depended, at least implicitly, on the importance of the right at issue, 
the perceived power of such institutions and the coercive impact of 
summary seizures. 
Thus, both the results and reasoning of the cases lend support to the 
three-factor analysis derived a bove.  Although these decisions do not 
discuss whether state constitutional rights guarantees bind private individ­
uals or whether the other, arguably l ess fundamental,  rights should be 
interpreted to apply to non-governmental actors, the results in these cases 
are consistent with such principles. In each case, the private entity required 
laws or state mandated "assigned risk pools," renders them even more "entangled" with the 
state.thanother insurers. c_ompar� Shavers v. Kelly, 402 Mich. 5 54 ,  267 N.W.2d 72 ( 1978) (rely1.ng ?n such facts for its finding that such an insurer was a state actor for Michigan const1tuttonal due process purp<>ses) with King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3 d  1 2 1 7, 743 P.2d 889, 240.Cal. .Rptr. 829 ( 1 987) (noting the same facts but declining to find state action under the Cahforma due process guarantee). 
308. T�e decision in Gay Law Stude'!t� is similar in structure. Although that decision was phrased m terms of an expanded definition of state action rather than an abandonment of such a concel?t, t�e court a�so �ound that the state constitutional right of equality applied only after cons1dermg the s1gmficant power w1"elded by th d r d d · I · I . . e e1en ant an its mu tip e connections with the state. See supra notes 1 3 8-48 and · 309. 77 N.J. 55,  389 A.2d 465 ( 1 978) .  
accompanying text. 
3 10. 66 N.J. 1 6 1 ,  1 77-78, 330 A.2d 1 ,  9- 1 0  ( 1 974) 3 1 1 .  77 N.J. at 77-80, 389 A.2d at  476-77. 
· 
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to observe state constitutional norms was not an individual, but a l arge and 
relatively impersonal entity that wielded significant de facto power over 
individual lives. The individual rights a t  stake i n  these cases - the right to 
engage in political speech and activity i n  a forum that would assure that 
such speech would reach its intended a udience, the right to equal treatment 
by large entities that control access to necessary public services or to a 
significant number of jobs, and the right to notice before private property is 
seized by a creditor - all involved important liberties that were signifi­
cantly infringed . The multifactor tests i n  Schmid and Alderwood are 
attempts to balance, i n  a particular factual setting, the competing private 
rights at stake. I t  requires little imagination to see them a s  instances of a 
broader requirement of balancing competing rights in all cases where 
private parties allegedly infringe state constitutional rights. 
Though additional factors may require consideration, these three 
factors may provide the outline of a n  alternative to the state action doctrine 
as a limit on the applicability of state constitutional rights guarantees. 
B. Constructing Alternative Limits: How Should They Be Applied? 
If the factors outlined above do provide a workable alternative to state 
action, the next issue that must be determined is how those factors should 
be applied. 
A requirement that state constitutional rights should not be a pplied to 
limit the autonomy of individuals acting in a purely personal capacity 
must, if that limit is to be effective, operate as a threshold requirement. 
Regardless of the eventual outcome of litigation, the mere fact that one's 
actions can be questioned in court is  i n  itself a significant burden on that 
individual's privacy and autonomy. Maximum freedom within this per­
sonal zone can be achieved only if the indiv idual is guaranteed freedom 
from constitutional restraint and judicial inquiry .312 
In contrast, the other factors outlined a bove - the i mportance of the 
right allegedly infringed, the degree of infringement and the balancing of 
the competing rights a t  stake - can be considered only on the merits. All 
facts must be known to accurately assess the competing i nterests. Such a 
balancing involves inquiry into the relative importance of the competing 
rights and the degree to which alternative outcomes will infringe those 
rights.313 However, this approach does not suggest that every case must be 
decided on a n  a d  hoc basis after a full trial. The experience with the 
abortion clinic protest cases, for example, already suggests that courts are 
3 1 2. See supra notes 194 & 264-65 and accompanying t.ext. 3 1 3. See supra notes 257-63 & 297-303 and accompanying text. 
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capable o f  deriving . gen�ral cat.egories of simil�r c�s�s in w�i.ch t�e balancing o f  competing rights will usually result in s1m1lar dec1S1ons. • 
The final question addresses the order and manner in which such 
limits should be applied. The requirement that the a l leged infringer not be 
a private individual acting in a personal capacity is a threshold require· 
ment. The requirements that the right infringed be .. fundamental" and 
that the infringement be significa nt also should function as required 
elements of the plaintiff's prima f acie case. Since these facts should be 
within the plaintiff's knowledge and unnecessary judicial inq uiry into the 
conduct of private parties should be avoided, the plaintiff should be 
required to make an initial showing a long these lines . The last requirement 
that the rights gained by imposing judicial restraint must not outweigh the 
rights thereby lost, can of course be d ecided only on a review of the merits 
as a whole.31� 
Looked at superficially, the cases appear to split on the issue of how 
alternative limits should be applied. Schmid and Alderwood considered all 
of the factors identified in their mult i-factor tests before reaching their 
conclusions, and they treated t hose factors as part o f  the analysis of the 
merits of the plaintiff's claims.316 However, subsequent lower court 
decisions in  New Jersey may indicate a significant modi fication of those 
tests. These decisions apply the first element of the Schmid test as a 
threshold requirement rather than a single requirement among several 
parts of a n  inquiry on the merits .  Only if  it is shown a t  the outset that "the 
owner has devoted his property to some public use" will  it be necessary to 
balance the competing interests b y  taking the other elements of the Schmid 
test into account. 317 
Similar results were reached in  Washington u nder the Alderwood 
test. Unless the property at issue is "open to the public,"  its owners need not 
accord state constitutional speech rights to others, apparently regardless of 
3 1 4. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. 
3 1
_
5 .  See Note, Four Alte:natives, supra note 54, at 608- 1 2  (advocating such a direct 
b.alancmg approach to the merits of cases mvolving private infringement of constitutional 
nghts) .  
3 16.  State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535,  563-69, 423 A.2d 6 1 5, 630-33, appeal dismissed, 
455 U.S. 100 ( 1 982); Alderwood Assocs. v .  Washington Envtl. Council 96 Wash. 2d 230 
243, 635 P.2d 1 08, 1 1 6 { 198 1 ) .  
' ' 
3 1 7: Bellemead ?ev. Corp. v. s.chneider, 1 96 N.J. Super. 5 7 1 ,  5 74, 483 A.2d 830, 832 (":PP· D�v. 1 984) (umon memb�rs did not have a state constitutional right to leaflet on the 
private s1d�-:Valks of a .commercial building not generally open for public use). Other New Jersey dec1S1ons applying the Belle mead version of the Schmid test include State v. Brown, 
212 N.J. Super. 6 1 ,  5 1 3  A.2d 974 (App. Div.) ,  certif. denied, 1 07 N.J. 53 ,  526 A.2d 140 
( 1986);.and Planned Parenthood Assoc. v. Cannizzaro, 204 N.J. Super. 5 3 1 ,  499 A.2d 535 (Ch. Div. 1 985),  ajfd, 2 1 7  N.J. Super. 623, 526 A.2d 74 1 (App. Div. 1 987). 
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the other factors .31• Applied in this way, threshold requirements of 
"devotion to public use" or "open to the public" appear to be somewhat 
similar in function and content to an expansive version of the "public 
function" line of traditional federal state action analysis.319 Like some of 
the early applications of the federal  public function test, these new 
articulations of the Schmid and Alderwood standards seem to attempt to 
define at the threshold a category of private entities that are in some 
respects as important as a public entity i s  to the community, and are 
therefore subject to constitutional restraint. 
The split among these courts may be more apparent than real, 
however. In Schmid and Alderwood, the impersonal nature of the alleged 
infringer and the importance of the right at issue were both clear. Once the 
court passed the state action issue, the only remaining issue was the need to 
balance the competing rights of the private litigants. Thus, it is not 
surprising that those courts constructed tests that only balanced those 
interests on the merits. In contrast, the a ppellate courts' reading of a 
threshold requirement of "public-ness" into the Schmid and Alderwood 
tests reflects the same perceptions - that state rights should not be 
interpreted to bind al l  private parties and that the mere fact of judicial 
inquiry can in itself become an imposition on liberty - as underlay the 
conclusions regarding a threshold requirement barring most claims 
against individuals. In the appellate cases, the question of w hether the 
defendants were the kind of entities that should be required to observe 
constitutional norms was much more problematic than it had been in 
PruneYard, Schmid or Alderwood. Those courts were more concerned 
with constructing a version of the test that would shield purely private 
relations from constitutional scrutiny . The method of analysis currently 
followed by the New Jersey and Washington courts does not exactly 
coincide with the analysis advocated here, but the results a nd concerns that 
motivated those decisions are nonetheless consistent with that analysis. 
C. Would Such A lternative Limits Be Preferable to State Action? 
One arguable virtue of analyses based on factors other than state 
action is that they permit individual rights to be vindicated in circum­
stances where such protection seems i ntuitively required, but where the 
318. City of Sunnyside v. Lopez, 50 Wash. App. 786, 792-95, 7 5 1  P.2d 3 1 3, 31_7-19  
(1988) (relying in  part on the New Jersey appellat� decis�on in  J!rown to  hold that a �nvate 
medical center was not so open to the public as to give antiabortion demonstrators a right
 to 
demonstrate on the privately owned premises) .  . 
319. See infra notes 328-29 and accompanying text. 
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infringing party is not part of or  connected to the government. Not 
everyone agrees that such an expansion of  j udicial activity is good. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the recurring efforts by some courts to expand 
the scope of constitutional rights, whether by redefining or by abandoning 
state action limits, reflects a belief that individ uals someti mes suffer de 
facto infringement of important individual liberties at the hands of 
powerful private entities and existing legal controls on the arbitrary 
exercise of non-governmental power are inadequate. To the extent one 
shares that perception, a theory of limits based on other elements provides 
what no state action based theory can :  the possibility of systematic judicial 
protection of basic rights from some forms of private infringement.110 
A related, but less controversial, virtue inheres in the a bility of such an 
analysis to focus the attention of courts on the real interests at stake in 
particular circumstances and avoid anomalous distinctions between func­
tionally identical cases. State action doctrines, no matter how defined, 
create distinctions between cases that do not track any practical differ­
ences but depend solely on the incidental factor of whether the infringer is a 
state actor. For example, it is not obvious why speech and petition rights in 
a municipal stadium, public park or other gathering place should depend 
on who holds the deed to the forum, or why the right of a truckdriver to 
refuse to provide urine samples to his employer should depend on whether 
he is employed by a private firm or by a state department of transportation. 
In such cases, the public or private nature of the infringer makes no 
difference in terms of the effects o f  that deprivation. There is little 
difference to the alleged victim. I do not argue that the claimed constitu­
tional right should prevail i n  all  such cases. But the decision whether 
individual rights should be vindicated should depend on the actual interests 
at stake i n  the particular case, not o n  the functional irrelevancy of the 
identity of the infringer. Analyses of the limits of  constitutional rights 
similar to that proposed here h ave the virtue of forcing courts to decide 
cases on the basis of the competing interests, a process that at least holds 
out the possibility that like cases can be treated alike regardless of who 
owns or controls the alleged infringer.s21 
Analysis along these lines also may rescue courts providing broader 
protection of individual rights from the charge that t heir d ecisions have 
been purely ad hoc, result-oriented and without theoretic justification.322 
On the contrary, it provides principled bases both for vindicating rights 
320. See infra notes 334-42 and accompanying text. 
321 . See, e.g., G�ennon & Nowack, supra note 6; Margulies, supra note 22, at 732-38; Note, Four Alternatives, supra note 54, at 608- 1 2. 
322. See, e.g., Hudnut, supra note 22, at 95; Simon, supra note 22, at 306-07, 3 1 3- 14. 
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and, equally important, for limiting the reach of state constitutions short of 
some potential applications. By identifying the autonomy interests of 
individuals as a central limit on the applicability of constitutional rights, it 
provides a principled reason why those guarantees should control the 
activities of some private entities but not others.323 By focusing the 
decisionmaker's attention on such factors a s  the nature of the rights 
allegedly infringed, the d egree of infrin gement and the competing i nterests 
of the private defendant, such an analysis at l east provides a rational basis 
for litigants to argue, and courts to j ustify, conclusions as to whether and 
why one case should differ from another in its results. 
Any system depending in part on a balancing of competing interests 
will never yield wholly predictable or determi nate results. Courts applying 
such tests may find it difficult to articulate reasons why the balance is 
struck differently in different cases, or they may be tempted to disguise 
personal value choices in the weight they give various elements . Nonethe­
less, such problems are not different in kind than those afflicting balancing 
tests in other areas, and presumably can be h andled through the good faith 
of judges and litigants. As experience is gained, generally agreed results 
will likely emerge for certain classes of cases.324 
In comparison, the state action doctrine, as defined by the Burger 
Court and followed by some state courts, is a less satisfactory method of 
limiting the reach of state constitutional rights guarantees. As many critics 
have pointed out, that approach has proven difficult to justify conceptually 
and impossible to apply consistently, 325 and does not adequately r esolve the 
tensions between liberty and security of right that are inherent in our 
traditional theory of rights.326 Moreover, under current federal formula­
tions, application of the state action doctrine has resulted in obvious 
323. The need for such a stopping place on the slippery slope is evident. During the oral 
argument in Alderwood, counsel for the petitioners was driven to concede t�at: "[I]f a 
private person's home was on the busiest corner of the city and hence the best available place from which to gather signatures, the collector's alleged constitutional right would compel 
the homeowner to allow a card table to be set up on the front lawn." Comment, supra note 
49, at 98. Such an absolute approach to state constitutional rights would seriously infringe 
the rights of individuals. Id. 
324. See supra notes 290-9 1 and accompanying text. .. . ,, 
325. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1 688-98 ;  Black, Foreword: State Action, 
Equal Protection and California 's Proposition 14, 8 1  HARV. L. REV. 69, 84-91 ( 1 967); 
Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 1 30 .
u. 
PA. L. REv. 1 296 ( 1 982);  Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action 
Doctrine, 28 Sr. Louis U.L.J. 683, 733-37 ( 1984); Thompson, Piercing the Veil ofS�ate 
Action: The Revisionist Theory and a Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession, 
1977 Wis. L. REv. 1 ,  1 9-21 .  
326. Skover, supra note 3 ,  at  260-75 .  
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functional anomalies, where the decision whether constitutional rights will 
be vindicated has li ttle relation to any rational valuation of the competing 
interests at stake or the real world impact of the conduct under scrutiny.327 
It is certainly no novel insight to point out that the United States 
Supreme Court has not interpreted the state action doctrine with much 
consistency over the years, or that the doctrine as presently interpreted has 
substantially narrowed the number a nd kind of entities that will be 
considered state actors. While the Court at one time took an expansive 
view, developing a number of rationales by which private entities could be 
sufficiently related to or dependent on the government to be required to 
respect the constitutional rights of others, 328 the trend s ince 1 972  has been 
to restrict the reach of federal constitutional rights by more strictly 
interpreting the requirements for a finding of state a ction. 329 To be sure, 
327. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REv . 503, 519-
35, 550-56 ( 1 985); Horowitz, The Misleading Search For "State Action " Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 ( l  957); Van Alstyne & Karst, State 
Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 6-7 ( 1 96 1 ) .  
328. One such rationale, the "public function" doctrine, posited that when a private 
entity effectively supplants the state as a provider of services and opportunities, that private 
entity must respect individual rights that relate to that service or opportunity. Amalga­
mated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 ( 1 968) (privately 
owned shopping center that had effectively replaced the traditional "downtown" as a public 
gathering place required to permit first amendment activities on its premises); Evans v. 
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 -02 ( 1 966) (municipal park could not be run on a segregated 
basis even if it were privately owned) ;  Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.  461 ( 1 953) (private 
political "club" that effectively controlled the local political process could not discriminate 
on the basis of race); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 50 1 ( 1946) (private owners of a company 
town required to respect the first amendment interests of residents and visitors). 
Alternatively, where the private entity was not performing any public function, a 
federal constitutional violation could be found if there was a sufficiently close connection 
between the private actor and some government body or official. This connection could take 
the form of official enforcement, authorization or encouragement of the private party's 
unconstitutional action. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 ( 1 967) (state 
constitutional amendment purporting to permit private racial discrimination held to 
officially "encourage" otherwise private discrimination and thereby create state action); 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l ( 1 948)  (court injunction enforcing private racially 
restrictive covenant constitutes "state action" in violation of the fourteenth amendment). 
The connection also coul� form a 
_
sufficiently close "nexus" or degree of "entanglement" 
between the challenged pnva te action and some government rule or official. Gilmore v. City 
of Montgomery, 4 1 7  U.S. 556 ( 1 974) (sufficient government entanglement where segre­
gated school was. granted temporary, exclusive use of public recreational facilities); Norwood v. Hamson, 4 13  U.�. 455 ( 1 9
_
7�) (sufficient government entanglement where 
se�re�ated school. was effectively subs1d1zed by provision of free books); Burton v. 
W!lmmgto� _
Parking Auth., 365 U.S . . 7 1  � ( 1 96 1 )  (government "entanglement" with private act1V1ty held adequate for apphcat1on of federal constitutional restrictions to a 
priva�e �esta_uranteur �hose �tablishment existed on the property o f  and was in economic 
symb1os1s with a pubhc parking garage). 
329. Since 1 972, the Court has redefined the "public function" doctrine to include 
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where the federal constitutional violation occurred at the hands of a 
government employee acting in an official capacity,330 or where a state 
official acts in concert with or provides "overt significant assistance" to the 
private defendant, 331 government action will still be found and federal 
constitutional rights vi ndicated. However, in two recent cases the Court 
has again held large and powerful quasi-private entities generally free 
from federal constitutional restraints, despite what was in both cases a 
significant degree of government support of and involvement in their 
activities. 331 
Such vaci llation i n  the definition of the state action doctrine is rooted 
only those few entities that provide services or wield powers "traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the State" or "traditionally associated with sovereignty." Jackson v. Metropoli­
tan Edison Co., 4 1 9  U.S. 345,  352-53 ( 1 974).  See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 ( 1987) (quoting Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, 457 U.S. 8 30, 840 ( 1 982)) (government action will be found only if "the challenged 
entity performs functions that have been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative' " of the 
government) (emphasis in original) . · 
The Court has similarly redefined the degree of state "encouragement" of or 
"entanglement" with private conduct necessary to engender constitutional scrutiny. To 
state a federal constitutional claim on this basis the plaintiff must show that the state is 
"responsible," because of its exercise of coercive power or other significant encouragement, 
for the "specific conduct" constituting the complaint. See, e.g. , Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991, 1004 (1982);  Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 ( 1972).  Mere approval or 
acquiescence by the state in decisions independently reached by private parties is 
insufficient. 
330. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 ( l  988) .  But see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 3 1 2  
(1981) (public defender under contract with local government to provide indigent legal 
services is not a government actor because, inter alia, the attorney acts as an adversary to, 
not an agent of, the state during the performance of his professional services). 
33 1 .  Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v .  Pope, 485 U.S. 478 ( 1 988)  (intimate 
involvement of state probate court in triggering a statutory time bar for claims against an 
estate constituted sufficient "government action" to require affording due process protec­
tions to creditors of the estate). See also Lugar v .  Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.  922 (1982) 
(tosameeffect). Cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 5 16 (1982) (mere existence and private 
use of a state statute barring claims in certain circumstances did not constitute sufficient 
government involvement to require due process protections for cre?itors); Fl.agg Bros. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 1 49 ( 1 978)  (private creditor using self help remedies authorized by state 
law was not required to comport with any constitutional standards of due process) . . 
332. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v .  Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 1 79 ( 1 988)  (NC�A is 
not a government actor despite its composition as an organization of state as well as pnv�te 
universities, the Association's coercive power over member schoo!s, �nd t�e �ffective 
cooperation between the NCAA and the University of Neva�a m mvesll�atmg and 
imposing sanctions on the plaintiff); San Francisco Arts & Athlell�s, Inc. v. ymte? States 
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 ( 1 987) (United States Olymp�c Committee is n�t a 
government actor despite its creation by federal law, ext�ns1ve �e�.eral regul�t1on, statutorily granted exclusive control of the use of the word Olympic and associated 
symbols, standby public financing, and role representing the nation in international athletic 
organizations) . 
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in the inescapable reality that governments and laws pervasively regulate 
private as well as public relationships in society. G overnments always 
decide, through law, which actions will  be required, permitted or forbid­
den. A private party can infringe the rights of a nother only if the 
government, in its capacity as the author and enforcer of laws regulating 
private interactions, constructs the legal  system to permit such action by 
that private party. The government is i n  this sense a s  responsible for the 
private infringements permitted a s  it is for the infringements directly 
commanded.333 Thus, any court seeking to base a conceptually consistent 
set of constitutional limits on the state action concept is presented with a 
Hobson's choice. A court can admit that state action is u biqui tous and that 
constitutional rights potentially apply universally, or it can reformulate the 
doctrine to impose essentially arbitrary restrictions on the part icular types 
of relations between the government and the infringement that are 
sufficient to trigger application of constitutional rights. 
The United States Supreme Court and some state courts are commit­
ted to using the state action doctrine to create a conceptual distinction 
between cases where constitutional rights are opera tive and cases where 
they are not . As a result, they have had to redefine the state action doctrine 
to impose l imits on the kinds of state involvement with private activity that 
will satisfy the requirement. As defined by the Suprem e  Court, the state 
action concept no longer involves an inquiry into the relationship between 
the questioned private activity and the matrix of  state power that 
333. This point has been raised repeatedly in academic literature. See Brest, supra 
note 325, at 1 3 1 5-22; Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function" and 
"Power Theory" Approaches, 1 979 WASH. U.L.Q. 757, 760; Glennon & Nowack, supra 
note 6, at 229-30; Horowitz, supra note 327, at 209. 
On the federal level, the argument that governments have a constitutional obligation to 
act to insure the re�lization of rights has never prevailed. On the contrary, the Supreme 
Co��t recently remmded us that the Constitution imposes no affirmative obligation on the 
pol.1ti�a� branches of government to take positive action to support the constitutional rights of md!Vl�uals, even wh�re such aid or action "may be necessary to secure life, liberty or 
property mte�ests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." Webster 
v . . Reproductive Health ,Servs. ,  109 S.  Ct. 3040, 305 1 { 1 989) (quoting DeShaney v. Wm�eba.go County �ep t of Social Servs., 1 09 S. Ct. 998, 100 3  ( 1 989)) . On the state constitutional level, m contrast, the issue is less clear. 
Regardless .of t�e merits of such arguments, however, the thesis presented here is not �ased on any obhg� tion �n the part ?f non-judicial  governmental authorities to affirmatively mtervene when private rights confhct. Rather, the argument is tha t  the government always sets the rules of �he game, and so i� responsible for the results tha t  those rules foreseeably engender. Thus, �nsofa.r as state action theory posits a class of infringements of rights where the �overnment is not mvo�ved and bears no responsibility, it is an  incorrect description of reahty. See Southcenter Jomt Venture v. National DemocraticPol'y Comm 1 1 3 Wash 2d 413, 459-60, 780 P.2d 1282, 1305-06 ( 1 989) ( Utter, J., concurring). " 
. 
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authorizes that private activity.334 Rather, it involves separate and 
narrower questions: w hether some government rule mandated the alleged 
violation; whether a government officia l  actively willed or carried out the 
alleged violation; or, alternatively, whether the power wielded by the 
allegedly private infringer is "exclusively" committed to the govern­
ment.836 Certainly some distinction may exist between government action 
or inaction that directly violates rights and that merely permits violations 
of rights by others. H owever, the difference inheres in only the manner and 
degree to which state officials directly participate in the violation, not in 
any clear distinction between whether state power is involved as a 
background element of that violation. Similarly, while a conceptual 
distinction may exist in principle between those activities conceded to be 
"traditionally" or "exclusively" governmental and other activities that are 
not, the line between the two is hazy a t  best and has further blurred over 
time.899 · 
This shift of analytic focus from broadly defined state action to narrow 
concepts involving state officials and "exclusive" state fonctions has 
exacerbated two fundamental problems for the position that the state 
action doctrine is an appropriate mechanism to limit application of 
constitutional rights . First, to the extent that the existence of state action 
turns on the existence and actions of state officials, the determination of 
whether constitutional protections apply will  necessaril y  depend on inci­
dental facts in what are otherwise functionally identical cases. For 
example, assume a statutory scheme regulating self-help by commercial 
creditors or providing for the extinguishment of claims among private 
parties. If this scheme happens to require a state official to perform even a 
purely ministerial act, state action wil l  be found and constitutional rights 
will apply.337 I f  the same result is achieved through a statutory scheme 
334. See Phillips, supra note 3 25, at 7 1 9  (noting that the Supreme Court's r�cent 
cases did not consider the relations between the government and the allegedly private 
infringer cumulatively; rather, each contact was examined separately and sequentially). 
See also Brest, supra note 325, at 1 3 1 5-23 (arguing that the matrix of st�te power that 
supports the creditor's actions is no different in Sniadach, where state action was found, 
than in Flagg Bros., where it was not). 
335. See supra note 329. . 
336. For example, mail delivery and pris�n .oper�tions were once ��elusive a
nd 
traditional functions of government. Today, mall is d�hvered by th� sem1-mdependent 
United States Postal Service and by a host of purely private corporations. Movements to 




other functions once performed entirely by pnvate entities - such �s prov1dmg chanty 
for the poor or operating bridges - now are performed almost entuely by governments: 
337.  Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. ,  Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487 ( 1988), 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 ( 1 982) . 
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omitting the ministerial act or otherwise making the deprivation self­
operative, state action will not be presen t  and constitutional rights will not 
apply.338 As even so staunch an opponent of the expansion of constitutional 
rights as Justice Rehnquist has pointed out, such a dist inction makes no 
sense.339 
Second, adherence to a state action requirement, narrowly defined, 
significantly limits the effective constitutional protection of individual 
rights. The category of government fun ctions sufficiently .. traditional" and 
"exclusive" for finding state action u nder current federal definitions is 
small. 340 Under both lines of a nalysis, the state act ion doctrine has 
rendered courts unable to vindicate basic rights in some ci rcumstances 
where intuition and equity dictate otherwise.30 
These difficulties cannot be resolved simply by broadening the 
definition of state action for state constitutional purposes . 342 First, there is 
little theoretic reason to suppose that the content of the state action concept 
- assuming that such a requirement were to be imported into state 
constitutions at all - should systematically differ depending on whether a 
state or the federal constitution is at i ssue. Such differences do not, for 
example, appear to be supported by considerations of  federalism or other 
criteria of the sort usually relied upon to justify state divergence from 
federal precedent. 343 
338. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 5 1 6  ( 1 982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 
(1 978). 
339. 485 U.S. at 492-94 (Rehnquist, C.J. ,  dissenting) . 
340. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 3 3 3 ,  at 778-80 (noting that schools, recreational 
parks, and public services would not fit within the current federal definition of "public 
function"). 
34 1 .  The results reached under the current federal definition of state action have, at 
one time or another, offended the perceptions of most of the Justices themselves. See, e.g., 
�ation�I �o�legiate Athl.etic Ass'n v .  Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 1 79 ( 1 988) (White, J., d1ssen�mg, JOmed b;Y Justices Brennan, Marshall & O'Connor); San Francisco Arts & 
�thletI
_
cs, I�c: v. United St�tes Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 548-7 3  ( 1 987) (Brennan, J., d1ssentmg, JOtned by Justice Marshall and, in relevant part, by Justices O'Connor and ��ackmun); F�agg Bros. v. Brooks •
. 
436 U.S. 1 49, 1 66-79 ( 1 978) (Marshall, J., dissenting, JO�n.e<! by Justices Stevens and White) . They also have engendered considerable academic cnt1c1sm. See supra notes 325 & 327. Most disturbing are the results in San Francisco Arts 
&
. 
At.h/etics and Natir;m'!I Cof legiate Athletic Association, where entities capable of w1eldmg great power w1thm their respec�ive .spheres - power that was delegated in part by govern�ents -:- ��re held to have const1tutional obligations no different than those of the most pnvate md1v1dual. 
3�2 .
. 
seecas�s cited supranotes 82-92, 1 3 8-49 & 1 18-92 . See also Note, "Malling" of Constztutwnal Rights, supra note 22 at 1 20-25 (proposing a loo d · f th " bl' f · " . ' sene version o e pu 1c unction strand of state action analysis that would includ h · t " t t t " c . . e s oppmg cen ers as s a e ac ors ior state const1tut1onal purposes). 
343. See generally Comment, Interpreting the State Constitution: A Survey and 
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Second, courts that have retained state action requirements in 
broadened form have found that this a pproach also l eads to arbitrary 
distinctions between functionally similar cases. For example, several 
courts rejected federal analyses and constructed a broad definition of state 
action in state due process challenges to creditors' self-help remedies by 
distinguishing statutes that expand common law remedies from those that 
merely codify pre-existing common law. The rationale for this distinction is 
that the former class of remedies involve "state action" because the remedy 
was created by the legislature's affirmative act.30 In contrast, remedies 
that do not alter common law, although codified, are not viewed as created 
by the legislature, and therefore do not involve state action.346 The 
distinction proved useful to courts that wanted to expand the application of 
state due process protections without abandoning the state action doctrine 
entirely,14' and was one of the grounds.relied upon by the New York Court 
of Appeals to derive the "flexible" a pproach to state action announced in 
Sharrock.a." 
Such distinctions between remedies rooted in a state's common law 
tradition and those created or modified by statute are, however, no less 
arbitrary than the d istinctions drawn in federal state action cases. The 
precise contours of common law creditors' rights varies from state to state. 
Thus, such a distinction may lead to anomalous results because identical 
remedies used i n  identical circumstances could be subject to constitutional 
restraint in one state, but not in another, depending upon how and when the 
remedy entered each state's j urisprudence. 348 Furthermore, such a distinc-
Assessment of Current Methodology, 3 5  U .  KAN. L .  REV. 593, 604- 1 1 ( 1 987) (discuss_ing 
various factors state courts have relied on to justify divergence from federal precedent) . But 
see Williams, supra note 275, at 389-402 (arguing that state constitutional interpretation 
can be wholly independent of federal precedent and that divergence needs no justification) .  
344. See, e.g., Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 1 7  Cal. 3d 803,  8 1 4- 1 6, 553 P.2d 
637, 644-46, 1 3 2  Cal. Rptr 477, 484-86 ( 1 976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1056 ( 1 977) 
(mechanic's lien and stop notice); Adams v.  Department of Motor V chicles, 1 1  Cal. 3d 1 46, 
153 n.1 3, 520 P.2d 96 1 ,  965 n. 1 3 ,  1 1 3  Cal. Rptr. 1 45,  149 n. 1 3  ( 1 974) (garageman's lien 
and sale). 
345. See, e.g., Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 1 Cal. 3d 3 52, 359, 5 2 1  P.2d 441 , 444-�5, 
113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 452-53 ( 1 974); USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung v. Cousins 
Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 1 1 ,  1 5- 1 6, 348 N .E.2d 8 3 1 ,  8 3 2-33 ( 1 976); National Airport Corp. _
v. 
Wayne Bank, 7 3  Mich. App. 572, 575-78, 2 5 2  N .W.2d 5 1 9, 521 -22 ( l  977); Jefferds v. Elhs, 
132A.D.2d 3 2 1 ,  522 N.Y.S.2d 398 ( 1 987),  appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 1 002, 521 N.E.2d 
445, 526 N.Y.S.2d 438 ( 1 988).  · 
346. See, e.g .• Martin v. Heady, 1 0 3  Cal. App. 3d 580, 587, 1 63 Cal. Rptr. 1 1 7, 1 2 1  
(1980). See supra note 1 9 1 .  
347. Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 4 5  N .Y.2d 1 52, 1 6 1 -62; 379 N.E.2d 1 1 69, 
1 1 74-75, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 45 ( 1 978). 
348. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v.  Brooks, 436 U .S. 1 49, 1 62-�� � 1 978);  Burke & Reber, 
supra note 1 50, at 46-47.  Louisiana draws its private law from ctvlhan, rather than comm
on 
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tion errs i n  that it  regards statutes and case law as fundamentally different 
for state action purposes. Although there are differences between legisla­
tors and judges, when they act i n  t heir official capacities, it is on behalf of 
the state. All law is a creature of the state, rega rdless of the creator's official 
title. Thus, whether a private party who benefits from that law becomes 
imbued with state action should not d epend upon which type of official 
made the law.3"9 
Other cases attempting to formulate an expansive definition of state 
action provide similar potential for a rbitrary distinctions. In Jones v. 
Memorial Hospital System,300 Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific 
Telephone and Telegraph Co.301 a nd Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 
/nc.,s02 the Texas, California and New York courts based their respective 
conclusions that their broader standards of  state action were met on a series 
of inquiries into the relations between the alleged infringer and various 
levels of government. All three purported to be close cases, such that any 
change in the degree of the relationship could change the result. Thus, 
minor differences i n  the relationship between the infringer and the state 
may create arbitrary differences i n  results, despite the irrelevance of the 
relationship to the · nature of the rights at issue. 
This is the fundamental problem. Any "state action" requirement, no 
matter how defined, will prove unsatisfactory because b y  definition it must 
divert attention away from real issues, such as the nature of the contending 
parties or conflicting rights, and focus attention instead on whether the 
requisite relationship between the government and the private party 
exists.363 
V. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, the scope of state constitutional righ ts guarantees must 
be limit�d. Traditionally, such l i mits developed through the concept of 
state action. State guarantees were construed like their federal counter­
parts to prohibit only actions by state officials or by a l imited class of private 
law so�rces, therefore, this analys�s might requ!re courts to consider virtually all creditors' remedies as created by st��e a�tton, an� subject to the full rigor of state due process, regardless of the countervailing interests mvolved in particular cases. See Comment supra note 150. • 
· 349. Cf Adi�kes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 1 44, 1 69-7 1  ( 1 970) (state action can be found on the basis of mere custom having the de facto force of law) 350. 746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 988) .  See supra notes 8 3�8 8  3 5 1 .  24 Cal. 3 d  458, 595 P.2d 592, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. 1 4  ( 1 979). See supra 
.
notes 1 38-48. 352. 45 N .Y.2d 1 52, 379 N.E.2d 1 1 69,  408 N.Y.S.2d 39 ( 1 97 8 ) .  See supra notes 1 78-89. 
353. See Skover, supra note 3, at 272. 
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entities acting in concert with or in place of the government. But, while 
there are exceptions, the language a nd drafting history of most state rights 
guarantees are sufficiently indeterminate to permit alternative 
interpretations. 
Despite these possibilities, the recent trend of decisions and commen­
tary has tended to reaffirm the need for state action limits on state 
constitutional rights. Three rationales for this reaffirmation are prominent: 
l) that the received American constitutional interpretation requires 
resolving ambiguities in favor of binding only government actors; 2) that 
construing constitutional rights guarantees to limit private parties imper­
missibly infringes on those actors' competing rights; and 3) that applying 
constitutiona l  norms to private d isputes usurps the primary role of 
legislatures to regulate private parties. 
These arguments constitute powerful reasons for developing princi­
pled means to limit the application of state constitutional rights. However, 
they do not demonstrate that such limits should be cast in  terms of state 
action. On the contrary, the asserted principle that state constitutions do 
not bind private parties rests upon s harp d istinctions between private and 
public law, which would have been foreign to the original constitutional 
drafters, and have never been rigidly a pplied. Moreover, the goals of 
preserving individual autonomy, avoiding undue sacrifices between com­
peting rights and securing the legitimate role of state legislatures can be 
better achieved by analyzing these factors directly, rather than focusing on 
a single inquiry into whether the infringing party is somehow connected to 
the government. 
Alternative limits on the reach of state constitutional rights can be 
constructed and would more closely track the historical, individual and 
structural interests at  stake. This article proposes a t hree-step process 
involving: first, a threshold determination of whether the alleged infringer 
was an individual acting within a s phere o f  personal autonomy; second, a 
prima facie showing by the complainant that an important right was 
significantly infringed by the defendant; and third, a balancing of the 
parties' competing i nterests on the merits. Such alternative limiting 
principles would provide workable boundaries that are preferable to limits 
based solely on state action concepts. U nlike state action t heories, this 
analysis would not require state courts to accept or reject the federal 
definition of "state action;" nor would it require courts to draw arbitrary 
lines among the myriad ways in which the matrix of law and government 
regulates private activity. By focusing a ttention on the parties and the 
rights at stake, the proposed process would enable courts to protect 
individual rights from a broader range of infringements as well as promote 
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the development o f  a consistent and convincing theory regarding why and 
under what circumstances i ndividual rights should be vindicated. 
